/* * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, ProvenRun S.A.S. All rights reserved. * * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */ /******************************************************************************* * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP. ******************************************************************************/ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "pncd_private.h" #include #include /******************************************************************************* * Structure to keep track of ProvenCore state ******************************************************************************/ static pnc_context_t pncd_sp_context; static bool ree_info; static uint64_t ree_base_addr; static uint64_t ree_length; static uint64_t ree_tag; static bool pnc_initialized; static spinlock_t smc_handler_lock; static int pncd_init(void); static void context_save(unsigned long security_state) { assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state)); cm_el1_sysregs_context_save((uint32_t) security_state); #if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS simd_ctx_save((uint32_t)security_state, false); #endif } static void *context_restore(unsigned long security_state) { void *handle; assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state)); /* Get a reference to the next context */ handle = cm_get_context((uint32_t) security_state); assert(handle); /* Restore state */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore((uint32_t) security_state); #if CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS simd_ctx_restore((uint32_t)security_state); #endif cm_set_next_eret_context((uint32_t) security_state); return handle; } static uint64_t pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, uint32_t flags, void *handle, void *cookie); /******************************************************************************* * Switch context to the specified security state and return the targeted * handle. Note that the context may remain unchanged if the switch is not * allowed. ******************************************************************************/ void *pncd_context_switch_to(unsigned long security_state) { unsigned long sec_state_from = security_state == SECURE ? NON_SECURE : SECURE; assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state)); /* Check if this is the first world switch */ if (!pnc_initialized) { int rc; uint32_t flags; assert(sec_state_from == SECURE); INFO("PnC initialization done\n"); /* * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts * when generated during code executing in the * non-secure state. */ flags = 0U; set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE); rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1, pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler, flags); if (rc != 0) { ERROR("Failed to register S-EL1 interrupt handler (%d)\n", rc); panic(); } context_save(SECURE); pnc_initialized = true; /* * Release the lock before restoring the EL3 context to * bl31_main. */ spin_unlock(&smc_handler_lock); /* * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated * the original request through a synchronous entry * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime * context. */ pncd_synchronous_sp_exit(&pncd_sp_context, (uint64_t) 0x0); /* Unreachable */ ERROR("Returned from pncd_synchronous_sp_exit... Should not happen\n"); panic(); } /* Check that the world switch is allowed */ if (read_mpidr() != pncd_sp_context.mpidr) { if (sec_state_from == SECURE) { /* * Secure -> Non-Secure world switch initiated on a CPU where there * should be no Trusted OS running */ WARN("Secure to Non-Secure switch requested on CPU where ProvenCore is not supposed to be running...\n"); } /* * Secure or Non-Secure world wants to switch world but there is no Secure * software on this core */ return cm_get_context((uint32_t) sec_state_from); } context_save(sec_state_from); return context_restore(security_state); } /******************************************************************************* * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the PNCD. It * validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the PNC at * 'pnc_sel1_intr_entry()' for handling the interrupt. ******************************************************************************/ static uint64_t pncd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id, uint32_t flags, void *handle, void *cookie) { /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */ assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE); /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */ assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE)); /* switch to PnC */ handle = pncd_context_switch_to(SECURE); assert(handle != NULL); SMC_RET0(handle); } #pragma weak plat_pncd_setup int plat_pncd_setup(void) { return 0; } /******************************************************************************* * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry * into the SP for its initialisation. ******************************************************************************/ static int pncd_setup(void) { entry_point_info_t *pnc_ep_info; /* * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its * absence is a critical failure. * * TODO: Add support to conditionally include the SPD service */ pnc_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); if (!pnc_ep_info) { WARN("No PNC provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device without PNC initialization. SMC`s destined for PNC will return SMC_UNK\n"); return 1; } /* * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without * registering any handlers */ if (!pnc_ep_info->pc) { return 1; } pncd_init_pnc_ep_state(pnc_ep_info, pnc_ep_info->pc, &pncd_sp_context); /* * All PNCD initialization done. Now register our init function with * BL31 for deferred invocation */ bl31_register_bl32_init(&pncd_init); bl31_set_next_image_type(NON_SECURE); return plat_pncd_setup(); } /******************************************************************************* * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure * context has already been created by pncd_setup() which can be directly used. * It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI * so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function * performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control * back to this routine through a SMC. ******************************************************************************/ static int32_t pncd_init(void) { entry_point_info_t *pnc_entry_point; uint64_t rc = 0; /* * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its * absence is a critical failure. */ pnc_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); assert(pnc_entry_point); cm_init_my_context(pnc_entry_point); /* * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. It will be * returned via PNC_ENTRY_DONE case */ rc = pncd_synchronous_sp_entry(&pncd_sp_context); /* * If everything went well at this point, the return value should be 0. */ return rc == 0; } #pragma weak plat_pncd_smc_handler /******************************************************************************* * This function is responsible for handling the platform-specific SMCs in the * Trusted OS/App range as defined in the SMC Calling Convention Document. ******************************************************************************/ uintptr_t plat_pncd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, u_register_t x1, u_register_t x2, u_register_t x3, u_register_t x4, void *cookie, void *handle, u_register_t flags) { (void) smc_fid; (void) x1; (void) x2; (void) x3; (void) x4; (void) cookie; (void) flags; SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); } /******************************************************************************* * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App * range as defined in the SMC Calling Convention Document. It is also * responsible for communicating with the Secure payload to delegate work and * return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it will also return any * information that the secure payload needs to do the work assigned to it. * * It should only be called with the smc_handler_lock held. ******************************************************************************/ static uintptr_t pncd_smc_handler_unsafe(uint32_t smc_fid, u_register_t x1, u_register_t x2, u_register_t x3, u_register_t x4, void *cookie, void *handle, u_register_t flags) { uint32_t ns; /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); assert(ns != 0 || read_mpidr() == pncd_sp_context.mpidr); switch (smc_fid) { case SMC_CONFIG_SHAREDMEM: if (ree_info) { /* Do not Yield */ SMC_RET0(handle); } /* * Fetch the physical base address (x1) and size (x2) of the * shared memory allocated by the Non-Secure world. This memory * will be used by PNC to communicate with the Non-Secure world. * Verifying the validity of these values is up to the Trusted * OS. */ ree_base_addr = x1 | (x2 << 32); ree_length = x3; ree_tag = x4; INFO("IN SMC_CONFIG_SHAREDMEM: addr=%lx, length=%lx, tag=%lx\n", (unsigned long) ree_base_addr, (unsigned long) ree_length, (unsigned long) ree_tag); if ((ree_base_addr % 0x200000) != 0) { SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); } if ((ree_length % 0x200000) != 0) { SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); } ree_info = true; /* Do not Yield */ SMC_RET4(handle, 0, 0, 0, 0); break; case SMC_GET_SHAREDMEM: if (ree_info) { x1 = (1U << 16) | ree_tag; x2 = ree_base_addr & 0xFFFFFFFF; x3 = (ree_base_addr >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF; x4 = ree_length & 0xFFFFFFFF; SMC_RET4(handle, x1, x2, x3, x4); } else { SMC_RET4(handle, 0, 0, 0, 0); } break; case SMC_ACTION_FROM_NS: if (ns == 0) { SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); } if (SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ < MIN_PPI_ID) { plat_ic_raise_s_el1_sgi(SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ, pncd_sp_context.mpidr); } else { plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(SPD_PNCD_S_IRQ); } SMC_RET0(handle); break; case SMC_ACTION_FROM_S: if (ns != 0) { SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); } if (SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ < MIN_PPI_ID) { /* * NS SGI is sent to the same core as the one running * PNC */ plat_ic_raise_ns_sgi(SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ, read_mpidr()); } else { plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(SPD_PNCD_NS_IRQ); } SMC_RET0(handle); break; case SMC_YIELD: assert(handle == cm_get_context(ns != 0 ? NON_SECURE : SECURE)); handle = pncd_context_switch_to(ns != 0 ? SECURE : NON_SECURE); assert(handle != NULL); SMC_RET0(handle); break; default: INFO("Unknown smc: %x\n", smc_fid); break; } return plat_pncd_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags); } static uintptr_t pncd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, u_register_t x1, u_register_t x2, u_register_t x3, u_register_t x4, void *cookie, void *handle, u_register_t flags) { uintptr_t ret; /* SMC handling is serialized */ spin_lock(&smc_handler_lock); ret = pncd_smc_handler_unsafe(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags); spin_unlock(&smc_handler_lock); return ret; } /* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */ DECLARE_RT_SVC( pncd_fast, OEN_TOS_START, OEN_TOS_END, SMC_TYPE_FAST, pncd_setup, pncd_smc_handler ); /* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for standard SMC calls */ DECLARE_RT_SVC( pncd_std, OEN_TOS_START, OEN_TOS_END, SMC_TYPE_YIELD, NULL, pncd_smc_handler );