Porting Guide ============= Introduction ------------ Porting Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) to a new platform involves making some mandatory and optional modifications for both the cold and warm boot paths. Modifications consist of: - Implementing a platform-specific function or variable, - Setting up the execution context in a certain way, or - Defining certain constants (for example #defines). The platform-specific functions and variables are declared in ``include/plat/common/platform.h``. The firmware provides a default implementation of variables and functions to fulfill the optional requirements in order to ease the porting effort. Each platform port can use them as is or provide their own implementation if the default implementation is inadequate. .. note:: TF-A historically provided default implementations of platform interfaces as *weak* functions. This practice is now discouraged and new platform interfaces as they get introduced in the code base should be *strongly* defined. We intend to convert existing weak functions over time. Until then, you will find references to *weak* functions in this document. Please review the :ref:`Threat Model` documents as part of the porting effort. Some platform interfaces play a key role in mitigating against some of the threats. Failing to fulfill these expectations could undermine the security guarantees offered by TF-A. These platform responsibilities are highlighted in the threat assessment section, under the "`Mitigations implemented?`" box for each threat. Some modifications are common to all Boot Loader (BL) stages. Section 2 discusses these in detail. The subsequent sections discuss the remaining modifications for each BL stage in detail. Please refer to the :ref:`Platform Ports Policy` for the policy regarding compatibility and deprecation of these porting interfaces. Only Arm development platforms (such as FVP and Juno) may use the functions/definitions in ``include/plat/arm/common/`` and the corresponding source files in ``plat/arm/common/``. This is done so that there are no dependencies between platforms maintained by different people/companies. If you want to use any of the functionality present in ``plat/arm`` files, please propose a patch that moves the code to ``plat/common`` so that it can be discussed. Common modifications -------------------- This section covers the modifications that should be made by the platform for each BL stage to correctly port the firmware stack. They are categorized as either mandatory or optional. Common mandatory modifications ------------------------------ A platform port must enable the Memory Management Unit (MMU) as well as the instruction and data caches for each BL stage. Setting up the translation tables is the responsibility of the platform port because memory maps differ across platforms. A memory translation library (see ``lib/xlat_tables_v2/``) is provided to help in this setup. Note that although this library supports non-identity mappings, this is intended only for re-mapping peripheral physical addresses and allows platforms with high I/O addresses to reduce their virtual address space. All other addresses corresponding to code and data must currently use an identity mapping. Also, the only translation granule size supported in TF-A is 4KB, as various parts of the code assume that is the case. It is not possible to switch to 16 KB or 64 KB granule sizes at the moment. In Arm standard platforms, each BL stage configures the MMU in the platform-specific architecture setup function, ``blX_plat_arch_setup()``, and uses an identity mapping for all addresses. If the build option ``USE_COHERENT_MEM`` is enabled, each platform can allocate a block of identity mapped secure memory with Device-nGnRE attributes aligned to page boundary (4K) for each BL stage. All sections which allocate coherent memory are grouped under ``.coherent_ram``. For ex: Bakery locks are placed in a section identified by name ``.bakery_lock`` inside ``.coherent_ram`` so that its possible for the firmware to place variables in it using the following C code directive: :: __section(".bakery_lock") Or alternatively the following assembler code directive: :: .section .bakery_lock The ``.coherent_ram`` section is a sum of all sections like ``.bakery_lock`` which are used to allocate any data structures that are accessed both when a CPU is executing with its MMU and caches enabled, and when it's running with its MMU and caches disabled. Examples are given below. The following variables, functions and constants must be defined by the platform for the firmware to work correctly. .. _platform_def_mandatory: File : platform_def.h [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Each platform must ensure that a header file of this name is in the system include path with the following constants defined. This will require updating the list of ``PLAT_INCLUDES`` in the ``platform.mk`` file. Platform ports may optionally use the file ``include/plat/common/common_def.h``, which provides typical values for some of the constants below. These values are likely to be suitable for all platform ports. - **#define : PLATFORM_LINKER_FORMAT** Defines the linker format used by the platform, for example ``elf64-littleaarch64``. - **#define : PLATFORM_LINKER_ARCH** Defines the processor architecture for the linker by the platform, for example ``aarch64``. - **#define : PLATFORM_STACK_SIZE** Defines the normal stack memory available to each CPU. This constant is used by ``plat/common/aarch64/platform_mp_stack.S`` and ``plat/common/aarch64/platform_up_stack.S``. - **#define : CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE** Defines the size in bytes of the largest cache line across all the cache levels in the platform. - **#define : FIRMWARE_WELCOME_STR** Defines the character string printed by BL1 upon entry into the ``bl1_main()`` function. - **#define : PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT** Defines the total number of CPUs implemented by the platform across all clusters in the system. - **#define : PLAT_NUM_PWR_DOMAINS** Defines the total number of nodes in the power domain topology tree at all the power domain levels used by the platform. This macro is used by the PSCI implementation to allocate data structures to represent power domain topology. - **#define : PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL** Defines the maximum power domain level that the power management operations should apply to. More often, but not always, the power domain level corresponds to affinity level. This macro allows the PSCI implementation to know the highest power domain level that it should consider for power management operations in the system that the platform implements. For example, the Base AEM FVP implements two clusters with a configurable number of CPUs and it reports the maximum power domain level as 1. - **#define : PLAT_MAX_OFF_STATE** Defines the local power state corresponding to the deepest power down possible at every power domain level in the platform. The local power states for each level may be sparsely allocated between 0 and this value with 0 being reserved for the RUN state. The PSCI implementation uses this value to initialize the local power states of the power domain nodes and to specify the requested power state for a PSCI_CPU_OFF call. - **#define : PLAT_MAX_RET_STATE** Defines the local power state corresponding to the deepest retention state possible at every power domain level in the platform. This macro should be a value less than PLAT_MAX_OFF_STATE and greater than 0. It is used by the PSCI implementation to distinguish between retention and power down local power states within PSCI_CPU_SUSPEND call. - **#define : PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL_STATES** Defines the maximum number of local power states per power domain level that the platform supports. The default value of this macro is 2 since most platforms just support a maximum of two local power states at each power domain level (power-down and retention). If the platform needs to account for more local power states, then it must redefine this macro. Currently, this macro is used by the Generic PSCI implementation to size the array used for PSCI_STAT_COUNT/RESIDENCY accounting. - **#define : BL1_RO_BASE** Defines the base address in secure ROM where BL1 originally lives. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. - **#define : BL1_RO_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address in secure ROM that BL1's actual content (i.e. excluding any data section allocated at runtime) can occupy. - **#define : BL1_RW_BASE** Defines the base address in secure RAM where BL1's read-write data will live at runtime. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. - **#define : BL1_RW_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address in secure RAM that BL1's read-write data can occupy at runtime. - **#define : BL2_BASE** Defines the base address in secure RAM where BL1 loads the BL2 binary image. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. This constant is not applicable when BL2_IN_XIP_MEM is set to '1'. - **#define : BL2_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address in secure RAM that the BL2 image can occupy. This constant is not applicable when BL2_IN_XIP_MEM is set to '1'. - **#define : BL2_RO_BASE** Defines the base address in secure XIP memory where BL2 RO section originally lives. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. This constant is only needed when BL2_IN_XIP_MEM is set to '1'. - **#define : BL2_RO_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address in secure XIP memory that BL2's actual content (i.e. excluding any data section allocated at runtime) can occupy. This constant is only needed when BL2_IN_XIP_MEM is set to '1'. - **#define : BL2_RW_BASE** Defines the base address in secure RAM where BL2's read-write data will live at runtime. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. This constant is only needed when BL2_IN_XIP_MEM is set to '1'. - **#define : BL2_RW_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address in secure RAM that BL2's read-write data can occupy at runtime. This constant is only needed when BL2_IN_XIP_MEM is set to '1'. - **#define : BL31_BASE** Defines the base address in secure RAM where BL2 loads the BL31 binary image. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. - **#define : BL31_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address in secure RAM that the BL31 image can occupy. - **#define : PLAT_RSS_COMMS_PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE** Defines the maximum message size between AP and RSS. Need to define if platform supports RSS. For every image, the platform must define individual identifiers that will be used by BL1 or BL2 to load the corresponding image into memory from non-volatile storage. For the sake of performance, integer numbers will be used as identifiers. The platform will use those identifiers to return the relevant information about the image to be loaded (file handler, load address, authentication information, etc.). The following image identifiers are mandatory: - **#define : BL2_IMAGE_ID** BL2 image identifier, used by BL1 to load BL2. - **#define : BL31_IMAGE_ID** BL31 image identifier, used by BL2 to load BL31. - **#define : BL33_IMAGE_ID** BL33 image identifier, used by BL2 to load BL33. If Trusted Board Boot is enabled, the following certificate identifiers must also be defined: - **#define : TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_CERT_ID** BL2 content certificate identifier, used by BL1 to load the BL2 content certificate. - **#define : TRUSTED_KEY_CERT_ID** Trusted key certificate identifier, used by BL2 to load the trusted key certificate. - **#define : SOC_FW_KEY_CERT_ID** BL31 key certificate identifier, used by BL2 to load the BL31 key certificate. - **#define : SOC_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID** BL31 content certificate identifier, used by BL2 to load the BL31 content certificate. - **#define : NON_TRUSTED_FW_KEY_CERT_ID** BL33 key certificate identifier, used by BL2 to load the BL33 key certificate. - **#define : NON_TRUSTED_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID** BL33 content certificate identifier, used by BL2 to load the BL33 content certificate. - **#define : FWU_CERT_ID** Firmware Update (FWU) certificate identifier, used by NS_BL1U to load the FWU content certificate. - **#define : PLAT_CRYPTOCELL_BASE** This defines the base address of Arm® TrustZone® CryptoCell and must be defined if CryptoCell crypto driver is used for Trusted Board Boot. For capable Arm platforms, this driver is used if ``ARM_CRYPTOCELL_INTEG`` is set. If the AP Firmware Updater Configuration image, BL2U is used, the following must also be defined: - **#define : BL2U_BASE** Defines the base address in secure memory where BL1 copies the BL2U binary image. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. - **#define : BL2U_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address in secure memory that the BL2U image can occupy. - **#define : BL2U_IMAGE_ID** BL2U image identifier, used by BL1 to fetch an image descriptor corresponding to BL2U. If the SCP Firmware Update Configuration Image, SCP_BL2U is used, the following must also be defined: - **#define : SCP_BL2U_IMAGE_ID** SCP_BL2U image identifier, used by BL1 to fetch an image descriptor corresponding to SCP_BL2U. .. note:: TF-A does not provide source code for this image. If the Non-Secure Firmware Updater ROM, NS_BL1U is used, the following must also be defined: - **#define : NS_BL1U_BASE** Defines the base address in non-secure ROM where NS_BL1U executes. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. .. note:: TF-A does not provide source code for this image. - **#define : NS_BL1U_IMAGE_ID** NS_BL1U image identifier, used by BL1 to fetch an image descriptor corresponding to NS_BL1U. If the Non-Secure Firmware Updater, NS_BL2U is used, the following must also be defined: - **#define : NS_BL2U_BASE** Defines the base address in non-secure memory where NS_BL2U executes. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. .. note:: TF-A does not provide source code for this image. - **#define : NS_BL2U_IMAGE_ID** NS_BL2U image identifier, used by BL1 to fetch an image descriptor corresponding to NS_BL2U. For the the Firmware update capability of TRUSTED BOARD BOOT, the following macros may also be defined: - **#define : PLAT_FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES** Total number of images that can be loaded simultaneously. If the platform doesn't specify any value, it defaults to 10. If a SCP_BL2 image is supported by the platform, the following constants must also be defined: - **#define : SCP_BL2_IMAGE_ID** SCP_BL2 image identifier, used by BL2 to load SCP_BL2 into secure memory from platform storage before being transferred to the SCP. - **#define : SCP_FW_KEY_CERT_ID** SCP_BL2 key certificate identifier, used by BL2 to load the SCP_BL2 key certificate (mandatory when Trusted Board Boot is enabled). - **#define : SCP_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID** SCP_BL2 content certificate identifier, used by BL2 to load the SCP_BL2 content certificate (mandatory when Trusted Board Boot is enabled). If a BL32 image is supported by the platform, the following constants must also be defined: - **#define : BL32_IMAGE_ID** BL32 image identifier, used by BL2 to load BL32. - **#define : TRUSTED_OS_FW_KEY_CERT_ID** BL32 key certificate identifier, used by BL2 to load the BL32 key certificate (mandatory when Trusted Board Boot is enabled). - **#define : TRUSTED_OS_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID** BL32 content certificate identifier, used by BL2 to load the BL32 content certificate (mandatory when Trusted Board Boot is enabled). - **#define : BL32_BASE** Defines the base address in secure memory where BL2 loads the BL32 binary image. Must be aligned on a page-size boundary. - **#define : BL32_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address that the BL32 image can occupy. If the Test Secure-EL1 Payload (TSP) instantiation of BL32 is supported by the platform, the following constants must also be defined: - **#define : TSP_SEC_MEM_BASE** Defines the base address of the secure memory used by the TSP image on the platform. This must be at the same address or below ``BL32_BASE``. - **#define : TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE** Defines the size of the secure memory used by the BL32 image on the platform. ``TSP_SEC_MEM_BASE`` and ``TSP_SEC_MEM_SIZE`` must fully accommodate the memory required by the BL32 image, defined by ``BL32_BASE`` and ``BL32_LIMIT``. - **#define : TSP_IRQ_SEC_PHY_TIMER** Defines the ID of the secure physical generic timer interrupt used by the TSP's interrupt handling code. If the platform port uses the translation table library code, the following constants must also be defined: - **#define : PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC** Optional flag that can be set per-image to enable the dynamic allocation of regions even when the MMU is enabled. If not defined, only static functionality will be available, if defined and set to 1 it will also include the dynamic functionality. - **#define : MAX_XLAT_TABLES** Defines the maximum number of translation tables that are allocated by the translation table library code. To minimize the amount of runtime memory used, choose the smallest value needed to map the required virtual addresses for each BL stage. If ``PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC`` flag is enabled for a BL image, ``MAX_XLAT_TABLES`` must be defined to accommodate the dynamic regions as well. - **#define : MAX_MMAP_REGIONS** Defines the maximum number of regions that are allocated by the translation table library code. A region consists of physical base address, virtual base address, size and attributes (Device/Memory, RO/RW, Secure/Non-Secure), as defined in the ``mmap_region_t`` structure. The platform defines the regions that should be mapped. Then, the translation table library will create the corresponding tables and descriptors at runtime. To minimize the amount of runtime memory used, choose the smallest value needed to register the required regions for each BL stage. If ``PLAT_XLAT_TABLES_DYNAMIC`` flag is enabled for a BL image, ``MAX_MMAP_REGIONS`` must be defined to accommodate the dynamic regions as well. - **#define : PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE** Defines the total size of the virtual address space in bytes. For example, for a 32 bit virtual address space, this value should be ``(1ULL << 32)``. - **#define : PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE** Defines the total size of the physical address space in bytes. For example, for a 32 bit physical address space, this value should be ``(1ULL << 32)``. If the platform port uses the IO storage framework, the following constants must also be defined: - **#define : MAX_IO_DEVICES** Defines the maximum number of registered IO devices. Attempting to register more devices than this value using ``io_register_device()`` will fail with -ENOMEM. - **#define : MAX_IO_HANDLES** Defines the maximum number of open IO handles. Attempting to open more IO entities than this value using ``io_open()`` will fail with -ENOMEM. - **#define : MAX_IO_BLOCK_DEVICES** Defines the maximum number of registered IO block devices. Attempting to register more devices this value using ``io_dev_open()`` will fail with -ENOMEM. MAX_IO_BLOCK_DEVICES should be less than MAX_IO_DEVICES. With this macro, multiple block devices could be supported at the same time. If the platform needs to allocate data within the per-cpu data framework in BL31, it should define the following macro. Currently this is only required if the platform decides not to use the coherent memory section by undefining the ``USE_COHERENT_MEM`` build flag. In this case, the framework allocates the required memory within the the per-cpu data to minimize wastage. - **#define : PLAT_PCPU_DATA_SIZE** Defines the memory (in bytes) to be reserved within the per-cpu data structure for use by the platform layer. The following constants are optional. They should be defined when the platform memory layout implies some image overlaying like in Arm standard platforms. - **#define : BL31_PROGBITS_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address in secure RAM that the BL31's progbits sections can occupy. - **#define : TSP_PROGBITS_LIMIT** Defines the maximum address that the TSP's progbits sections can occupy. If the platform supports OS-initiated mode, i.e. the build option ``PSCI_OS_INIT_MODE`` is enabled, and if the platform's maximum power domain level for PSCI_CPU_SUSPEND differs from ``PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL``, the following constant must be defined. - **#define : PLAT_MAX_CPU_SUSPEND_PWR_LVL** Defines the maximum power domain level that PSCI_CPU_SUSPEND should apply to. If the platform port uses the PL061 GPIO driver, the following constant may optionally be defined: - **PLAT_PL061_MAX_GPIOS** Maximum number of GPIOs required by the platform. This allows control how much memory is allocated for PL061 GPIO controllers. The default value is #. $(eval $(call add_define,PLAT_PL061_MAX_GPIOS)) If the platform port uses the partition driver, the following constant may optionally be defined: - **PLAT_PARTITION_MAX_ENTRIES** Maximum number of partition entries required by the platform. This allows control how much memory is allocated for partition entries. The default value is 128. For example, define the build flag in ``platform.mk``: PLAT_PARTITION_MAX_ENTRIES := 12 $(eval $(call add_define,PLAT_PARTITION_MAX_ENTRIES)) - **PLAT_PARTITION_BLOCK_SIZE** The size of partition block. It could be either 512 bytes or 4096 bytes. The default value is 512. For example, define the build flag in ``platform.mk``: PLAT_PARTITION_BLOCK_SIZE := 4096 $(eval $(call add_define,PLAT_PARTITION_BLOCK_SIZE)) If the platform port uses the Arm® Ethos™-N NPU driver, the following configuration must be performed: - The NPU SiP service handler must be hooked up. This consists of both the initial setup (``ethosn_smc_setup``) and the handler itself (``ethosn_smc_handler``) If the platform port uses the Arm® Ethos™-N NPU driver with TZMP1 support enabled, the following constants and configuration must also be defined: - **ETHOSN_NPU_PROT_FW_NSAID** Defines the Non-secure Access IDentity (NSAID) that the NPU shall use to access the protected memory that contains the NPU's firmware. - **ETHOSN_NPU_PROT_DATA_RW_NSAID** Defines the Non-secure Access IDentity (NSAID) that the NPU shall use for read/write access to the protected memory that contains inference data. - **ETHOSN_NPU_PROT_DATA_RO_NSAID** Defines the Non-secure Access IDentity (NSAID) that the NPU shall use for read-only access to the protected memory that contains inference data. - **ETHOSN_NPU_NS_RW_DATA_NSAID** Defines the Non-secure Access IDentity (NSAID) that the NPU shall use for read/write access to the non-protected memory. - **ETHOSN_NPU_NS_RO_DATA_NSAID** Defines the Non-secure Access IDentity (NSAID) that the NPU shall use for read-only access to the non-protected memory. - **ETHOSN_NPU_FW_IMAGE_BASE** and **ETHOSN_NPU_FW_IMAGE_LIMIT** Defines the physical address range that the NPU's firmware will be loaded into and executed from. - Configure the platforms TrustZone Controller (TZC) with appropriate regions of protected memory. At minimum this must include a region for the NPU's firmware code and a region for protected inference data, and these must be accessible using the NSAIDs defined above. - Include the NPU firmware and certificates in the FIP. - Provide FCONF entries to configure the image source for the NPU firmware and certificates. - Add MMU mappings such that: - BL2 can write the NPU firmware into the region defined by ``ETHOSN_NPU_FW_IMAGE_BASE`` and ``ETHOSN_NPU_FW_IMAGE_LIMIT`` - BL31 (SiP service) can read the NPU firmware from the same region - Add the firmware image ID ``ETHOSN_NPU_FW_IMAGE_ID`` to the list of images loaded by BL2. Please see the reference implementation code for the Juno platform as an example. The following constant is optional. It should be defined to override the default behaviour of the ``assert()`` function (for example, to save memory). - **PLAT_LOG_LEVEL_ASSERT** If ``PLAT_LOG_LEVEL_ASSERT`` is higher or equal than ``LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE``, ``assert()`` prints the name of the file, the line number and the asserted expression. Else if it is higher than ``LOG_LEVEL_INFO``, it prints the file name and the line number. Else if it is lower than ``LOG_LEVEL_INFO``, it doesn't print anything to the console. If ``PLAT_LOG_LEVEL_ASSERT`` isn't defined, it defaults to ``LOG_LEVEL``. If the platform port uses the DRTM feature, the following constants must be defined: - **#define : PLAT_DRTM_EVENT_LOG_MAX_SIZE** Maximum Event Log size used by the platform. Platform can decide the maximum size of the Event Log buffer, depending upon the highest hash algorithm chosen and the number of components selected to measure during the DRTM execution flow. - **#define : PLAT_DRTM_MMAP_ENTRIES** Number of the MMAP entries used by the DRTM implementation to calculate the size of address map region of the platform. File : plat_macros.S [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Each platform must ensure a file of this name is in the system include path with the following macro defined. In the Arm development platforms, this file is found in ``plat/arm/board//include/plat_macros.S``. - **Macro : plat_crash_print_regs** This macro allows the crash reporting routine to print relevant platform registers in case of an unhandled exception in BL31. This aids in debugging and this macro can be defined to be empty in case register reporting is not desired. For instance, GIC or interconnect registers may be helpful for troubleshooting. Handling Reset -------------- BL1 by default implements the reset vector where execution starts from a cold or warm boot. BL31 can be optionally set as a reset vector using the ``RESET_TO_BL31`` make variable. For each CPU, the reset vector code is responsible for the following tasks: #. Distinguishing between a cold boot and a warm boot. #. In the case of a cold boot and the CPU being a secondary CPU, ensuring that the CPU is placed in a platform-specific state until the primary CPU performs the necessary steps to remove it from this state. #. In the case of a warm boot, ensuring that the CPU jumps to a platform- specific address in the BL31 image in the same processor mode as it was when released from reset. The following functions need to be implemented by the platform port to enable reset vector code to perform the above tasks. Function : plat_get_my_entrypoint() [mandatory when PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS == 0] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uintptr_t This function is called with the MMU and caches disabled (``SCTLR_EL3.M`` = 0 and ``SCTLR_EL3.C`` = 0). The function is responsible for distinguishing between a warm and cold reset for the current CPU using platform-specific means. If it's a warm reset, then it returns the warm reset entrypoint point provided to ``plat_setup_psci_ops()`` during BL31 initialization. If it's a cold reset then this function must return zero. This function does not follow the Procedure Call Standard used by the Application Binary Interface for the Arm 64-bit architecture. The caller should not assume that callee saved registers are preserved across a call to this function. This function fulfills requirement 1 and 3 listed above. Note that for platforms that support programming the reset address, it is expected that a CPU will start executing code directly at the right address, both on a cold and warm reset. In this case, there is no need to identify the type of reset nor to query the warm reset entrypoint. Therefore, implementing this function is not required on such platforms. Function : plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup() [mandatory when COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU == 0] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void This function is called with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is responsible for placing the executing secondary CPU in a platform-specific state until the primary CPU performs the necessary actions to bring it out of that state and allow entry into the OS. This function must not return. In the Arm FVP port, when using the normal boot flow, each secondary CPU powers itself off. The primary CPU is responsible for powering up the secondary CPUs when normal world software requires them. When booting an EL3 payload instead, they stay powered on and are put in a holding pen until their mailbox gets populated. This function fulfills requirement 2 above. Note that for platforms that can't release secondary CPUs out of reset, only the primary CPU will execute the cold boot code. Therefore, implementing this function is not required on such platforms. Function : plat_is_my_cpu_primary() [mandatory when COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU == 0] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : unsigned int This function identifies whether the current CPU is the primary CPU or a secondary CPU. A return value of zero indicates that the CPU is not the primary CPU, while a non-zero return value indicates that the CPU is the primary CPU. Note that for platforms that can't release secondary CPUs out of reset, only the primary CPU will execute the cold boot code. Therefore, there is no need to distinguish between primary and secondary CPUs and implementing this function is not required. Function : platform_mem_init() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function is called before any access to data is made by the firmware, in order to carry out any essential memory initialization. Function: plat_get_rotpk_info() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void *, void **, unsigned int *, unsigned int * Return : int This function is mandatory when Trusted Board Boot is enabled. It returns a pointer to the ROTPK stored in the platform (or a hash of it) and its length. The ROTPK must be encoded in DER format according to the following ASN.1 structure: :: AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } In case the function returns a hash of the key: :: DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, digest OCTET STRING } The function returns 0 on success. Any other value is treated as error by the Trusted Board Boot. The function also reports extra information related to the ROTPK in the flags parameter: :: ROTPK_IS_HASH : Indicates that the ROTPK returned by the platform is a hash. ROTPK_NOT_DEPLOYED : This allows the platform to skip certificate ROTPK verification while the platform ROTPK is not deployed. When this flag is set, the function does not need to return a platform ROTPK, and the authentication framework uses the ROTPK in the certificate without verifying it against the platform value. This flag must not be used in a deployed production environment. Function: plat_get_nv_ctr() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void *, unsigned int * Return : int This function is mandatory when Trusted Board Boot is enabled. It returns the non-volatile counter value stored in the platform in the second argument. The cookie in the first argument may be used to select the counter in case the platform provides more than one (for example, on platforms that use the default TBBR CoT, the cookie will correspond to the OID values defined in TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID or NON_TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID). The function returns 0 on success. Any other value means the counter value could not be retrieved from the platform. Function: plat_set_nv_ctr() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void *, unsigned int Return : int This function is mandatory when Trusted Board Boot is enabled. It sets a new counter value in the platform. The cookie in the first argument may be used to select the counter (as explained in plat_get_nv_ctr()). The second argument is the updated counter value to be written to the NV counter. The function returns 0 on success. Any other value means the counter value could not be updated. Function: plat_set_nv_ctr2() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void *, const auth_img_desc_t *, unsigned int Return : int This function is optional when Trusted Board Boot is enabled. If this interface is defined, then ``plat_set_nv_ctr()`` need not be defined. The first argument passed is a cookie and is typically used to differentiate between a Non Trusted NV Counter and a Trusted NV Counter. The second argument is a pointer to an authentication image descriptor and may be used to decide if the counter is allowed to be updated or not. The third argument is the updated counter value to be written to the NV counter. The function returns 0 on success. Any other value means the counter value either could not be updated or the authentication image descriptor indicates that it is not allowed to be updated. Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement support (in BL31) ------------------------------------------------------- The functions mentioned in this section are mandatory, when platform enables DRTM_SUPPORT build flag. Function : plat_get_addr_mmap() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : const mmap_region_t * This function is used to return the address of the platform *address-map* table, which describes the regions of normal memory, memory mapped I/O and non-volatile memory. Function : plat_has_non_host_platforms() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : bool This function returns *true* if the platform has any trusted devices capable of DMA, otherwise returns *false*. Function : plat_has_unmanaged_dma_peripherals() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : bool This function returns *true* if platform uses peripherals whose DMA is not managed by an SMMU, otherwise returns *false*. Note - If the platform has peripherals that are not managed by the SMMU, then the platform should investigate such peripherals to determine whether they can be trusted, and such peripherals should be moved under "Non-host platforms" if they can be trusted. Function : plat_get_total_num_smmus() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : unsigned int This function returns the total number of SMMUs in the platform. Function : plat_enumerate_smmus() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : const uintptr_t *, size_t This function returns an array of SMMU addresses and the actual number of SMMUs reported by the platform. Function : plat_drtm_get_dma_prot_features() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : const plat_drtm_dma_prot_features_t* This function returns the address of plat_drtm_dma_prot_features_t structure containing the maximum number of protected regions and bitmap with the types of DMA protection supported by the platform. For more details see section 3.3 Table 6 of `DRTM`_ specification. Function : plat_drtm_dma_prot_get_max_table_bytes() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint64_t This function returns the maximum size of DMA protected regions table in bytes. Function : plat_drtm_get_tpm_features() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : const plat_drtm_tpm_features_t* This function returns the address of *plat_drtm_tpm_features_t* structure containing PCR usage schema, TPM-based hash, and firmware hash algorithm supported by the platform. Function : plat_drtm_get_min_size_normal_world_dce() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint64_t This function returns the size normal-world DCE of the platform. Function : plat_drtm_get_imp_def_dlme_region_size() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint64_t This function returns the size of implementation defined DLME region of the platform. Function : plat_drtm_get_tcb_hash_table_size() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint64_t This function returns the size of TCB hash table of the platform. Function : plat_drtm_get_tcb_hash_features() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint64_t This function returns the Maximum number of TCB hashes recorded by the platform. For more details see section 3.3 Table 6 of `DRTM`_ specification. Function : plat_drtm_validate_ns_region() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uintptr_t, uintptr_t Return : int This function validates that given region is within the Non-Secure region of DRAM. This function takes a region start address and size an input arguments, and returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. Function : plat_set_drtm_error() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uint64_t Return : int This function writes a 64 bit error code received as input into non-volatile storage and returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. Function : plat_get_drtm_error() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uint64_t* Return : int This function reads a 64 bit error code from the non-volatile storage into the received address, and returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. Common mandatory function modifications --------------------------------------- The following functions are mandatory functions which need to be implemented by the platform port. Function : plat_my_core_pos() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : unsigned int This function returns the index of the calling CPU which is used as a CPU-specific linear index into blocks of memory (for example while allocating per-CPU stacks). This function will be invoked very early in the initialization sequence which mandates that this function should be implemented in assembly and should not rely on the availability of a C runtime environment. This function can clobber x0 - x8 and must preserve x9 - x29. This function plays a crucial role in the power domain topology framework in PSCI and details of this can be found in :ref:`PSCI Power Domain Tree Structure`. Function : plat_core_pos_by_mpidr() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : u_register_t Return : int This function validates the ``MPIDR`` of a CPU and converts it to an index, which can be used as a CPU-specific linear index into blocks of memory. In case the ``MPIDR`` is invalid, this function returns -1. This function will only be invoked by BL31 after the power domain topology is initialized and can utilize the C runtime environment. For further details about how TF-A represents the power domain topology and how this relates to the linear CPU index, please refer :ref:`PSCI Power Domain Tree Structure`. Function : plat_get_mbedtls_heap() [when TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT == 1] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Arguments : void **heap_addr, size_t *heap_size Return : int This function is invoked during Mbed TLS library initialisation to get a heap, by means of a starting address and a size. This heap will then be used internally by the Mbed TLS library. Hence, each BL stage that utilises Mbed TLS must be able to provide a heap to it. A helper function can be found in `drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.c` in which a heap is statically reserved during compile time inside every image (i.e. every BL stage) that utilises Mbed TLS. In this default implementation, the function simply returns the address and size of this "pre-allocated" heap. For a platform to use this default implementation, only a call to the helper from inside plat_get_mbedtls_heap() body is enough and nothing else is needed. However, by writting their own implementation, platforms have the potential to optimise memory usage. For example, on some Arm platforms, the Mbed TLS heap is shared between BL1 and BL2 stages and, thus, the necessary space is not reserved twice. On success the function should return 0 and a negative error code otherwise. Function : plat_get_enc_key_info() [when FW_ENC_STATUS == 0 or 1] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Arguments : enum fw_enc_status_t fw_enc_status, uint8_t *key, size_t *key_len, unsigned int *flags, const uint8_t *img_id, size_t img_id_len Return : int This function provides a symmetric key (either SSK or BSSK depending on fw_enc_status) which is invoked during runtime decryption of encrypted firmware images. `plat/common/plat_bl_common.c` provides a dummy weak implementation for testing purposes which must be overridden by the platform trying to implement a real world firmware encryption use-case. It also allows the platform to pass symmetric key identifier rather than actual symmetric key which is useful in cases where the crypto backend provides secure storage for the symmetric key. So in this case ``ENC_KEY_IS_IDENTIFIER`` flag must be set in ``flags``. In addition to above a platform may also choose to provide an image specific symmetric key/identifier using img_id. On success the function should return 0 and a negative error code otherwise. Note that this API depends on ``DECRYPTION_SUPPORT`` build flag. Function : plat_fwu_set_images_source() [when PSA_FWU_SUPPORT == 1] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : const struct fwu_metadata *metadata Return : void This function is mandatory when PSA_FWU_SUPPORT is enabled. It provides a means to retrieve image specification (offset in non-volatile storage and length) of active/updated images using the passed FWU metadata, and update I/O policies of active/updated images using retrieved image specification information. Further I/O layer operations such as I/O open, I/O read, etc. on these images rely on this function call. In Arm platforms, this function is used to set an I/O policy of the FIP image, container of all active/updated secure and non-secure images. Function : plat_fwu_set_metadata_image_source() [when PSA_FWU_SUPPORT == 1] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int image_id, uintptr_t *dev_handle, uintptr_t *image_spec Return : int This function is mandatory when PSA_FWU_SUPPORT is enabled. It is responsible for setting up the platform I/O policy of the requested metadata image (either FWU_METADATA_IMAGE_ID or BKUP_FWU_METADATA_IMAGE_ID) that will be used to load this image from the platform's non-volatile storage. FWU metadata can not be always stored as a raw image in non-volatile storage to define its image specification (offset in non-volatile storage and length) statically in I/O policy. For example, the FWU metadata image is stored as a partition inside the GUID partition table image. Its specification is defined in the partition table that needs to be parsed dynamically. This function provides a means to retrieve such dynamic information to set the I/O policy of the FWU metadata image. Further I/O layer operations such as I/O open, I/O read, etc. on FWU metadata image relies on this function call. It returns '0' on success, otherwise a negative error value on error. Alongside, returns device handle and image specification from the I/O policy of the requested FWU metadata image. Function : plat_fwu_get_boot_idx() [when PSA_FWU_SUPPORT == 1] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint32_t This function is mandatory when PSA_FWU_SUPPORT is enabled. It provides the means to retrieve the boot index value from the platform. The boot index is the bank from which the platform has booted the firmware images. By default, the platform will read the metadata structure and try to boot from the active bank. If the platform fails to boot from the active bank due to reasons like an Authentication failure, or on crossing a set number of watchdog resets while booting from the active bank, the platform can then switch to boot from a different bank. This function then returns the bank that the platform should boot its images from. Common optional modifications ----------------------------- The following are helper functions implemented by the firmware that perform common platform-specific tasks. A platform may choose to override these definitions. Function : plat_set_my_stack() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function sets the current stack pointer to the normal memory stack that has been allocated for the current CPU. For BL images that only require a stack for the primary CPU, the UP version of the function is used. The size of the stack allocated to each CPU is specified by the platform defined constant ``PLATFORM_STACK_SIZE``. Common implementations of this function for the UP and MP BL images are provided in ``plat/common/aarch64/platform_up_stack.S`` and ``plat/common/aarch64/platform_mp_stack.S`` Function : plat_get_my_stack() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uintptr_t This function returns the base address of the normal memory stack that has been allocated for the current CPU. For BL images that only require a stack for the primary CPU, the UP version of the function is used. The size of the stack allocated to each CPU is specified by the platform defined constant ``PLATFORM_STACK_SIZE``. Common implementations of this function for the UP and MP BL images are provided in ``plat/common/aarch64/platform_up_stack.S`` and ``plat/common/aarch64/platform_mp_stack.S`` Function : plat_report_exception() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int Return : void A platform may need to report various information about its status when an exception is taken, for example the current exception level, the CPU security state (secure/non-secure), the exception type, and so on. This function is called in the following circumstances: - In BL1, whenever an exception is taken. - In BL2, whenever an exception is taken. The default implementation doesn't do anything, to avoid making assumptions about the way the platform displays its status information. For AArch64, this function receives the exception type as its argument. Possible values for exceptions types are listed in the ``include/common/bl_common.h`` header file. Note that these constants are not related to any architectural exception code; they are just a TF-A convention. For AArch32, this function receives the exception mode as its argument. Possible values for exception modes are listed in the ``include/lib/aarch32/arch.h`` header file. Function : plat_reset_handler() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void A platform may need to do additional initialization after reset. This function allows the platform to do the platform specific initializations. Platform specific errata workarounds could also be implemented here. The API should preserve the values of callee saved registers x19 to x29. The default implementation doesn't do anything. If a platform needs to override the default implementation, refer to the :ref:`Firmware Design` for general guidelines. Function : plat_disable_acp() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This API allows a platform to disable the Accelerator Coherency Port (if present) during a cluster power down sequence. The default weak implementation doesn't do anything. Since this API is called during the power down sequence, it has restrictions for stack usage and it can use the registers x0 - x17 as scratch registers. It should preserve the value in x18 register as it is used by the caller to store the return address. Function : plat_error_handler() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : int Return : void This API is called when the generic code encounters an error situation from which it cannot continue. It allows the platform to perform error reporting or recovery actions (for example, reset the system). This function must not return. The parameter indicates the type of error using standard codes from ``errno.h``. Possible errors reported by the generic code are: - ``-EAUTH``: a certificate or image could not be authenticated (when Trusted Board Boot is enabled) - ``-ENOENT``: the requested image or certificate could not be found or an IO error was detected - ``-ENOMEM``: resources exhausted. TF-A does not use dynamic memory, so this error is usually an indication of an incorrect array size The default implementation simply spins. Function : plat_panic_handler() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This API is called when the generic code encounters an unexpected error situation from which it cannot recover. This function must not return, and must be implemented in assembly because it may be called before the C environment is initialized. .. note:: The address from where it was called is stored in x30 (Link Register). The default implementation simply spins. Function : plat_system_reset() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function is used by the platform to resets the system. It can be used in any specific use-case where system needs to be resetted. For example, in case of DRTM implementation this function reset the system after writing the DRTM error code in the non-volatile storage. This function never returns. Failure in reset results in panic. Function : plat_get_bl_image_load_info() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : bl_load_info_t * This function returns pointer to the list of images that the platform has populated to load. This function is invoked in BL2 to load the BL3xx images. Function : plat_get_next_bl_params() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : bl_params_t * This function returns a pointer to the shared memory that the platform has kept aside to pass TF-A related information that next BL image needs. This function is invoked in BL2 to pass this information to the next BL image. Function : plat_get_stack_protector_canary() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : u_register_t This function returns a random value that is used to initialize the canary used when the stack protector is enabled with ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR. A predictable value will weaken the protection as the attacker could easily write the right value as part of the attack most of the time. Therefore, it should return a true random number. .. warning:: For the protection to be effective, the global data need to be placed at a lower address than the stack bases. Failure to do so would allow an attacker to overwrite the canary as part of the stack buffer overflow attack. Function : plat_flush_next_bl_params() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function flushes to main memory all the image params that are passed to next image. This function is invoked in BL2 to flush this information to the next BL image. Function : plat_log_get_prefix() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int Return : const char * This function defines the prefix string corresponding to the `log_level` to be prepended to all the log output from TF-A. The `log_level` (argument) will correspond to one of the standard log levels defined in debug.h. The platform can override the common implementation to define a different prefix string for the log output. The implementation should be robust to future changes that increase the number of log levels. Function : plat_get_soc_version() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : int32_t This function returns soc version which mainly consist of below fields :: soc_version[30:24] = JEP-106 continuation code for the SiP soc_version[23:16] = JEP-106 identification code with parity bit for the SiP soc_version[15:0] = Implementation defined SoC ID Function : plat_get_soc_revision() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : int32_t This function returns soc revision in below format :: soc_revision[0:30] = SOC revision of specific SOC Function : plat_is_smccc_feature_available() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : u_register_t Return : int32_t This function returns SMC_ARCH_CALL_SUCCESS if the platform supports the SMCCC function specified in the argument; otherwise returns SMC_ARCH_CALL_NOT_SUPPORTED. Function : plat_can_cmo() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint64_t When CONDITIONAL_CMO flag is enabled: - This function indicates whether cache management operations should be performed. It returns 0 if CMOs should be skipped and non-zero otherwise. - The function must not clobber x1, x2 and x3. It's also not safe to rely on stack. Otherwise obey AAPCS. Modifications specific to a Boot Loader stage --------------------------------------------- Boot Loader Stage 1 (BL1) ------------------------- BL1 implements the reset vector where execution starts from after a cold or warm boot. For each CPU, BL1 is responsible for the following tasks: #. Handling the reset as described in section 2.2 #. In the case of a cold boot and the CPU being the primary CPU, ensuring that only this CPU executes the remaining BL1 code, including loading and passing control to the BL2 stage. #. Identifying and starting the Firmware Update process (if required). #. Loading the BL2 image from non-volatile storage into secure memory at the address specified by the platform defined constant ``BL2_BASE``. #. Populating a ``meminfo`` structure with the following information in memory, accessible by BL2 immediately upon entry. :: meminfo.total_base = Base address of secure RAM visible to BL2 meminfo.total_size = Size of secure RAM visible to BL2 By default, BL1 places this ``meminfo`` structure at the end of secure memory visible to BL2. It is possible for the platform to decide where it wants to place the ``meminfo`` structure for BL2 or restrict the amount of memory visible to BL2 by overriding the weak default implementation of ``bl1_plat_handle_post_image_load`` API. The following functions need to be implemented by the platform port to enable BL1 to perform the above tasks. Function : bl1_early_platform_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is only called by the primary CPU. On Arm standard platforms, this function: - Enables a secure instance of SP805 to act as the Trusted Watchdog. - Initializes a UART (PL011 console), which enables access to the ``printf`` family of functions in BL1. - Enables issuing of snoop and DVM (Distributed Virtual Memory) requests to the CCI slave interface corresponding to the cluster that includes the primary CPU. Function : bl1_plat_arch_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function performs any platform-specific and architectural setup that the platform requires. Platform-specific setup might include configuration of memory controllers and the interconnect. In Arm standard platforms, this function enables the MMU. This function helps fulfill requirement 2 above. Function : bl1_platform_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches enabled. It is responsible for performing any remaining platform-specific setup that can occur after the MMU and data cache have been enabled. if support for multiple boot sources is required, it initializes the boot sequence used by plat_try_next_boot_source(). In Arm standard platforms, this function initializes the storage abstraction layer used to load the next bootloader image. This function helps fulfill requirement 4 above. Function : bl1_plat_sec_mem_layout() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : meminfo * This function should only be called on the cold boot path. It executes with the MMU and data caches enabled. The pointer returned by this function must point to a ``meminfo`` structure containing the extents and availability of secure RAM for the BL1 stage. :: meminfo.total_base = Base address of secure RAM visible to BL1 meminfo.total_size = Size of secure RAM visible to BL1 This information is used by BL1 to load the BL2 image in secure RAM. BL1 also populates a similar structure to tell BL2 the extents of memory available for its own use. This function helps fulfill requirements 4 and 5 above. Function : bl1_plat_prepare_exit() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : entry_point_info_t * Return : void This function is called prior to exiting BL1 in response to the ``BL1_SMC_RUN_IMAGE`` SMC request raised by BL2. It should be used to perform platform specific clean up or bookkeeping operations before transferring control to the next image. It receives the address of the ``entry_point_info_t`` structure passed from BL2. This function runs with MMU disabled. Function : bl1_plat_set_ep_info() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int image_id, entry_point_info_t *ep_info Return : void This function allows platforms to override ``ep_info`` for the given ``image_id``. The default implementation just returns. Function : bl1_plat_get_next_image_id() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : unsigned int This and the following function must be overridden to enable the FWU feature. BL1 calls this function after platform setup to identify the next image to be loaded and executed. If the platform returns ``BL2_IMAGE_ID`` then BL1 proceeds with the normal boot sequence, which loads and executes BL2. If the platform returns a different image id, BL1 assumes that Firmware Update is required. The default implementation always returns ``BL2_IMAGE_ID``. The Arm development platforms override this function to detect if firmware update is required, and if so, return the first image in the firmware update process. Function : bl1_plat_get_image_desc() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int image_id Return : image_desc_t * BL1 calls this function to get the image descriptor information ``image_desc_t`` for the provided ``image_id`` from the platform. The default implementation always returns a common BL2 image descriptor. Arm standard platforms return an image descriptor corresponding to BL2 or one of the firmware update images defined in the Trusted Board Boot Requirements specification. Function : bl1_plat_handle_pre_image_load() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int image_id Return : int This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information corresponding to ``image_id``. This function is invoked in BL1, both in cold boot and FWU code path, before loading the image. Function : bl1_plat_handle_post_image_load() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int image_id Return : int This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information corresponding to ``image_id``. This function is invoked in BL1, both in cold boot and FWU code path, after loading and authenticating the image. The default weak implementation of this function calculates the amount of Trusted SRAM that can be used by BL2 and allocates a ``meminfo_t`` structure at the beginning of this free memory and populates it. The address of ``meminfo_t`` structure is updated in ``arg1`` of the entrypoint information to BL2. Function : bl1_plat_fwu_done() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int image_id, uintptr_t image_src, unsigned int image_size Return : void BL1 calls this function when the FWU process is complete. It must not return. The platform may override this function to take platform specific action, for example to initiate the normal boot flow. The default implementation spins forever. Function : bl1_plat_mem_check() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uintptr_t mem_base, unsigned int mem_size, unsigned int flags Return : int BL1 calls this function while handling FWU related SMCs, more specifically when copying or authenticating an image. Its responsibility is to ensure that the region of memory identified by ``mem_base`` and ``mem_size`` is mapped in BL1, and that this memory corresponds to either a secure or non-secure memory region as indicated by the security state of the ``flags`` argument. This function can safely assume that the value resulting from the addition of ``mem_base`` and ``mem_size`` fits into a ``uintptr_t`` type variable and does not overflow. This function must return 0 on success, a non-null error code otherwise. The default implementation of this function asserts therefore platforms must override it when using the FWU feature. Boot Loader Stage 2 (BL2) ------------------------- The BL2 stage is executed only by the primary CPU, which is determined in BL1 using the ``platform_is_primary_cpu()`` function. BL1 passed control to BL2 at ``BL2_BASE``. BL2 executes in Secure EL1 and and invokes ``plat_get_bl_image_load_info()`` to retrieve the list of images to load from non-volatile storage to secure/non-secure RAM. After all the images are loaded then BL2 invokes ``plat_get_next_bl_params()`` to get the list of executable images to be passed to the next BL image. The following functions must be implemented by the platform port to enable BL2 to perform the above tasks. Function : bl2_early_platform_setup2() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : u_register_t, u_register_t, u_register_t, u_register_t Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is only called by the primary CPU. The 4 arguments are passed by BL1 to BL2 and these arguments are platform specific. On Arm standard platforms, the arguments received are : arg0 - Points to load address of FW_CONFIG arg1 - ``meminfo`` structure populated by BL1. The platform copies the contents of ``meminfo`` as it may be subsequently overwritten by BL2. On Arm standard platforms, this function also: - Initializes a UART (PL011 console), which enables access to the ``printf`` family of functions in BL2. - Initializes the storage abstraction layer used to load further bootloader images. It is necessary to do this early on platforms with a SCP_BL2 image, since the later ``bl2_platform_setup`` must be done after SCP_BL2 is loaded. Function : bl2_plat_arch_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is only called by the primary CPU. The purpose of this function is to perform any architectural initialization that varies across platforms. On Arm standard platforms, this function enables the MMU. Function : bl2_platform_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function may execute with the MMU and data caches enabled if the platform port does the necessary initialization in ``bl2_plat_arch_setup()``. It is only called by the primary CPU. The purpose of this function is to perform any platform initialization specific to BL2. In Arm standard platforms, this function performs security setup, including configuration of the TrustZone controller to allow non-secure masters access to most of DRAM. Part of DRAM is reserved for secure world use. Function : bl2_plat_handle_pre_image_load() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int Return : int This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information for given ``image_id``. This function is currently invoked in BL2 before loading each image. Function : bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int Return : int This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image information for given ``image_id``. This function is currently invoked in BL2 after loading each image. Function : bl2_plat_preload_setup [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This optional function performs any BL2 platform initialization required before image loading, that is not done later in bl2_platform_setup(). Specifically, if support for multiple boot sources is required, it initializes the boot sequence used by plat_try_next_boot_source(). Function : plat_try_next_boot_source() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : int This optional function passes to the next boot source in the redundancy sequence. This function moves the current boot redundancy source to the next element in the boot sequence. If there are no more boot sources then it must return 0, otherwise it must return 1. The default implementation of this always returns 0. Boot Loader Stage 2 (BL2) at EL3 -------------------------------- When the platform has a non-TF-A Boot ROM it is desirable to jump directly to BL2 instead of TF-A BL1. In this case BL2 is expected to execute at EL3 instead of executing at EL1. Refer to the :ref:`Firmware Design` document for more information. All mandatory functions of BL2 must be implemented, except the functions bl2_early_platform_setup and bl2_el3_plat_arch_setup, because their work is done now by bl2_el3_early_platform_setup and bl2_el3_plat_arch_setup. These functions should generally implement the bl1_plat_xxx() and bl2_plat_xxx() functionality combined. Function : bl2_el3_early_platform_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : u_register_t, u_register_t, u_register_t, u_register_t Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is only called by the primary CPU. This function receives four parameters which can be used by the platform to pass any needed information from the Boot ROM to BL2. On Arm standard platforms, this function does the following: - Initializes a UART (PL011 console), which enables access to the ``printf`` family of functions in BL2. - Initializes the storage abstraction layer used to load further bootloader images. It is necessary to do this early on platforms with a SCP_BL2 image, since the later ``bl2_platform_setup`` must be done after SCP_BL2 is loaded. - Initializes the private variables that define the memory layout used. Function : bl2_el3_plat_arch_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is only called by the primary CPU. The purpose of this function is to perform any architectural initialization that varies across platforms. On Arm standard platforms, this function enables the MMU. Function : bl2_el3_plat_prepare_exit() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function is called prior to exiting BL2 and run the next image. It should be used to perform platform specific clean up or bookkeeping operations before transferring control to the next image. This function runs with MMU disabled. FWU Boot Loader Stage 2 (BL2U) ------------------------------ The AP Firmware Updater Configuration, BL2U, is an optional part of the FWU process and is executed only by the primary CPU. BL1 passes control to BL2U at ``BL2U_BASE``. BL2U executes in Secure-EL1 and is responsible for: #. (Optional) Transferring the optional SCP_BL2U binary image from AP secure memory to SCP RAM. BL2U uses the SCP_BL2U ``image_info`` passed by BL1. ``SCP_BL2U_BASE`` defines the address in AP secure memory where SCP_BL2U should be copied from. Subsequent handling of the SCP_BL2U image is implemented by the platform specific ``bl2u_plat_handle_scp_bl2u()`` function. If ``SCP_BL2U_BASE`` is not defined then this step is not performed. #. Any platform specific setup required to perform the FWU process. For example, Arm standard platforms initialize the TZC controller so that the normal world can access DDR memory. The following functions must be implemented by the platform port to enable BL2U to perform the tasks mentioned above. Function : bl2u_early_platform_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : meminfo *mem_info, void *plat_info Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is only called by the primary CPU. The arguments to this function is the address of the ``meminfo`` structure and platform specific info provided by BL1. The platform may copy the contents of the ``mem_info`` and ``plat_info`` into private storage as the original memory may be subsequently overwritten by BL2U. On Arm CSS platforms ``plat_info`` is interpreted as an ``image_info_t`` structure, to extract SCP_BL2U image information, which is then copied into a private variable. Function : bl2u_plat_arch_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is only called by the primary CPU. The purpose of this function is to perform any architectural initialization that varies across platforms, for example enabling the MMU (since the memory map differs across platforms). Function : bl2u_platform_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function may execute with the MMU and data caches enabled if the platform port does the necessary initialization in ``bl2u_plat_arch_setup()``. It is only called by the primary CPU. The purpose of this function is to perform any platform initialization specific to BL2U. In Arm standard platforms, this function performs security setup, including configuration of the TrustZone controller to allow non-secure masters access to most of DRAM. Part of DRAM is reserved for secure world use. Function : bl2u_plat_handle_scp_bl2u() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : int This function is used to perform any platform-specific actions required to handle the SCP firmware. Typically it transfers the image into SCP memory using a platform-specific protocol and waits until SCP executes it and signals to the Application Processor (AP) for BL2U execution to continue. This function returns 0 on success, a negative error code otherwise. This function is included if SCP_BL2U_BASE is defined. Boot Loader Stage 3-1 (BL31) ---------------------------- During cold boot, the BL31 stage is executed only by the primary CPU. This is determined in BL1 using the ``platform_is_primary_cpu()`` function. BL1 passes control to BL31 at ``BL31_BASE``. During warm boot, BL31 is executed by all CPUs. BL31 executes at EL3 and is responsible for: #. Re-initializing all architectural and platform state. Although BL1 performs some of this initialization, BL31 remains resident in EL3 and must ensure that EL3 architectural and platform state is completely initialized. It should make no assumptions about the system state when it receives control. #. Passing control to a normal world BL image, pre-loaded at a platform- specific address by BL2. On ARM platforms, BL31 uses the ``bl_params`` list populated by BL2 in memory to do this. #. Providing runtime firmware services. Currently, BL31 only implements a subset of the Power State Coordination Interface (PSCI) API as a runtime service. See :ref:`psci_in_bl31` below for details of porting the PSCI implementation. #. Optionally passing control to the BL32 image, pre-loaded at a platform- specific address by BL2. BL31 exports a set of APIs that allow runtime services to specify the security state in which the next image should be executed and run the corresponding image. On ARM platforms, BL31 uses the ``bl_params`` list populated by BL2 in memory to do this. If BL31 is a reset vector, It also needs to handle the reset as specified in section 2.2 before the tasks described above. The following functions must be implemented by the platform port to enable BL31 to perform the above tasks. Function : bl31_early_platform_setup2() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : u_register_t, u_register_t, u_register_t, u_register_t Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is only called by the primary CPU. BL2 can pass 4 arguments to BL31 and these arguments are platform specific. In Arm standard platforms, the arguments received are : arg0 - The pointer to the head of `bl_params_t` list which is list of executable images following BL31, arg1 - Points to load address of SOC_FW_CONFIG if present except in case of Arm FVP and Juno platform. In case of Arm FVP and Juno platform, points to load address of FW_CONFIG. arg2 - Points to load address of HW_CONFIG if present arg3 - A special value to verify platform parameters from BL2 to BL31. Not used in release builds. The function runs through the `bl_param_t` list and extracts the entry point information for BL32 and BL33. It also performs the following: - Initialize a UART (PL011 console), which enables access to the ``printf`` family of functions in BL31. - Enable issuing of snoop and DVM (Distributed Virtual Memory) requests to the CCI slave interface corresponding to the cluster that includes the primary CPU. Function : bl31_plat_arch_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function executes with the MMU and data caches disabled. It is only called by the primary CPU. The purpose of this function is to perform any architectural initialization that varies across platforms. On Arm standard platforms, this function enables the MMU. Function : bl31_platform_setup() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This function may execute with the MMU and data caches enabled if the platform port does the necessary initialization in ``bl31_plat_arch_setup()``. It is only called by the primary CPU. The purpose of this function is to complete platform initialization so that both BL31 runtime services and normal world software can function correctly. On Arm standard platforms, this function does the following: - Initialize the generic interrupt controller. Depending on the GIC driver selected by the platform, the appropriate GICv2 or GICv3 initialization will be done, which mainly consists of: - Enable secure interrupts in the GIC CPU interface. - Disable the legacy interrupt bypass mechanism. - Configure the priority mask register to allow interrupts of all priorities to be signaled to the CPU interface. - Mark SGIs 8-15 and the other secure interrupts on the platform as secure. - Target all secure SPIs to CPU0. - Enable these secure interrupts in the GIC distributor. - Configure all other interrupts as non-secure. - Enable signaling of secure interrupts in the GIC distributor. - Enable system-level implementation of the generic timer counter through the memory mapped interface. - Grant access to the system counter timer module - Initialize the power controller device. In particular, initialise the locks that prevent concurrent accesses to the power controller device. Function : bl31_plat_runtime_setup() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void The purpose of this function is allow the platform to perform any BL31 runtime setup just prior to BL31 exit during cold boot. The default weak implementation of this function will invoke ``console_switch_state()`` to switch console output to consoles marked for use in the ``runtime`` state. Function : bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uint32_t Return : entry_point_info * This function may execute with the MMU and data caches enabled if the platform port does the necessary initializations in ``bl31_plat_arch_setup()``. This function is called by ``bl31_main()`` to retrieve information provided by BL2 for the next image in the security state specified by the argument. BL31 uses this information to pass control to that image in the specified security state. This function must return a pointer to the ``entry_point_info`` structure (that was copied during ``bl31_early_platform_setup()``) if the image exists. It should return NULL otherwise. Function : plat_rmmd_get_cca_attest_token() [mandatory when ENABLE_RME == 1] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uintptr_t, size_t *, uintptr_t, size_t Return : int This function returns the Platform attestation token. The parameters of the function are: arg0 - A pointer to the buffer where the Platform token should be copied by this function. The buffer must be big enough to hold the Platform token. arg1 - Contains the size (in bytes) of the buffer passed in arg0. The function returns the platform token length in this parameter. arg2 - A pointer to the buffer where the challenge object is stored. arg3 - The length of the challenge object in bytes. Possible values are 32, 48 and 64. The function returns 0 on success, -EINVAL on failure. Function : plat_rmmd_get_cca_realm_attest_key() [mandatory when ENABLE_RME == 1] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uintptr_t, size_t *, unsigned int Return : int This function returns the delegated realm attestation key which will be used to sign Realm attestation token. The API currently only supports P-384 ECC curve key. The parameters of the function are: arg0 - A pointer to the buffer where the attestation key should be copied by this function. The buffer must be big enough to hold the attestation key. arg1 - Contains the size (in bytes) of the buffer passed in arg0. The function returns the attestation key length in this parameter. arg2 - The type of the elliptic curve to which the requested attestation key belongs. The function returns 0 on success, -EINVAL on failure. Function : plat_rmmd_get_el3_rmm_shared_mem() [when ENABLE_RME == 1] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uintptr_t * Return : size_t This function returns the size of the shared area between EL3 and RMM (or 0 on failure). A pointer to the shared area (or a NULL pointer on failure) is stored in the pointer passed as argument. Function : plat_rmmd_load_manifest() [when ENABLE_RME == 1] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Arguments : rmm_manifest_t *manifest Return : int When ENABLE_RME is enabled, this function populates a boot manifest for the RMM image and stores it in the area specified by manifest. When ENABLE_RME is disabled, this function is not used. Function : bl31_plat_enable_mmu [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uint32_t Return : void This function enables the MMU. The boot code calls this function with MMU and caches disabled. This function should program necessary registers to enable translation, and upon return, the MMU on the calling PE must be enabled. The function must honor flags passed in the first argument. These flags are defined by the translation library, and can be found in the file ``include/lib/xlat_tables/xlat_mmu_helpers.h``. On DynamIQ systems, this function must not use stack while enabling MMU, which is how the function in xlat table library version 2 is implemented. Function : plat_init_apkey [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint128_t This function returns the 128-bit value which can be used to program ARMv8.3 pointer authentication keys. The value should be obtained from a reliable source of randomness. This function is only needed if ARMv8.3 pointer authentication is used in the Trusted Firmware by building with ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` option set to non-zero. Function : plat_get_syscnt_freq2() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : unsigned int This function is used by the architecture setup code to retrieve the counter frequency for the CPU's generic timer. This value will be programmed into the ``CNTFRQ_EL0`` register. In Arm standard platforms, it returns the base frequency of the system counter, which is retrieved from the first entry in the frequency modes table. #define : PLAT_PERCPU_BAKERY_LOCK_SIZE [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ When ``USE_COHERENT_MEM = 0``, this constant defines the total memory (in bytes) aligned to the cache line boundary that should be allocated per-cpu to accommodate all the bakery locks. If this constant is not defined when ``USE_COHERENT_MEM = 0``, the linker calculates the size of the ``.bakery_lock`` input section, aligns it to the nearest ``CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE``, multiplies it with ``PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT`` and stores the result in a linker symbol. This constant prevents a platform from relying on the linker and provide a more efficient mechanism for accessing per-cpu bakery lock information. If this constant is defined and its value is not equal to the value calculated by the linker then a link time assertion is raised. A compile time assertion is raised if the value of the constant is not aligned to the cache line boundary. .. _porting_guide_sdei_requirements: SDEI porting requirements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The |SDEI| dispatcher requires the platform to provide the following macros and functions, of which some are optional, and some others mandatory. Macros ...... Macro: PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI [mandatory] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This macro must be defined to the EL3 exception priority level associated with Normal |SDEI| events on the platform. This must have a higher value (therefore of lower priority) than ``PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI``. Macro: PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI [mandatory] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This macro must be defined to the EL3 exception priority level associated with Critical |SDEI| events on the platform. This must have a lower value (therefore of higher priority) than ``PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI``. **Note**: |SDEI| exception priorities must be the lowest among Secure priorities. Among the |SDEI| exceptions, Critical |SDEI| priority must be higher than Normal |SDEI| priority. Functions ......... Function: int plat_sdei_validate_entry_point() [optional] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ :: Argument: uintptr_t ep, unsigned int client_mode Return: int This function validates the entry point address of the event handler provided by the client for both event registration and *Complete and Resume* |SDEI| calls. The function ensures that the address is valid in the client translation regime. The second argument is the exception level that the client is executing in. It can be Non-Secure EL1 or Non-Secure EL2. The function must return ``0`` for successful validation, or ``-1`` upon failure. The default implementation always returns ``0``. On Arm platforms, this function translates the entry point address within the client translation regime and further ensures that the resulting physical address is located in Non-secure DRAM. Function: void plat_sdei_handle_masked_trigger(uint64_t mpidr, unsigned int intr) [optional] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ :: Argument: uint64_t Argument: unsigned int Return: void |SDEI| specification requires that a PE comes out of reset with the events masked. The client therefore is expected to call ``PE_UNMASK`` to unmask |SDEI| events on the PE. No |SDEI| events can be dispatched until such time. Should a PE receive an interrupt that was bound to an |SDEI| event while the events are masked on the PE, the dispatcher implementation invokes the function ``plat_sdei_handle_masked_trigger``. The MPIDR of the PE that received the interrupt and the interrupt ID are passed as parameters. The default implementation only prints out a warning message. .. _porting_guide_trng_requirements: TRNG porting requirements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The |TRNG| backend requires the platform to provide the following values and mandatory functions. Values ...... value: uuid_t plat_trng_uuid [mandatory] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This value must be defined to the UUID of the TRNG backend that is specific to the hardware after ``plat_entropy_setup`` function is called. This value must conform to the SMCCC calling convention; The most significant 32 bits of the UUID must not equal ``0xffffffff`` or the signed integer ``-1`` as this value in w0 indicates failure to get a TRNG source. Functions ......... Function: void plat_entropy_setup(void) [mandatory] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ :: Argument: none Return: none This function is expected to do platform-specific initialization of any TRNG hardware. This may include generating a UUID from a hardware-specific seed. Function: bool plat_get_entropy(uint64_t \*out) [mandatory] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ :: Argument: uint64_t * Return: bool Out : when the return value is true, the entropy has been written into the storage pointed to This function writes entropy into storage provided by the caller. If no entropy is available, it must return false and the storage must not be written. .. _psci_in_bl31: Power State Coordination Interface (in BL31) -------------------------------------------- The TF-A implementation of the PSCI API is based around the concept of a *power domain*. A *power domain* is a CPU or a logical group of CPUs which share some state on which power management operations can be performed as specified by `PSCI`_. Each CPU in the system is assigned a cpu index which is a unique number between ``0`` and ``PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT - 1``. The *power domains* are arranged in a hierarchical tree structure and each *power domain* can be identified in a system by the cpu index of any CPU that is part of that domain and a *power domain level*. A processing element (for example, a CPU) is at level 0. If the *power domain* node above a CPU is a logical grouping of CPUs that share some state, then level 1 is that group of CPUs (for example, a cluster), and level 2 is a group of clusters (for example, the system). More details on the power domain topology and its organization can be found in :ref:`PSCI Power Domain Tree Structure`. BL31's platform initialization code exports a pointer to the platform-specific power management operations required for the PSCI implementation to function correctly. This information is populated in the ``plat_psci_ops`` structure. The PSCI implementation calls members of the ``plat_psci_ops`` structure for performing power management operations on the power domains. For example, the target CPU is specified by its ``MPIDR`` in a PSCI ``CPU_ON`` call. The ``pwr_domain_on()`` handler (if present) is called for the CPU power domain. The ``power-state`` parameter of a PSCI ``CPU_SUSPEND`` call can be used to describe composite power states specific to a platform. The PSCI implementation defines a generic representation of the power-state parameter, which is an array of local power states where each index corresponds to a power domain level. Each entry contains the local power state the power domain at that power level could enter. It depends on the ``validate_power_state()`` handler to convert the power-state parameter (possibly encoding a composite power state) passed in a PSCI ``CPU_SUSPEND`` call to this representation. The following functions form part of platform port of PSCI functionality. Function : plat_psci_stat_accounting_start() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : const psci_power_state_t * Return : void This is an optional hook that platforms can implement for residency statistics accounting before entering a low power state. The ``pwr_domain_state`` field of ``state_info`` (first argument) can be inspected if stat accounting is done differently at CPU level versus higher levels. As an example, if the element at index 0 (CPU power level) in the ``pwr_domain_state`` array indicates a power down state, special hardware logic may be programmed in order to keep track of the residency statistics. For higher levels (array indices > 0), the residency statistics could be tracked in software using PMF. If ``ENABLE_PMF`` is set, the default implementation will use PMF to capture timestamps. Function : plat_psci_stat_accounting_stop() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : const psci_power_state_t * Return : void This is an optional hook that platforms can implement for residency statistics accounting after exiting from a low power state. The ``pwr_domain_state`` field of ``state_info`` (first argument) can be inspected if stat accounting is done differently at CPU level versus higher levels. As an example, if the element at index 0 (CPU power level) in the ``pwr_domain_state`` array indicates a power down state, special hardware logic may be programmed in order to keep track of the residency statistics. For higher levels (array indices > 0), the residency statistics could be tracked in software using PMF. If ``ENABLE_PMF`` is set, the default implementation will use PMF to capture timestamps. Function : plat_psci_stat_get_residency() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int, const psci_power_state_t *, unsigned int Return : u_register_t This is an optional interface that is is invoked after resuming from a low power state and provides the time spent resident in that low power state by the power domain at a particular power domain level. When a CPU wakes up from suspend, all its parent power domain levels are also woken up. The generic PSCI code invokes this function for each parent power domain that is resumed and it identified by the ``lvl`` (first argument) parameter. The ``state_info`` (second argument) describes the low power state that the power domain has resumed from. The current CPU is the first CPU in the power domain to resume from the low power state and the ``last_cpu_idx`` (third parameter) is the index of the last CPU in the power domain to suspend and may be needed to calculate the residency for that power domain. Function : plat_get_target_pwr_state() [optional] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : unsigned int, const plat_local_state_t *, unsigned int Return : plat_local_state_t The PSCI generic code uses this function to let the platform participate in state coordination during a power management operation. The function is passed a pointer to an array of platform specific local power state ``states`` (second argument) which contains the requested power state for each CPU at a particular power domain level ``lvl`` (first argument) within the power domain. The function is expected to traverse this array of upto ``ncpus`` (third argument) and return a coordinated target power state by the comparing all the requested power states. The target power state should not be deeper than any of the requested power states. A weak definition of this API is provided by default wherein it assumes that the platform assigns a local state value in order of increasing depth of the power state i.e. for two power states X & Y, if X < Y then X represents a shallower power state than Y. As a result, the coordinated target local power state for a power domain will be the minimum of the requested local power state values. Function : plat_get_power_domain_tree_desc() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : const unsigned char * This function returns a pointer to the byte array containing the power domain topology tree description. The format and method to construct this array are described in :ref:`PSCI Power Domain Tree Structure`. The BL31 PSCI initialization code requires this array to be described by the platform, either statically or dynamically, to initialize the power domain topology tree. In case the array is populated dynamically, then plat_core_pos_by_mpidr() and plat_my_core_pos() should also be implemented suitably so that the topology tree description matches the CPU indices returned by these APIs. These APIs together form the platform interface for the PSCI topology framework. Function : plat_setup_psci_ops() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uintptr_t, const plat_psci_ops ** Return : int This function may execute with the MMU and data caches enabled if the platform port does the necessary initializations in ``bl31_plat_arch_setup()``. It is only called by the primary CPU. This function is called by PSCI initialization code. Its purpose is to let the platform layer know about the warm boot entrypoint through the ``sec_entrypoint`` (first argument) and to export handler routines for platform-specific psci power management actions by populating the passed pointer with a pointer to BL31's private ``plat_psci_ops`` structure. A description of each member of this structure is given below. Please refer to the Arm FVP specific implementation of these handlers in ``plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_pm.c`` as an example. For each PSCI function that the platform wants to support, the associated operation or operations in this structure must be provided and implemented (Refer section 4 of :ref:`Firmware Design` for the PSCI API supported in TF-A). To disable a PSCI function in a platform port, the operation should be removed from this structure instead of providing an empty implementation. plat_psci_ops.cpu_standby() ........................... Perform the platform-specific actions to enter the standby state for a cpu indicated by the passed argument. This provides a fast path for CPU standby wherein overheads of PSCI state management and lock acquisition is avoided. For this handler to be invoked by the PSCI ``CPU_SUSPEND`` API implementation, the suspend state type specified in the ``power-state`` parameter should be STANDBY and the target power domain level specified should be the CPU. The handler should put the CPU into a low power retention state (usually by issuing a wfi instruction) and ensure that it can be woken up from that state by a normal interrupt. The generic code expects the handler to succeed. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_on() ............................. Perform the platform specific actions to power on a CPU, specified by the ``MPIDR`` (first argument). The generic code expects the platform to return PSCI_E_SUCCESS on success or PSCI_E_INTERN_FAIL for any failure. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_off_early() [optional] ............................................... This optional function performs the platform specific actions to check if powering off the calling CPU and its higher parent power domain levels as indicated by the ``target_state`` (first argument) is possible or allowed. The ``target_state`` encodes the platform coordinated target local power states for the CPU power domain and its parent power domain levels. For this handler, the local power state for the CPU power domain will be a power down state where as it could be either power down, retention or run state for the higher power domain levels depending on the result of state coordination. The generic code expects PSCI_E_DENIED return code if the platform thinks that CPU_OFF should not proceed on the calling CPU. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_off() .............................. Perform the platform specific actions to prepare to power off the calling CPU and its higher parent power domain levels as indicated by the ``target_state`` (first argument). It is called by the PSCI ``CPU_OFF`` API implementation. The ``target_state`` encodes the platform coordinated target local power states for the CPU power domain and its parent power domain levels. The handler needs to perform power management operation corresponding to the local state at each power level. For this handler, the local power state for the CPU power domain will be a power down state where as it could be either power down, retention or run state for the higher power domain levels depending on the result of state coordination. The generic code expects the handler to succeed. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_validate_suspend() [optional] ...................................................... This is an optional function that is only compiled into the build if the build option ``PSCI_OS_INIT_MODE`` is enabled. If implemented, this function allows the platform to perform platform specific validations based on hardware states. The generic code expects this function to return PSCI_E_SUCCESS on success, or either PSCI_E_DENIED or PSCI_E_INVALID_PARAMS as appropriate for any invalid requests. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_suspend_pwrdown_early() [optional] ........................................................... This optional function may be used as a performance optimization to replace or complement pwr_domain_suspend() on some platforms. Its calling semantics are identical to pwr_domain_suspend(), except the PSCI implementation only calls this function when suspending to a power down state, and it guarantees that data caches are enabled. When HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY = 0, the PSCI implementation disables data caches before calling pwr_domain_suspend(). If the target_state corresponds to a power down state and it is safe to perform some or all of the platform specific actions in that function with data caches enabled, it may be more efficient to move those actions to this function. When HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY = 1, data caches remain enabled throughout, and so there is no advantage to moving platform specific actions to this function. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_suspend() .................................. Perform the platform specific actions to prepare to suspend the calling CPU and its higher parent power domain levels as indicated by the ``target_state`` (first argument). It is called by the PSCI ``CPU_SUSPEND`` API implementation. The ``target_state`` has a similar meaning as described in the ``pwr_domain_off()`` operation. It encodes the platform coordinated target local power states for the CPU power domain and its parent power domain levels. The handler needs to perform power management operation corresponding to the local state at each power level. The generic code expects the handler to succeed. The difference between turning a power domain off versus suspending it is that in the former case, the power domain is expected to re-initialize its state when it is next powered on (see ``pwr_domain_on_finish()``). In the latter case, the power domain is expected to save enough state so that it can resume execution by restoring this state when its powered on (see ``pwr_domain_suspend_finish()``). When suspending a core, the platform can also choose to power off the GICv3 Redistributor and ITS through an implementation-defined sequence. To achieve this safely, the ITS context must be saved first. The architectural part is implemented by the ``gicv3_its_save_disable()`` helper, but most of the needed sequence is implementation defined and it is therefore the responsibility of the platform code to implement the necessary sequence. Then the GIC Redistributor context can be saved using the ``gicv3_rdistif_save()`` helper. Powering off the Redistributor requires the implementation to support it and it is the responsibility of the platform code to execute the right implementation defined sequence. When a system suspend is requested, the platform can also make use of the ``gicv3_distif_save()`` helper to save the context of the GIC Distributor after it has saved the context of the Redistributors and ITS of all the cores in the system. The context of the Distributor can be large and may require it to be allocated in a special area if it cannot fit in the platform's global static data, for example in DRAM. The Distributor can then be powered down using an implementation-defined sequence. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_pwr_down_wfi() ....................................... This is an optional function and, if implemented, is expected to perform platform specific actions including the ``wfi`` invocation which allows the CPU to powerdown. Since this function is invoked outside the PSCI locks, the actions performed in this hook must be local to the CPU or the platform must ensure that races between multiple CPUs cannot occur. The ``target_state`` has a similar meaning as described in the ``pwr_domain_off()`` operation and it encodes the platform coordinated target local power states for the CPU power domain and its parent power domain levels. This function must not return back to the caller (by calling wfi in an infinite loop to ensure some CPUs power down mitigations work properly). If this function is not implemented by the platform, PSCI generic implementation invokes ``psci_power_down_wfi()`` for power down. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_on_finish() .................................... This function is called by the PSCI implementation after the calling CPU is powered on and released from reset in response to an earlier PSCI ``CPU_ON`` call. It performs the platform-specific setup required to initialize enough state for this CPU to enter the normal world and also provide secure runtime firmware services. The ``target_state`` (first argument) is the prior state of the power domains immediately before the CPU was turned on. It indicates which power domains above the CPU might require initialization due to having previously been in low power states. The generic code expects the handler to succeed. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_on_finish_late() [optional] ........................................................... This optional function is called by the PSCI implementation after the calling CPU is fully powered on with respective data caches enabled. The calling CPU and the associated cluster are guaranteed to be participating in coherency. This function gives the flexibility to perform any platform-specific actions safely, such as initialization or modification of shared data structures, without the overhead of explicit cache maintainace operations. The ``target_state`` has a similar meaning as described in the ``pwr_domain_on_finish()`` operation. The generic code expects the handler to succeed. plat_psci_ops.pwr_domain_suspend_finish() ......................................... This function is called by the PSCI implementation after the calling CPU is powered on and released from reset in response to an asynchronous wakeup event, for example a timer interrupt that was programmed by the CPU during the ``CPU_SUSPEND`` call or ``SYSTEM_SUSPEND`` call. It performs the platform-specific setup required to restore the saved state for this CPU to resume execution in the normal world and also provide secure runtime firmware services. The ``target_state`` (first argument) has a similar meaning as described in the ``pwr_domain_on_finish()`` operation. The generic code expects the platform to succeed. If the Distributor, Redistributors or ITS have been powered off as part of a suspend, their context must be restored in this function in the reverse order to how they were saved during suspend sequence. plat_psci_ops.system_off() .......................... This function is called by PSCI implementation in response to a ``SYSTEM_OFF`` call. It performs the platform-specific system poweroff sequence after notifying the Secure Payload Dispatcher. plat_psci_ops.system_reset() ............................ This function is called by PSCI implementation in response to a ``SYSTEM_RESET`` call. It performs the platform-specific system reset sequence after notifying the Secure Payload Dispatcher. plat_psci_ops.validate_power_state() .................................... This function is called by the PSCI implementation during the ``CPU_SUSPEND`` call to validate the ``power_state`` parameter of the PSCI API and if valid, populate it in ``req_state`` (second argument) array as power domain level specific local states. If the ``power_state`` is invalid, the platform must return PSCI_E_INVALID_PARAMS as error, which is propagated back to the normal world PSCI client. plat_psci_ops.validate_ns_entrypoint() ...................................... This function is called by the PSCI implementation during the ``CPU_SUSPEND``, ``SYSTEM_SUSPEND`` and ``CPU_ON`` calls to validate the non-secure ``entry_point`` parameter passed by the normal world. If the ``entry_point`` is invalid, the platform must return PSCI_E_INVALID_ADDRESS as error, which is propagated back to the normal world PSCI client. plat_psci_ops.get_sys_suspend_power_state() ........................................... This function is called by the PSCI implementation during the ``SYSTEM_SUSPEND`` call to get the ``req_state`` parameter from platform which encodes the power domain level specific local states to suspend to system affinity level. The ``req_state`` will be utilized to do the PSCI state coordination and ``pwr_domain_suspend()`` will be invoked with the coordinated target state to enter system suspend. plat_psci_ops.get_pwr_lvl_state_idx() ..................................... This is an optional function and, if implemented, is invoked by the PSCI implementation to convert the ``local_state`` (first argument) at a specified ``pwr_lvl`` (second argument) to an index between 0 and ``PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL_STATES`` - 1. This function is only needed if the platform supports more than two local power states at each power domain level, that is ``PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL_STATES`` is greater than 2, and needs to account for these local power states. plat_psci_ops.translate_power_state_by_mpidr() .............................................. This is an optional function and, if implemented, verifies the ``power_state`` (second argument) parameter of the PSCI API corresponding to a target power domain. The target power domain is identified by using both ``MPIDR`` (first argument) and the power domain level encoded in ``power_state``. The power domain level specific local states are to be extracted from ``power_state`` and be populated in the ``output_state`` (third argument) array. The functionality is similar to the ``validate_power_state`` function described above and is envisaged to be used in case the validity of ``power_state`` depend on the targeted power domain. If the ``power_state`` is invalid for the targeted power domain, the platform must return PSCI_E_INVALID_PARAMS as error. If this function is not implemented, then the generic implementation relies on ``validate_power_state`` function to translate the ``power_state``. This function can also be used in case the platform wants to support local power state encoding for ``power_state`` parameter of PSCI_STAT_COUNT/RESIDENCY APIs as described in Section 5.18 of `PSCI`_. plat_psci_ops.get_node_hw_state() ................................. This is an optional function. If implemented this function is intended to return the power state of a node (identified by the first parameter, the ``MPIDR``) in the power domain topology (identified by the second parameter, ``power_level``), as retrieved from a power controller or equivalent component on the platform. Upon successful completion, the implementation must map and return the final status among ``HW_ON``, ``HW_OFF`` or ``HW_STANDBY``. Upon encountering failures, it must return either ``PSCI_E_INVALID_PARAMS`` or ``PSCI_E_NOT_SUPPORTED`` as appropriate. Implementations are not expected to handle ``power_levels`` greater than ``PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL``. plat_psci_ops.system_reset2() ............................. This is an optional function. If implemented this function is called during the ``SYSTEM_RESET2`` call to perform a reset based on the first parameter ``reset_type`` as specified in `PSCI`_. The parameter ``cookie`` can be used to pass additional reset information. If the ``reset_type`` is not supported, the function must return ``PSCI_E_NOT_SUPPORTED``. For architectural resets, all failures must return ``PSCI_E_INVALID_PARAMETERS`` and vendor reset can return other PSCI error codes as defined in `PSCI`_. On success this function will not return. plat_psci_ops.write_mem_protect() ................................. This is an optional function. If implemented it enables or disables the ``MEM_PROTECT`` functionality based on the value of ``val``. A non-zero value enables ``MEM_PROTECT`` and a value of zero disables it. Upon encountering failures it must return a negative value and on success it must return 0. plat_psci_ops.read_mem_protect() ................................ This is an optional function. If implemented it returns the current state of ``MEM_PROTECT`` via the ``val`` parameter. Upon encountering failures it must return a negative value and on success it must return 0. plat_psci_ops.mem_protect_chk() ............................... This is an optional function. If implemented it checks if a memory region defined by a base address ``base`` and with a size of ``length`` bytes is protected by ``MEM_PROTECT``. If the region is protected then it must return 0, otherwise it must return a negative number. .. _porting_guide_imf_in_bl31: Interrupt Management framework (in BL31) ---------------------------------------- BL31 implements an Interrupt Management Framework (IMF) to manage interrupts generated in either security state and targeted to EL1 or EL2 in the non-secure state or EL3/S-EL1 in the secure state. The design of this framework is described in the :ref:`Interrupt Management Framework` A platform should export the following APIs to support the IMF. The following text briefly describes each API and its implementation in Arm standard platforms. The API implementation depends upon the type of interrupt controller present in the platform. Arm standard platform layer supports both `Arm Generic Interrupt Controller version 2.0 (GICv2)`_ and `3.0 (GICv3)`_. Juno builds the Arm platform layer to use GICv2 and the FVP can be configured to use either GICv2 or GICv3 depending on the build flag ``FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER`` (See :ref:`build_options_arm_fvp_platform` for more details). See also: :ref:`Interrupt Controller Abstraction APIs`. Function : plat_interrupt_type_to_line() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uint32_t, uint32_t Return : uint32_t The Arm processor signals an interrupt exception either through the IRQ or FIQ interrupt line. The specific line that is signaled depends on how the interrupt controller (IC) reports different interrupt types from an execution context in either security state. The IMF uses this API to determine which interrupt line the platform IC uses to signal each type of interrupt supported by the framework from a given security state. This API must be invoked at EL3. The first parameter will be one of the ``INTR_TYPE_*`` values (see :ref:`Interrupt Management Framework`) indicating the target type of the interrupt, the second parameter is the security state of the originating execution context. The return result is the bit position in the ``SCR_EL3`` register of the respective interrupt trap: IRQ=1, FIQ=2. In the case of Arm standard platforms using GICv2, S-EL1 interrupts are configured as FIQs and Non-secure interrupts as IRQs from either security state. In the case of Arm standard platforms using GICv3, the interrupt line to be configured depends on the security state of the execution context when the interrupt is signalled and are as follows: - The S-EL1 interrupts are signaled as IRQ in S-EL0/1 context and as FIQ in NS-EL0/1/2 context. - The Non secure interrupts are signaled as FIQ in S-EL0/1 context and as IRQ in the NS-EL0/1/2 context. - The EL3 interrupts are signaled as FIQ in both S-EL0/1 and NS-EL0/1/2 context. Function : plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_type() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint32_t This API returns the type of the highest priority pending interrupt at the platform IC. The IMF uses the interrupt type to retrieve the corresponding handler function. ``INTR_TYPE_INVAL`` is returned when there is no interrupt pending. The valid interrupt types that can be returned are ``INTR_TYPE_EL3``, ``INTR_TYPE_S_EL1`` and ``INTR_TYPE_NS``. This API must be invoked at EL3. In the case of Arm standard platforms using GICv2, the *Highest Priority Pending Interrupt Register* (``GICC_HPPIR``) is read to determine the id of the pending interrupt. The type of interrupt depends upon the id value as follows. #. id < 1022 is reported as a S-EL1 interrupt #. id = 1022 is reported as a Non-secure interrupt. #. id = 1023 is reported as an invalid interrupt type. In the case of Arm standard platforms using GICv3, the system register ``ICC_HPPIR0_EL1``, *Highest Priority Pending group 0 Interrupt Register*, is read to determine the id of the pending interrupt. The type of interrupt depends upon the id value as follows. #. id = ``PENDING_G1S_INTID`` (1020) is reported as a S-EL1 interrupt #. id = ``PENDING_G1NS_INTID`` (1021) is reported as a Non-secure interrupt. #. id = ``GIC_SPURIOUS_INTERRUPT`` (1023) is reported as an invalid interrupt type. #. All other interrupt id's are reported as EL3 interrupt. Function : plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint32_t This API returns the id of the highest priority pending interrupt at the platform IC. ``INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE`` is returned when there is no interrupt pending. In the case of Arm standard platforms using GICv2, the *Highest Priority Pending Interrupt Register* (``GICC_HPPIR``) is read to determine the id of the pending interrupt. The id that is returned by API depends upon the value of the id read from the interrupt controller as follows. #. id < 1022. id is returned as is. #. id = 1022. The *Aliased Highest Priority Pending Interrupt Register* (``GICC_AHPPIR``) is read to determine the id of the non-secure interrupt. This id is returned by the API. #. id = 1023. ``INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE`` is returned. In the case of Arm standard platforms using GICv3, if the API is invoked from EL3, the system register ``ICC_HPPIR0_EL1``, *Highest Priority Pending Interrupt group 0 Register*, is read to determine the id of the pending interrupt. The id that is returned by API depends upon the value of the id read from the interrupt controller as follows. #. id < ``PENDING_G1S_INTID`` (1020). id is returned as is. #. id = ``PENDING_G1S_INTID`` (1020) or ``PENDING_G1NS_INTID`` (1021). The system register ``ICC_HPPIR1_EL1``, *Highest Priority Pending Interrupt group 1 Register* is read to determine the id of the group 1 interrupt. This id is returned by the API as long as it is a valid interrupt id #. If the id is any of the special interrupt identifiers, ``INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE`` is returned. When the API invoked from S-EL1 for GICv3 systems, the id read from system register ``ICC_HPPIR1_EL1``, *Highest Priority Pending group 1 Interrupt Register*, is returned if is not equal to GIC_SPURIOUS_INTERRUPT (1023) else ``INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE`` is returned. Function : plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : uint32_t This API is used by the CPU to indicate to the platform IC that processing of the highest pending interrupt has begun. It should return the raw, unmodified value obtained from the interrupt controller when acknowledging an interrupt. The actual interrupt number shall be extracted from this raw value using the API `plat_ic_get_interrupt_id()`. This function in Arm standard platforms using GICv2, reads the *Interrupt Acknowledge Register* (``GICC_IAR``). This changes the state of the highest priority pending interrupt from pending to active in the interrupt controller. It returns the value read from the ``GICC_IAR``, unmodified. In the case of Arm standard platforms using GICv3, if the API is invoked from EL3, the function reads the system register ``ICC_IAR0_EL1``, *Interrupt Acknowledge Register group 0*. If the API is invoked from S-EL1, the function reads the system register ``ICC_IAR1_EL1``, *Interrupt Acknowledge Register group 1*. The read changes the state of the highest pending interrupt from pending to active in the interrupt controller. The value read is returned unmodified. The TSP uses this API to start processing of the secure physical timer interrupt. Function : plat_ic_end_of_interrupt() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uint32_t Return : void This API is used by the CPU to indicate to the platform IC that processing of the interrupt corresponding to the id (passed as the parameter) has finished. The id should be the same as the id returned by the ``plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt()`` API. Arm standard platforms write the id to the *End of Interrupt Register* (``GICC_EOIR``) in case of GICv2, and to ``ICC_EOIR0_EL1`` or ``ICC_EOIR1_EL1`` system register in case of GICv3 depending on where the API is invoked from, EL3 or S-EL1. This deactivates the corresponding interrupt in the interrupt controller. The TSP uses this API to finish processing of the secure physical timer interrupt. Function : plat_ic_get_interrupt_type() [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uint32_t Return : uint32_t This API returns the type of the interrupt id passed as the parameter. ``INTR_TYPE_INVAL`` is returned if the id is invalid. If the id is valid, a valid interrupt type (one of ``INTR_TYPE_EL3``, ``INTR_TYPE_S_EL1`` and ``INTR_TYPE_NS``) is returned depending upon how the interrupt has been configured by the platform IC. This API must be invoked at EL3. Arm standard platforms using GICv2 configures S-EL1 interrupts as Group0 interrupts and Non-secure interrupts as Group1 interrupts. It reads the group value corresponding to the interrupt id from the relevant *Interrupt Group Register* (``GICD_IGROUPRn``). It uses the group value to determine the type of interrupt. In the case of Arm standard platforms using GICv3, both the *Interrupt Group Register* (``GICD_IGROUPRn``) and *Interrupt Group Modifier Register* (``GICD_IGRPMODRn``) is read to figure out whether the interrupt is configured as Group 0 secure interrupt, Group 1 secure interrupt or Group 1 NS interrupt. Common helper functions ----------------------- Function : elx_panic() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This API is called from assembly files when reporting a critical failure that has occured in lower EL and is been trapped in EL3. This call **must not** return. Function : el3_panic() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This API is called from assembly files when encountering a critical failure that cannot be recovered from. This function assumes that it is invoked from a C runtime environment i.e. valid stack exists. This call **must not** return. Function : panic() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This API called from C files when encountering a critical failure that cannot be recovered from. This function in turn prints backtrace (if enabled) and calls el3_panic(). This call **must not** return. Crash Reporting mechanism (in BL31) ----------------------------------- BL31 implements a crash reporting mechanism which prints the various registers of the CPU to enable quick crash analysis and debugging. This mechanism relies on the platform implementing ``plat_crash_console_init``, ``plat_crash_console_putc`` and ``plat_crash_console_flush``. The file ``plat/common/aarch64/crash_console_helpers.S`` contains sample implementation of all of them. Platforms may include this file to their makefiles in order to benefit from them. By default, they will cause the crash output to be routed over the normal console infrastructure and get printed on consoles configured to output in crash state. ``console_set_scope()`` can be used to control whether a console is used for crash output. .. note:: Platforms are responsible for making sure that they only mark consoles for use in the crash scope that are able to support this, i.e. that are written in assembly and conform with the register clobber rules for putc() (x0-x2, x16-x17) and flush() (x0-x3, x16-x17) crash callbacks. In some cases (such as debugging very early crashes that happen before the normal boot console can be set up), platforms may want to control crash output more explicitly. These platforms may instead provide custom implementations for these. They are executed outside of a C environment and without a stack. Many console drivers provide functions named ``console_xxx_core_init/putc/flush`` that are designed to be used by these functions. See Arm platforms (like juno) for an example of this. Function : plat_crash_console_init [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : int This API is used by the crash reporting mechanism to initialize the crash console. It must only use the general purpose registers x0 through x7 to do the initialization and returns 1 on success. Function : plat_crash_console_putc [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : int Return : int This API is used by the crash reporting mechanism to print a character on the designated crash console. It must only use general purpose registers x1 and x2 to do its work. The parameter and the return value are in general purpose register x0. Function : plat_crash_console_flush [mandatory] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : void Return : void This API is used by the crash reporting mechanism to force write of all buffered data on the designated crash console. It should only use general purpose registers x0 through x5 to do its work. .. _External Abort handling and RAS Support: External Abort handling and RAS Support --------------------------------------- Function : plat_ea_handler ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : int Argument : uint64_t Argument : void * Argument : void * Argument : uint64_t Return : void This function is invoked by the RAS framework for the platform to handle an External Abort received at EL3. The intention of the function is to attempt to resolve the cause of External Abort and return; if that's not possible, to initiate orderly shutdown of the system. The first parameter (``int ea_reason``) indicates the reason for External Abort. Its value is one of ``ERROR_EA_*`` constants defined in ``ea_handle.h``. The second parameter (``uint64_t syndrome``) is the respective syndrome presented to EL3 after having received the External Abort. Depending on the nature of the abort (as can be inferred from the ``ea_reason`` parameter), this can be the content of either ``ESR_EL3`` or ``DISR_EL1``. The third parameter (``void *cookie``) is unused for now. The fourth parameter (``void *handle``) is a pointer to the preempted context. The fifth parameter (``uint64_t flags``) indicates the preempted security state. These parameters are received from the top-level exception handler. If ``RAS_FFH_SUPPORT`` is set to ``1``, the default implementation of this function iterates through RAS handlers registered by the platform. If any of the RAS handlers resolve the External Abort, no further action is taken. If ``RAS_FFH_SUPPORT`` is set to ``0``, or if none of the platform RAS handlers could resolve the External Abort, the default implementation prints an error message, and panics. Function : plat_handle_uncontainable_ea ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : int Argument : uint64_t Return : void This function is invoked by the RAS framework when an External Abort of Uncontainable type is received at EL3. Due to the critical nature of Uncontainable errors, the intention of this function is to initiate orderly shutdown of the system, and is not expected to return. This function must be implemented in assembly. The first and second parameters are the same as that of ``plat_ea_handler``. The default implementation of this function calls ``report_unhandled_exception``. Function : plat_handle_double_fault ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : int Argument : uint64_t Return : void This function is invoked by the RAS framework when another External Abort is received at EL3 while one is already being handled. I.e., a call to ``plat_ea_handler`` is outstanding. Due to its critical nature, the intention of this function is to initiate orderly shutdown of the system, and is not expected recover or return. This function must be implemented in assembly. The first and second parameters are the same as that of ``plat_ea_handler``. The default implementation of this function calls ``report_unhandled_exception``. Function : plat_handle_el3_ea ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Return : void This function is invoked when an External Abort is received while executing in EL3. Due to its critical nature, the intention of this function is to initiate orderly shutdown of the system, and is not expected recover or return. This function must be implemented in assembly. The default implementation of this function calls ``report_unhandled_exception``. Function : plat_handle_rng_trap ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uint64_t Argument : cpu_context_t * Return : int This function is invoked by BL31's exception handler when there is a synchronous system register trap caused by access to the RNDR or RNDRRS registers. It allows platforms implementing ``FEAT_RNG_TRAP`` and enabling ``ENABLE_FEAT_RNG_TRAP`` to emulate those system registers by returing back some entropy to the lower EL. The first parameter (``uint64_t esr_el3``) contains the content of the ESR_EL3 syndrome register, which encodes the instruction that was trapped. The interesting information in there is the target register (``get_sysreg_iss_rt()``). The second parameter (``cpu_context_t *ctx``) represents the CPU state in the lower exception level, at the time when the execution of the ``mrs`` instruction was trapped. Its content can be changed, to put the entropy into the target register. The return value indicates how to proceed: - When returning ``TRAP_RET_UNHANDLED`` (-1), the machine will panic. - When returning ``TRAP_RET_REPEAT`` (0), the exception handler will return to the same instruction, so its execution will be repeated. - When returning ``TRAP_RET_CONTINUE`` (1), the exception handler will return to the next instruction. This function needs to be implemented by a platform if it enables FEAT_RNG_TRAP. Function : plat_handle_impdef_trap ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :: Argument : uint64_t Argument : cpu_context_t * Return : int This function is invoked by BL31's exception handler when there is a synchronous system register trap caused by access to the implementation defined registers. It allows platforms enabling ``IMPDEF_SYSREG_TRAP`` to emulate those system registers choosing to program bits of their choice. The first parameter (``uint64_t esr_el3``) contains the content of the ESR_EL3 syndrome register, which encodes the instruction that was trapped. The second parameter (``cpu_context_t *ctx``) represents the CPU state in the lower exception level, at the time when the execution of the ``mrs`` instruction was trapped. The return value indicates how to proceed: - When returning ``TRAP_RET_UNHANDLED`` (-1), the machine will panic. - When returning ``TRAP_RET_REPEAT`` (0), the exception handler will return to the same instruction, so its execution will be repeated. - When returning ``TRAP_RET_CONTINUE`` (1), the exception handler will return to the next instruction. This function needs to be implemented by a platform if it enables IMPDEF_SYSREG_TRAP. Build flags ----------- There are some build flags which can be defined by the platform to control inclusion or exclusion of certain BL stages from the FIP image. These flags need to be defined in the platform makefile which will get included by the build system. - **NEED_BL33** By default, this flag is defined ``yes`` by the build system and ``BL33`` build option should be supplied as a build option. The platform has the option of excluding the BL33 image in the ``fip`` image by defining this flag to ``no``. If any of the options ``EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE`` or ``PRELOADED_BL33_BASE`` are used, this flag will be set to ``no`` automatically. - **ARM_ARCH_MAJOR and ARM_ARCH_MINOR** By default, ARM_ARCH_MAJOR.ARM_ARCH_MINOR is set to 8.0 in ``defaults.mk``, if the platform makefile/build defines or uses the correct ARM_ARCH_MAJOR and ARM_ARCH_MINOR then mandatory Architectural features available for that Arch version will be enabled by default and any optional Arch feature supported by the Architecture and available in TF-A can be enabled from platform specific makefile. Look up to ``arch_features.mk`` for details pertaining to mandatory and optional Arch specific features. Platform include paths ---------------------- Platforms are allowed to add more include paths to be passed to the compiler. The ``PLAT_INCLUDES`` variable is used for this purpose. This is needed in particular for the file ``platform_def.h``. Example: .. code:: c PLAT_INCLUDES += -Iinclude/plat/myplat/include C Library --------- To avoid subtle toolchain behavioral dependencies, the header files provided by the compiler are not used. The software is built with the ``-nostdinc`` flag to ensure no headers are included from the toolchain inadvertently. Instead the required headers are included in the TF-A source tree. The library only contains those C library definitions required by the local implementation. If more functionality is required, the needed library functions will need to be added to the local implementation. Some C headers have been obtained from `FreeBSD`_ and `SCC`_, while others have been written specifically for TF-A. Some implementation files have been obtained from `FreeBSD`_, others have been written specifically for TF-A as well. The files can be found in ``include/lib/libc`` and ``lib/libc``. SCC can be found in http://www.simple-cc.org/. A copy of the `FreeBSD`_ sources can be obtained from http://github.com/freebsd/freebsd. Storage abstraction layer ------------------------- In order to improve platform independence and portability a storage abstraction layer is used to load data from non-volatile platform storage. Currently storage access is only required by BL1 and BL2 phases and performed inside the ``load_image()`` function in ``bl_common.c``. .. uml:: resources/diagrams/plantuml/io_framework_usage_overview.puml It is mandatory to implement at least one storage driver. For the Arm development platforms the Firmware Image Package (FIP) driver is provided as the default means to load data from storage (see :ref:`firmware_design_fip`). The storage layer is described in the header file ``include/drivers/io/io_storage.h``. The implementation of the common library is in ``drivers/io/io_storage.c`` and the driver files are located in ``drivers/io/``. .. uml:: resources/diagrams/plantuml/io_arm_class_diagram.puml Each IO driver must provide ``io_dev_*`` structures, as described in ``drivers/io/io_driver.h``. These are returned via a mandatory registration function that is called on platform initialization. The semi-hosting driver implementation in ``io_semihosting.c`` can be used as an example. Each platform should register devices and their drivers via the storage abstraction layer. These drivers then need to be initialized by bootloader phases as required in their respective ``blx_platform_setup()`` functions. .. uml:: resources/diagrams/plantuml/io_dev_registration.puml The storage abstraction layer provides mechanisms (``io_dev_init()``) to initialize storage devices before IO operations are called. .. uml:: resources/diagrams/plantuml/io_dev_init_and_check.puml The basic operations supported by the layer include ``open()``, ``close()``, ``read()``, ``write()``, ``size()`` and ``seek()``. Drivers do not have to implement all operations, but each platform must provide at least one driver for a device capable of supporting generic operations such as loading a bootloader image. The current implementation only allows for known images to be loaded by the firmware. These images are specified by using their identifiers, as defined in ``include/plat/common/common_def.h`` (or a separate header file included from there). The platform layer (``plat_get_image_source()``) then returns a reference to a device and a driver-specific ``spec`` which will be understood by the driver to allow access to the image data. The layer is designed in such a way that is it possible to chain drivers with other drivers. For example, file-system drivers may be implemented on top of physical block devices, both represented by IO devices with corresponding drivers. In such a case, the file-system "binding" with the block device may be deferred until the file-system device is initialised. The abstraction currently depends on structures being statically allocated by the drivers and callers, as the system does not yet provide a means of dynamically allocating memory. This may also have the affect of limiting the amount of open resources per driver. Measured Boot Platform Interface -------------------------------- Enabling the MEASURED_BOOT flag adds extra platform requirements. Please refer to :ref:`Measured Boot Design` for more details. -------------- *Copyright (c) 2013-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.* .. _PSCI: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0022/latest/ .. _Arm Generic Interrupt Controller version 2.0 (GICv2): http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ihi0048b/index.html .. _3.0 (GICv3): http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ihi0069b/index.html .. _FreeBSD: https://www.freebsd.org .. _SCC: http://www.simple-cc.org/ .. _DRTM: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0113/a