/* * Copyright (c) 2013-2024, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2022, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved. * * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if ENABLE_FEAT_TWED /* Make sure delay value fits within the range(0-15) */ CASSERT(((TWED_DELAY & ~SCR_TWEDEL_MASK) == 0U), assert_twed_delay_value_check); #endif /* ENABLE_FEAT_TWED */ per_world_context_t per_world_context[CPU_DATA_CONTEXT_NUM]; static bool has_secure_perworld_init; static void manage_extensions_common(cpu_context_t *ctx); static void manage_extensions_nonsecure(cpu_context_t *ctx); static void manage_extensions_secure(cpu_context_t *ctx); static void manage_extensions_secure_per_world(void); #if ((IMAGE_BL1) || (IMAGE_BL31 && (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS))) static void setup_el1_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep) { u_register_t sctlr_elx, actlr_elx; /* * Initialise SCTLR_EL1 to the reset value corresponding to the target * execution state setting all fields rather than relying on the hw. * Some fields have architecturally UNKNOWN reset values and these are * set to zero. * * SCTLR.EE: Endianness is taken from the entrypoint attributes. * * SCTLR.M, SCTLR.C and SCTLR.I: These fields must be zero (as * required by PSCI specification) */ sctlr_elx = (EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) != 0U) ? SCTLR_EE_BIT : 0UL; if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) { sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_EL1_RES1; } else { /* * If the target execution state is AArch32 then the following * fields need to be set. * * SCTRL_EL1.nTWE: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFE * instructions are not trapped to EL1. * * SCTLR_EL1.nTWI: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFI * instructions are not trapped to EL1. * * SCTLR_EL1.CP15BEN: Set to one to enable EL0 execution of the * CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions. */ sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_AARCH32_EL1_RES1 | SCTLR_CP15BEN_BIT | SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT; } /* * If workaround of errata 764081 for Cortex-A75 is used then set * SCTLR_EL1.IESB to enable Implicit Error Synchronization Barrier. */ if (errata_a75_764081_applies()) { sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_IESB_BIT; } /* Store the initialised SCTLR_EL1 value in the cpu_context */ write_ctx_sctlr_el1_reg_errata(ctx, sctlr_elx); /* * Base the context ACTLR_EL1 on the current value, as it is * implementation defined. The context restore process will write * the value from the context to the actual register and can cause * problems for processor cores that don't expect certain bits to * be zero. */ actlr_elx = read_actlr_el1(); write_el1_ctx_common(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), actlr_el1, actlr_elx); } #endif /* (IMAGE_BL1) || (IMAGE_BL31 && (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS)) */ /****************************************************************************** * This function performs initializations that are specific to SECURE state * and updates the cpu context specified by 'ctx'. *****************************************************************************/ static void setup_secure_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep) { u_register_t scr_el3; el3_state_t *state; state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3); #if defined(IMAGE_BL31) && !defined(SPD_spmd) /* * SCR_EL3.IRQ, SCR_EL3.FIQ: Enable the physical FIQ and IRQ routing as * indicated by the interrupt routing model for BL31. */ scr_el3 |= get_scr_el3_from_routing_model(SECURE); #endif /* Allow access to Allocation Tags when FEAT_MTE2 is implemented and enabled. */ if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) { scr_el3 |= SCR_ATA_BIT; } write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3); /* * Initialize EL1 context registers unless SPMC is running * at S-EL2. */ #if (!SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2) setup_el1_context(ctx, ep); #endif manage_extensions_secure(ctx); /** * manage_extensions_secure_per_world api has to be executed once, * as the registers getting initialised, maintain constant value across * all the cpus for the secure world. * Henceforth, this check ensures that the registers are initialised once * and avoids re-initialization from multiple cores. */ if (!has_secure_perworld_init) { manage_extensions_secure_per_world(); } } #if ENABLE_RME /****************************************************************************** * This function performs initializations that are specific to REALM state * and updates the cpu context specified by 'ctx'. *****************************************************************************/ static void setup_realm_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep) { u_register_t scr_el3; el3_state_t *state; state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3); scr_el3 |= SCR_NS_BIT | SCR_NSE_BIT; /* CSV2 version 2 and above */ if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) { /* Enable access to the SCXTNUM_ELx registers. */ scr_el3 |= SCR_EnSCXT_BIT; } if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) { /* Set the SCTLR2En bit in SCR_EL3 to enable access to * SCTLR2_ELx registers. */ scr_el3 |= SCR_SCTLR2En_BIT; } write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3); } #endif /* ENABLE_RME */ /****************************************************************************** * This function performs initializations that are specific to NON-SECURE state * and updates the cpu context specified by 'ctx'. *****************************************************************************/ static void setup_ns_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep) { u_register_t scr_el3; el3_state_t *state; state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3); /* SCR_NS: Set the NS bit */ scr_el3 |= SCR_NS_BIT; /* Allow access to Allocation Tags when FEAT_MTE2 is implemented and enabled. */ if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) { scr_el3 |= SCR_ATA_BIT; } #if !CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS /* * Pointer Authentication feature, if present, is always enabled by default * for Non secure lower exception levels. We do not have an explicit * flag to set it. * CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS flag, is explicitly used to enable for lower * exception levels of secure and realm worlds. * * To prevent the leakage between the worlds during world switch, * we enable it only for the non-secure world. * * If the Secure/realm world wants to use pointer authentication, * CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS must be explicitly set to 1, in which case * it will be enabled globally for all the contexts. * * SCR_EL3.API: Set to one to not trap any PAuth instructions at ELs * other than EL3 * * SCR_EL3.APK: Set to one to not trap any PAuth key values at ELs other * than EL3 */ scr_el3 |= SCR_API_BIT | SCR_APK_BIT; #endif /* CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS */ #if HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST_NS /* SCR_EL3.EA: Route External Abort and SError Interrupt to EL3. */ scr_el3 |= SCR_EA_BIT; #endif #if RAS_TRAP_NS_ERR_REC_ACCESS /* * SCR_EL3.TERR: Trap Error record accesses. Accesses to the RAS ERR * and RAS ERX registers from EL1 and EL2(from any security state) * are trapped to EL3. * Set here to trap only for NS EL1/EL2 * */ scr_el3 |= SCR_TERR_BIT; #endif /* CSV2 version 2 and above */ if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) { /* Enable access to the SCXTNUM_ELx registers. */ scr_el3 |= SCR_EnSCXT_BIT; } #ifdef IMAGE_BL31 /* * SCR_EL3.IRQ, SCR_EL3.FIQ: Enable the physical FIQ and IRQ routing as * indicated by the interrupt routing model for BL31. */ scr_el3 |= get_scr_el3_from_routing_model(NON_SECURE); #endif if (is_feat_the_supported()) { /* Set the RCWMASKEn bit in SCR_EL3 to enable access to * RCWMASK_EL1 and RCWSMASK_EL1 registers. */ scr_el3 |= SCR_RCWMASKEn_BIT; } if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) { /* Set the SCTLR2En bit in SCR_EL3 to enable access to * SCTLR2_ELx registers. */ scr_el3 |= SCR_SCTLR2En_BIT; } if (is_feat_d128_supported()) { /* Set the D128En bit in SCR_EL3 to enable access to 128-bit * versions of TTBR0_EL1, TTBR1_EL1, RCWMASK_EL1, RCWSMASK_EL1, * PAR_EL1 and TTBR1_EL2, TTBR0_EL2 and VTTBR_EL2 registers. */ scr_el3 |= SCR_D128En_BIT; } write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3); /* Initialize EL2 context registers */ #if (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) /* * Initialize SCTLR_EL2 context register with reset value. */ write_el2_ctx_common(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), sctlr_el2, SCTLR_EL2_RES1); if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) { /* * Initialize register HCRX_EL2 with its init value. * As the value of HCRX_EL2 is UNKNOWN on reset, there is a * chance that this can lead to unexpected behavior in lower * ELs that have not been updated since the introduction of * this feature if not properly initialized, especially when * it comes to those bits that enable/disable traps. */ write_el2_ctx_hcx(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), hcrx_el2, HCRX_EL2_INIT_VAL); } if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) { /* * Initialize HFG*_EL2 registers with a default value so legacy * systems unaware of FEAT_FGT do not get trapped due to their lack * of initialization for this feature. */ write_el2_ctx_fgt(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), hfgitr_el2, HFGITR_EL2_INIT_VAL); write_el2_ctx_fgt(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), hfgrtr_el2, HFGRTR_EL2_INIT_VAL); write_el2_ctx_fgt(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), hfgwtr_el2, HFGWTR_EL2_INIT_VAL); } #else /* Initialize EL1 context registers */ setup_el1_context(ctx, ep); #endif /* (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) */ manage_extensions_nonsecure(ctx); } /******************************************************************************* * The following function performs initialization of the cpu_context 'ctx' * for first use that is common to all security states, and sets the * initial entrypoint state as specified by the entry_point_info structure. * * The EE and ST attributes are used to configure the endianness and secure * timer availability for the new execution context. ******************************************************************************/ static void setup_context_common(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t *ep) { u_register_t scr_el3; u_register_t mdcr_el3; el3_state_t *state; gp_regs_t *gp_regs; state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); /* Clear any residual register values from the context */ zeromem(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); /* * The lower-EL context is zeroed so that no stale values leak to a world. * It is assumed that an all-zero lower-EL context is good enough for it * to boot correctly. However, there are very few registers where this * is not true and some values need to be recreated. */ #if (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) el2_sysregs_t *el2_ctx = get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx); /* * These bits are set in the gicv3 driver. Losing them (especially the * SRE bit) is problematic for all worlds. Henceforth recreate them. */ u_register_t icc_sre_el2_val = ICC_SRE_DIB_BIT | ICC_SRE_DFB_BIT | ICC_SRE_EN_BIT | ICC_SRE_SRE_BIT; write_el2_ctx_common(el2_ctx, icc_sre_el2, icc_sre_el2_val); /* * The actlr_el2 register can be initialized in platform's reset handler * and it may contain access control bits (e.g. CLUSTERPMUEN bit). */ write_el2_ctx_common(el2_ctx, actlr_el2, read_actlr_el2()); #endif /* (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) */ /* Start with a clean SCR_EL3 copy as all relevant values are set */ scr_el3 = SCR_RESET_VAL; /* * SCR_EL3.TWE: Set to zero so that execution of WFE instructions at * EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL3. * * SCR_EL3.TWI: Set to zero so that execution of WFI instructions at * EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL3. * * SCR_EL3.SMD: Set to zero to enable SMC calls at EL1 and above, from * both Security states and both Execution states. * * SCR_EL3.SIF: Set to one to disable secure instruction execution from * Non-secure memory. */ scr_el3 &= ~(SCR_TWE_BIT | SCR_TWI_BIT | SCR_SMD_BIT); scr_el3 |= SCR_SIF_BIT; /* * SCR_EL3.RW: Set the execution state, AArch32 or AArch64, for next * Exception level as specified by SPSR. */ if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) { scr_el3 |= SCR_RW_BIT; } /* * SCR_EL3.ST: Traps Secure EL1 accesses to the Counter-timer Physical * Secure timer registers to EL3, from AArch64 state only, if specified * by the entrypoint attributes. If SEL2 is present and enabled, the ST * bit always behaves as 1 (i.e. secure physical timer register access * is not trapped) */ if (EP_GET_ST(ep->h.attr) != 0U) { scr_el3 |= SCR_ST_BIT; } /* * If FEAT_HCX is enabled, enable access to HCRX_EL2 by setting * SCR_EL3.HXEn. */ if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) { scr_el3 |= SCR_HXEn_BIT; } /* * If FEAT_LS64_ACCDATA is enabled, enable access to ACCDATA_EL1 by * setting SCR_EL3.ADEn and allow the ST64BV0 instruction by setting * SCR_EL3.EnAS0. */ if (is_feat_ls64_accdata_supported()) { scr_el3 |= SCR_ADEn_BIT | SCR_EnAS0_BIT; } /* * If FEAT_RNG_TRAP is enabled, all reads of the RNDR and RNDRRS * registers are trapped to EL3. */ #if ENABLE_FEAT_RNG_TRAP scr_el3 |= SCR_TRNDR_BIT; #endif #if FAULT_INJECTION_SUPPORT /* Enable fault injection from lower ELs */ scr_el3 |= SCR_FIEN_BIT; #endif #if CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS /* * Enable Pointer Authentication globally for all the worlds. * * SCR_EL3.API: Set to one to not trap any PAuth instructions at ELs * other than EL3 * * SCR_EL3.APK: Set to one to not trap any PAuth key values at ELs other * than EL3 */ scr_el3 |= SCR_API_BIT | SCR_APK_BIT; #endif /* CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS */ /* * SCR_EL3.TCR2EN: Enable access to TCR2_ELx for AArch64 if present. */ if (is_feat_tcr2_supported() && (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64)) { scr_el3 |= SCR_TCR2EN_BIT; } /* * SCR_EL3.PIEN: Enable permission indirection and overlay * registers for AArch64 if present. */ if (is_feat_sxpie_supported() || is_feat_sxpoe_supported()) { scr_el3 |= SCR_PIEN_BIT; } /* * SCR_EL3.GCSEn: Enable GCS registers for AArch64 if present. */ if ((is_feat_gcs_supported()) && (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64)) { scr_el3 |= SCR_GCSEn_BIT; } /* * SCR_EL3.HCE: Enable HVC instructions if next execution state is * AArch64 and next EL is EL2, or if next execution state is AArch32 and * next mode is Hyp. * SCR_EL3.FGTEn: Enable Fine Grained Virtualization Traps under the * same conditions as HVC instructions and when the processor supports * ARMv8.6-FGT. * SCR_EL3.ECVEn: Enable Enhanced Counter Virtualization (ECV) * CNTPOFF_EL2 register under the same conditions as HVC instructions * and when the processor supports ECV. */ if (((GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) && (GET_EL(ep->spsr) == MODE_EL2)) || ((GET_RW(ep->spsr) != MODE_RW_64) && (GET_M32(ep->spsr) == MODE32_hyp))) { scr_el3 |= SCR_HCE_BIT; if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) { scr_el3 |= SCR_FGTEN_BIT; } if (is_feat_ecv_supported()) { scr_el3 |= SCR_ECVEN_BIT; } } /* Enable WFE trap delay in SCR_EL3 if supported and configured */ if (is_feat_twed_supported()) { /* Set delay in SCR_EL3 */ scr_el3 &= ~(SCR_TWEDEL_MASK << SCR_TWEDEL_SHIFT); scr_el3 |= ((TWED_DELAY & SCR_TWEDEL_MASK) << SCR_TWEDEL_SHIFT); /* Enable WFE delay */ scr_el3 |= SCR_TWEDEn_BIT; } #if IMAGE_BL31 && defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 /* Enable S-EL2 if FEAT_SEL2 is implemented for all the contexts. */ if (is_feat_sel2_supported()) { scr_el3 |= SCR_EEL2_BIT; } #endif /* (IMAGE_BL31 && defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2) */ /* * Populate EL3 state so that we've the right context * before doing ERET */ write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3); write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, ep->pc); write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SPSR_EL3, ep->spsr); /* Start with a clean MDCR_EL3 copy as all relevant values are set */ mdcr_el3 = MDCR_EL3_RESET_VAL; /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- * Initialise MDCR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw. * Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. * * MDCR_EL3.SDD: Set to one to disable AArch64 Secure self-hosted debug. * Debug exceptions, other than Breakpoint Instruction exceptions, are * disabled from all ELs in Secure state. * * MDCR_EL3.SPD32: Set to 0b10 to disable AArch32 Secure self-hosted * privileged debug from S-EL1. * * MDCR_EL3.TDOSA: Set to zero so that EL2 and EL2 System register * access to the powerdown debug registers do not trap to EL3. * * MDCR_EL3.TDA: Set to zero to allow EL0, EL1 and EL2 access to the * debug registers, other than those registers that are controlled by * MDCR_EL3.TDOSA. */ mdcr_el3 |= ((MDCR_SDD_BIT | MDCR_SPD32(MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE)) & ~(MDCR_TDA_BIT | MDCR_TDOSA_BIT)) ; write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_MDCR_EL3, mdcr_el3); /* * Configure MDCR_EL3 register as applicable for each world * (NS/Secure/Realm) context. */ manage_extensions_common(ctx); /* * Store the X0-X7 value from the entrypoint into the context * Use memcpy as we are in control of the layout of the structures */ gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(ctx); memcpy(gp_regs, (void *)&ep->args, sizeof(aapcs64_params_t)); } /******************************************************************************* * Context management library initialization routine. This library is used by * runtime services to share pointers to 'cpu_context' structures for secure * non-secure and realm states. Management of the structures and their associated * memory is not done by the context management library e.g. the PSCI service * manages the cpu context used for entry from and exit to the non-secure state. * The Secure payload dispatcher service manages the context(s) corresponding to * the secure state. It also uses this library to get access to the non-secure * state cpu context pointers. * Lastly, this library provides the API to make SP_EL3 point to the cpu context * which will be used for programming an entry into a lower EL. The same context * will be used to save state upon exception entry from that EL. ******************************************************************************/ void __init cm_init(void) { /* * The context management library has only global data to initialize, but * that will be done when the BSS is zeroed out. */ } /******************************************************************************* * This is the high-level function used to initialize the cpu_context 'ctx' for * first use. It performs initializations that are common to all security states * and initializations specific to the security state specified in 'ep' ******************************************************************************/ void cm_setup_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t *ep) { unsigned int security_state; assert(ctx != NULL); /* * Perform initializations that are common * to all security states */ setup_context_common(ctx, ep); security_state = GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr); /* Perform security state specific initializations */ switch (security_state) { case SECURE: setup_secure_context(ctx, ep); break; #if ENABLE_RME case REALM: setup_realm_context(ctx, ep); break; #endif case NON_SECURE: setup_ns_context(ctx, ep); break; default: ERROR("Invalid security state\n"); panic(); break; } } /******************************************************************************* * Enable architecture extensions for EL3 execution. This function only updates * registers in-place which are expected to either never change or be * overwritten by el3_exit. ******************************************************************************/ #if IMAGE_BL31 void cm_manage_extensions_el3(void) { if (is_feat_amu_supported()) { amu_init_el3(); } if (is_feat_sme_supported()) { sme_init_el3(); } pmuv3_init_el3(); } #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */ /****************************************************************************** * Function to initialise the registers with the RESET values in the context * memory, which are maintained per world. ******************************************************************************/ #if IMAGE_BL31 void cm_el3_arch_init_per_world(per_world_context_t *per_world_ctx) { /* * Initialise CPTR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw. * * CPTR_EL3.TFP: Set to zero so that accesses to the V- or Z- registers * by Advanced SIMD, floating-point or SVE instructions (if * implemented) do not trap to EL3. * * CPTR_EL3.TCPAC: Set to zero so that accesses to CPACR_EL1, * CPTR_EL2,CPACR, or HCPTR do not trap to EL3. */ uint64_t cptr_el3 = CPTR_EL3_RESET_VAL & ~(TCPAC_BIT | TFP_BIT); per_world_ctx->ctx_cptr_el3 = cptr_el3; /* * Initialize MPAM3_EL3 to its default reset value * * MPAM3_EL3_RESET_VAL sets the MPAM3_EL3.TRAPLOWER bit that forces * all lower ELn MPAM3_EL3 register access to, trap to EL3 */ per_world_ctx->ctx_mpam3_el3 = MPAM3_EL3_RESET_VAL; } #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */ /******************************************************************************* * Initialise per_world_context for Non-Secure world. * This function enables the architecture extensions, which have same value * across the cores for the non-secure world. ******************************************************************************/ #if IMAGE_BL31 void manage_extensions_nonsecure_per_world(void) { cm_el3_arch_init_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]); if (is_feat_sme_supported()) { sme_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]); } if (is_feat_sve_supported()) { sve_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]); } if (is_feat_amu_supported()) { amu_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]); } if (is_feat_sys_reg_trace_supported()) { sys_reg_trace_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]); } if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) { mpam_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]); } } #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */ /******************************************************************************* * Initialise per_world_context for Secure world. * This function enables the architecture extensions, which have same value * across the cores for the secure world. ******************************************************************************/ static void manage_extensions_secure_per_world(void) { #if IMAGE_BL31 cm_el3_arch_init_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]); if (is_feat_sme_supported()) { if (ENABLE_SME_FOR_SWD) { /* * Enable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context, SPM must ensure * SME, SVE, and FPU/SIMD context properly managed. */ sme_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]); } else { /* * Disable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context so non-secure * world can safely use the associated registers. */ sme_disable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]); } } if (is_feat_sve_supported()) { if (ENABLE_SVE_FOR_SWD) { /* * Enable SVE and FPU in secure context, SPM must ensure * that the SVE and FPU register contexts are properly managed. */ sve_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]); } else { /* * Disable SVE and FPU in secure context so non-secure world * can safely use them. */ sve_disable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]); } } /* NS can access this but Secure shouldn't */ if (is_feat_sys_reg_trace_supported()) { sys_reg_trace_disable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]); } has_secure_perworld_init = true; #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */ } /******************************************************************************* * Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Non-secure world only * and disable for secure world. * * NOTE: Arch features which have been provided with the capability of getting * enabled only for non-secure world and being disabled for secure world are * grouped here, as the MDCR_EL3 context value remains same across the worlds. ******************************************************************************/ static void manage_extensions_common(cpu_context_t *ctx) { #if IMAGE_BL31 if (is_feat_spe_supported()) { /* * Enable FEAT_SPE for Non-Secure and prohibit for Secure state. */ spe_enable(ctx); } if (is_feat_trbe_supported()) { /* * Enable FEAT_TRBE for Non-Secure and prohibit for Secure and * Realm state. */ trbe_enable(ctx); } if (is_feat_trf_supported()) { /* * Enable FEAT_TRF for Non-Secure and prohibit for Secure state. */ trf_enable(ctx); } #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */ } /******************************************************************************* * Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Non-secure world. ******************************************************************************/ static void manage_extensions_nonsecure(cpu_context_t *ctx) { #if IMAGE_BL31 if (is_feat_amu_supported()) { amu_enable(ctx); } if (is_feat_sme_supported()) { sme_enable(ctx); } if (is_feat_fgt2_supported()) { fgt2_enable(ctx); } if (is_feat_debugv8p9_supported()) { debugv8p9_extended_bp_wp_enable(ctx); } if (is_feat_brbe_supported()) { brbe_enable(ctx); } pmuv3_enable(ctx); #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */ } /* TODO: move to lib/extensions/pauth when it has been ported to FEAT_STATE */ static __unused void enable_pauth_el2(void) { u_register_t hcr_el2 = read_hcr_el2(); /* * For Armv8.3 pointer authentication feature, disable traps to EL2 when * accessing key registers or using pointer authentication instructions * from lower ELs. */ hcr_el2 |= (HCR_API_BIT | HCR_APK_BIT); write_hcr_el2(hcr_el2); } #if INIT_UNUSED_NS_EL2 /******************************************************************************* * Enable architecture extensions in-place at EL2 on first entry to Non-secure * world when EL2 is empty and unused. ******************************************************************************/ static void manage_extensions_nonsecure_el2_unused(void) { #if IMAGE_BL31 if (is_feat_spe_supported()) { spe_init_el2_unused(); } if (is_feat_amu_supported()) { amu_init_el2_unused(); } if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) { mpam_init_el2_unused(); } if (is_feat_trbe_supported()) { trbe_init_el2_unused(); } if (is_feat_sys_reg_trace_supported()) { sys_reg_trace_init_el2_unused(); } if (is_feat_trf_supported()) { trf_init_el2_unused(); } pmuv3_init_el2_unused(); if (is_feat_sve_supported()) { sve_init_el2_unused(); } if (is_feat_sme_supported()) { sme_init_el2_unused(); } #if ENABLE_PAUTH enable_pauth_el2(); #endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */ #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */ } #endif /* INIT_UNUSED_NS_EL2 */ /******************************************************************************* * Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Secure world. ******************************************************************************/ static void manage_extensions_secure(cpu_context_t *ctx) { #if IMAGE_BL31 if (is_feat_sme_supported()) { if (ENABLE_SME_FOR_SWD) { /* * Enable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context, secure manager * must ensure SME, SVE, and FPU/SIMD context properly managed. */ sme_init_el3(); sme_enable(ctx); } else { /* * Disable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context so non-secure * world can safely use the associated registers. */ sme_disable(ctx); } } #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */ } #if !IMAGE_BL1 /******************************************************************************* * The following function initializes the cpu_context for a CPU specified by * its `cpu_idx` for first use, and sets the initial entrypoint state as * specified by the entry_point_info structure. ******************************************************************************/ void cm_init_context_by_index(unsigned int cpu_idx, const entry_point_info_t *ep) { cpu_context_t *ctx; ctx = cm_get_context_by_index(cpu_idx, GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr)); cm_setup_context(ctx, ep); } #endif /* !IMAGE_BL1 */ /******************************************************************************* * The following function initializes the cpu_context for the current CPU * for first use, and sets the initial entrypoint state as specified by the * entry_point_info structure. ******************************************************************************/ void cm_init_my_context(const entry_point_info_t *ep) { cpu_context_t *ctx; ctx = cm_get_context(GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr)); cm_setup_context(ctx, ep); } /* EL2 present but unused, need to disable safely. SCTLR_EL2 can be ignored */ static void init_nonsecure_el2_unused(cpu_context_t *ctx) { #if INIT_UNUSED_NS_EL2 u_register_t hcr_el2 = HCR_RESET_VAL; u_register_t mdcr_el2; u_register_t scr_el3; scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCR_EL3); /* Set EL2 register width: Set HCR_EL2.RW to match SCR_EL3.RW */ if ((scr_el3 & SCR_RW_BIT) != 0U) { hcr_el2 |= HCR_RW_BIT; } write_hcr_el2(hcr_el2); /* * Initialise CPTR_EL2 setting all fields rather than relying on the hw. * All fields have architecturally UNKNOWN reset values. */ write_cptr_el2(CPTR_EL2_RESET_VAL); /* * Initialise CNTHCTL_EL2. All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on * reset and are set to zero except for field(s) listed below. * * CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PTEN: Set to one to disable traps to Hyp mode of * Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the physical timer registers. * * CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PCTEN: Set to one to disable traps to Hyp mode of * Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the physical counter registers. */ write_cnthctl_el2(CNTHCTL_RESET_VAL | EL1PCEN_BIT | EL1PCTEN_BIT); /* * Initialise CNTVOFF_EL2 to zero as it resets to an architecturally * UNKNOWN value. */ write_cntvoff_el2(0); /* * Set VPIDR_EL2 and VMPIDR_EL2 to match MIDR_EL1 and MPIDR_EL1 * respectively. */ write_vpidr_el2(read_midr_el1()); write_vmpidr_el2(read_mpidr_el1()); /* * Initialise VTTBR_EL2. All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. * * VTTBR_EL2.VMID: Set to zero. Even though EL1&0 stage 2 address * translation is disabled, cache maintenance operations depend on the * VMID. * * VTTBR_EL2.BADDR: Set to zero as EL1&0 stage 2 address translation is * disabled. */ write_vttbr_el2(VTTBR_RESET_VAL & ~((VTTBR_VMID_MASK << VTTBR_VMID_SHIFT) | (VTTBR_BADDR_MASK << VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT))); /* * Initialise MDCR_EL2, setting all fields rather than relying on hw. * Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. * * MDCR_EL2.TDRA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0 and EL1 System * register accesses to the Debug ROM registers are not trapped to EL2. * * MDCR_EL2.TDOSA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL1 System register * accesses to the powerdown debug registers are not trapped to EL2. * * MDCR_EL2.TDA: Set to zero so that System register accesses to the * debug registers do not trap to EL2. * * MDCR_EL2.TDE: Set to zero so that debug exceptions are not routed to * EL2. */ mdcr_el2 = MDCR_EL2_RESET_VAL & ~(MDCR_EL2_TDRA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDOSA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDE_BIT); write_mdcr_el2(mdcr_el2); /* * Initialise HSTR_EL2. All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset. * * HSTR_EL2.T: Set all these fields to zero so that Non-secure EL0 or * EL1 accesses to System registers do not trap to EL2. */ write_hstr_el2(HSTR_EL2_RESET_VAL & ~(HSTR_EL2_T_MASK)); /* * Initialise CNTHP_CTL_EL2. All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on * reset. * * CNTHP_CTL_EL2:ENABLE: Set to zero to disable the EL2 physical timer * and prevent timer interrupts. */ write_cnthp_ctl_el2(CNTHP_CTL_RESET_VAL & ~(CNTHP_CTL_ENABLE_BIT)); manage_extensions_nonsecure_el2_unused(); #endif /* INIT_UNUSED_NS_EL2 */ } /******************************************************************************* * Prepare the CPU system registers for first entry into realm, secure, or * normal world. * * If execution is requested to EL2 or hyp mode, SCTLR_EL2 is initialized * If execution is requested to non-secure EL1 or svc mode, and the CPU supports * EL2 then EL2 is disabled by configuring all necessary EL2 registers. * For all entries, the EL1 registers are initialized from the cpu_context ******************************************************************************/ void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state) { u_register_t sctlr_el2, scr_el3; cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); if (security_state == NON_SECURE) { uint64_t el2_implemented = el_implemented(2); scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCR_EL3); if (el2_implemented != EL_IMPL_NONE) { /* * If context is not being used for EL2, initialize * HCRX_EL2 with its init value here. */ if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) { write_hcrx_el2(HCRX_EL2_INIT_VAL); } /* * Initialize Fine-grained trap registers introduced * by FEAT_FGT so all traps are initially disabled when * switching to EL2 or a lower EL, preventing undesired * behavior. */ if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) { /* * Initialize HFG*_EL2 registers with a default * value so legacy systems unaware of FEAT_FGT * do not get trapped due to their lack of * initialization for this feature. */ write_hfgitr_el2(HFGITR_EL2_INIT_VAL); write_hfgrtr_el2(HFGRTR_EL2_INIT_VAL); write_hfgwtr_el2(HFGWTR_EL2_INIT_VAL); } /* Condition to ensure EL2 is being used. */ if ((scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT) != 0U) { /* Initialize SCTLR_EL2 register with reset value. */ sctlr_el2 = SCTLR_EL2_RES1; /* * If workaround of errata 764081 for Cortex-A75 * is used then set SCTLR_EL2.IESB to enable * Implicit Error Synchronization Barrier. */ if (errata_a75_764081_applies()) { sctlr_el2 |= SCTLR_IESB_BIT; } write_sctlr_el2(sctlr_el2); } else { /* * (scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT==0) * EL2 implemented but unused. */ init_nonsecure_el2_unused(ctx); } } } #if (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS) /* Restore EL1 system registers, only when CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS=0 */ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(security_state); #endif cm_set_next_eret_context(security_state); } #if (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) static void el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hdfgrtr_el2, read_hdfgrtr_el2()); if (is_feat_amu_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hafgrtr_el2, read_hafgrtr_el2()); } write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hdfgwtr_el2, read_hdfgwtr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgitr_el2, read_hfgitr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgrtr_el2, read_hfgrtr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgwtr_el2, read_hfgwtr_el2()); } static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { write_hdfgrtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hdfgrtr_el2)); if (is_feat_amu_supported()) { write_hafgrtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hafgrtr_el2)); } write_hdfgwtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hdfgwtr_el2)); write_hfgitr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgitr_el2)); write_hfgrtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgrtr_el2)); write_hfgwtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgwtr_el2)); } static void el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt2(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hdfgrtr2_el2, read_hdfgrtr2_el2()); write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hdfgwtr2_el2, read_hdfgwtr2_el2()); write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgitr2_el2, read_hfgitr2_el2()); write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgrtr2_el2, read_hfgrtr2_el2()); write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgwtr2_el2, read_hfgwtr2_el2()); } static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt2(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { write_hdfgrtr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hdfgrtr2_el2)); write_hdfgwtr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hdfgwtr2_el2)); write_hfgitr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgitr2_el2)); write_hfgrtr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgrtr2_el2)); write_hfgwtr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgwtr2_el2)); } static void el2_sysregs_context_save_mpam(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { u_register_t mpam_idr = read_mpamidr_el1(); write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpam2_el2, read_mpam2_el2()); /* * The context registers that we intend to save would be part of the * PE's system register frame only if MPAMIDR_EL1.HAS_HCR == 1. */ if ((mpam_idr & MPAMIDR_HAS_HCR_BIT) == 0U) { return; } /* * MPAMHCR_EL2, MPAMVPMV_EL2 and MPAMVPM0_EL2 are always present if * MPAMIDR_HAS_HCR_BIT == 1. */ write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamhcr_el2, read_mpamhcr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm0_el2, read_mpamvpm0_el2()); write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpmv_el2, read_mpamvpmv_el2()); /* * The number of MPAMVPM registers is implementation defined, their * number is stored in the MPAMIDR_EL1 register. */ switch ((mpam_idr >> MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_SHIFT) & MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_MASK) { case 7: write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm7_el2, read_mpamvpm7_el2()); __fallthrough; case 6: write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm6_el2, read_mpamvpm6_el2()); __fallthrough; case 5: write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm5_el2, read_mpamvpm5_el2()); __fallthrough; case 4: write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm4_el2, read_mpamvpm4_el2()); __fallthrough; case 3: write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm3_el2, read_mpamvpm3_el2()); __fallthrough; case 2: write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm2_el2, read_mpamvpm2_el2()); __fallthrough; case 1: write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm1_el2, read_mpamvpm1_el2()); break; } } static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_mpam(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { u_register_t mpam_idr = read_mpamidr_el1(); write_mpam2_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpam2_el2)); if ((mpam_idr & MPAMIDR_HAS_HCR_BIT) == 0U) { return; } write_mpamhcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamhcr_el2)); write_mpamvpm0_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm0_el2)); write_mpamvpmv_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpmv_el2)); switch ((mpam_idr >> MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_SHIFT) & MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_MASK) { case 7: write_mpamvpm7_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm7_el2)); __fallthrough; case 6: write_mpamvpm6_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm6_el2)); __fallthrough; case 5: write_mpamvpm5_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm5_el2)); __fallthrough; case 4: write_mpamvpm4_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm4_el2)); __fallthrough; case 3: write_mpamvpm3_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm3_el2)); __fallthrough; case 2: write_mpamvpm2_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm2_el2)); __fallthrough; case 1: write_mpamvpm1_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm1_el2)); break; } } /* --------------------------------------------------------------------------- * The following registers are not added: * ICH_AP0R_EL2 * ICH_AP1R_EL2 * ICH_LR_EL2 * * NOTE: For a system with S-EL2 present but not enabled, accessing * ICC_SRE_EL2 is undefined from EL3. To workaround this change the * SCR_EL3.NS = 1 before accessing this register. * --------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void el2_sysregs_context_save_gic(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { #if defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, icc_sre_el2, read_icc_sre_el2()); #else u_register_t scr_el3 = read_scr_el3(); write_scr_el3(scr_el3 | SCR_NS_BIT); isb(); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, icc_sre_el2, read_icc_sre_el2()); write_scr_el3(scr_el3); isb(); #endif write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ich_hcr_el2, read_ich_hcr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ich_vmcr_el2, read_ich_vmcr_el2()); } static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_gic(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { #if defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2 write_icc_sre_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, icc_sre_el2)); #else u_register_t scr_el3 = read_scr_el3(); write_scr_el3(scr_el3 | SCR_NS_BIT); isb(); write_icc_sre_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, icc_sre_el2)); write_scr_el3(scr_el3); isb(); #endif write_ich_hcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ich_hcr_el2)); write_ich_vmcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ich_vmcr_el2)); } /* ----------------------------------------------------- * The following registers are not added: * AMEVCNTVOFF0_EL2 * AMEVCNTVOFF1_EL2 * ----------------------------------------------------- */ static void el2_sysregs_context_save_common(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, actlr_el2, read_actlr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, afsr0_el2, read_afsr0_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, afsr1_el2, read_afsr1_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, amair_el2, read_amair_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cnthctl_el2, read_cnthctl_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cntvoff_el2, read_cntvoff_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cptr_el2, read_cptr_el2()); if (CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS) { write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, dbgvcr32_el2, read_dbgvcr32_el2()); } write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, elr_el2, read_elr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, esr_el2, read_esr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, far_el2, read_far_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hacr_el2, read_hacr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hcr_el2, read_hcr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hpfar_el2, read_hpfar_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hstr_el2, read_hstr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, mair_el2, read_mair_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, mdcr_el2, read_mdcr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, sctlr_el2, read_sctlr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, spsr_el2, read_spsr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, sp_el2, read_sp_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, tcr_el2, read_tcr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el2, read_tpidr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vbar_el2, read_vbar_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vmpidr_el2, read_vmpidr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vpidr_el2, read_vpidr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vtcr_el2, read_vtcr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_sysreg128(ctx, ttbr0_el2, read_ttbr0_el2()); write_el2_ctx_sysreg128(ctx, vttbr_el2, read_vttbr_el2()); } static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_common(el2_sysregs_t *ctx) { write_actlr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, actlr_el2)); write_afsr0_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, afsr0_el2)); write_afsr1_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, afsr1_el2)); write_amair_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, amair_el2)); write_cnthctl_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cnthctl_el2)); write_cntvoff_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cntvoff_el2)); write_cptr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cptr_el2)); if (CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS) { write_dbgvcr32_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, dbgvcr32_el2)); } write_elr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, elr_el2)); write_esr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, esr_el2)); write_far_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, far_el2)); write_hacr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hacr_el2)); write_hcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hcr_el2)); write_hpfar_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hpfar_el2)); write_hstr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hstr_el2)); write_mair_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, mair_el2)); write_mdcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, mdcr_el2)); write_sctlr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, sctlr_el2)); write_spsr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, spsr_el2)); write_sp_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, sp_el2)); write_tcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, tcr_el2)); write_tpidr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el2)); write_ttbr0_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr0_el2)); write_vbar_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vbar_el2)); write_vmpidr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vmpidr_el2)); write_vpidr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vpidr_el2)); write_vtcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vtcr_el2)); write_vttbr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vttbr_el2)); } /******************************************************************************* * Save EL2 sysreg context ******************************************************************************/ void cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(uint32_t security_state) { cpu_context_t *ctx; el2_sysregs_t *el2_sysregs_ctx; ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); el2_sysregs_ctx = get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx); el2_sysregs_context_save_common(el2_sysregs_ctx); el2_sysregs_context_save_gic(el2_sysregs_ctx); if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_mte2(el2_sysregs_ctx, tfsr_el2, read_tfsr_el2()); } if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) { el2_sysregs_context_save_mpam(el2_sysregs_ctx); } if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) { el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt(el2_sysregs_ctx); } if (is_feat_fgt2_supported()) { el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt2(el2_sysregs_ctx); } if (is_feat_ecv_v2_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_ecv(el2_sysregs_ctx, cntpoff_el2, read_cntpoff_el2()); } if (is_feat_vhe_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_vhe(el2_sysregs_ctx, contextidr_el2, read_contextidr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_vhe_sysreg128(el2_sysregs_ctx, ttbr1_el2, read_ttbr1_el2()); } if (is_feat_ras_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_ras(el2_sysregs_ctx, vdisr_el2, read_vdisr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_ras(el2_sysregs_ctx, vsesr_el2, read_vsesr_el2()); } if (is_feat_nv2_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_neve(el2_sysregs_ctx, vncr_el2, read_vncr_el2()); } if (is_feat_trf_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_trf(el2_sysregs_ctx, trfcr_el2, read_trfcr_el2()); } if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_csv2_2(el2_sysregs_ctx, scxtnum_el2, read_scxtnum_el2()); } if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_hcx(el2_sysregs_ctx, hcrx_el2, read_hcrx_el2()); } if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_tcr2(el2_sysregs_ctx, tcr2_el2, read_tcr2_el2()); } if (is_feat_sxpie_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_sxpie(el2_sysregs_ctx, pire0_el2, read_pire0_el2()); write_el2_ctx_sxpie(el2_sysregs_ctx, pir_el2, read_pir_el2()); } if (is_feat_sxpoe_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_sxpoe(el2_sysregs_ctx, por_el2, read_por_el2()); } if (is_feat_s2pie_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_s2pie(el2_sysregs_ctx, s2pir_el2, read_s2pir_el2()); } if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_gcs(el2_sysregs_ctx, gcscr_el2, read_gcscr_el2()); write_el2_ctx_gcs(el2_sysregs_ctx, gcspr_el2, read_gcspr_el2()); } if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) { write_el2_ctx_sctlr2(el2_sysregs_ctx, sctlr2_el2, read_sctlr2_el2()); } } /******************************************************************************* * Restore EL2 sysreg context ******************************************************************************/ void cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(uint32_t security_state) { cpu_context_t *ctx; el2_sysregs_t *el2_sysregs_ctx; ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); el2_sysregs_ctx = get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx); el2_sysregs_context_restore_common(el2_sysregs_ctx); el2_sysregs_context_restore_gic(el2_sysregs_ctx); if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) { write_tfsr_el2(read_el2_ctx_mte2(el2_sysregs_ctx, tfsr_el2)); } if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) { el2_sysregs_context_restore_mpam(el2_sysregs_ctx); } if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) { el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt(el2_sysregs_ctx); } if (is_feat_fgt2_supported()) { el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt2(el2_sysregs_ctx); } if (is_feat_ecv_v2_supported()) { write_cntpoff_el2(read_el2_ctx_ecv(el2_sysregs_ctx, cntpoff_el2)); } if (is_feat_vhe_supported()) { write_contextidr_el2(read_el2_ctx_vhe(el2_sysregs_ctx, contextidr_el2)); write_ttbr1_el2(read_el2_ctx_vhe(el2_sysregs_ctx, ttbr1_el2)); } if (is_feat_ras_supported()) { write_vdisr_el2(read_el2_ctx_ras(el2_sysregs_ctx, vdisr_el2)); write_vsesr_el2(read_el2_ctx_ras(el2_sysregs_ctx, vsesr_el2)); } if (is_feat_nv2_supported()) { write_vncr_el2(read_el2_ctx_neve(el2_sysregs_ctx, vncr_el2)); } if (is_feat_trf_supported()) { write_trfcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_trf(el2_sysregs_ctx, trfcr_el2)); } if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) { write_scxtnum_el2(read_el2_ctx_csv2_2(el2_sysregs_ctx, scxtnum_el2)); } if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) { write_hcrx_el2(read_el2_ctx_hcx(el2_sysregs_ctx, hcrx_el2)); } if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) { write_tcr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_tcr2(el2_sysregs_ctx, tcr2_el2)); } if (is_feat_sxpie_supported()) { write_pire0_el2(read_el2_ctx_sxpie(el2_sysregs_ctx, pire0_el2)); write_pir_el2(read_el2_ctx_sxpie(el2_sysregs_ctx, pir_el2)); } if (is_feat_sxpoe_supported()) { write_por_el2(read_el2_ctx_sxpoe(el2_sysregs_ctx, por_el2)); } if (is_feat_s2pie_supported()) { write_s2pir_el2(read_el2_ctx_s2pie(el2_sysregs_ctx, s2pir_el2)); } if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) { write_gcscr_el2(read_el2_ctx_gcs(el2_sysregs_ctx, gcscr_el2)); write_gcspr_el2(read_el2_ctx_gcs(el2_sysregs_ctx, gcspr_el2)); } if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) { write_sctlr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_sctlr2(el2_sysregs_ctx, sctlr2_el2)); } } #endif /* (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) */ #if IMAGE_BL31 /********************************************************************************* * This function allows Architecture features asymmetry among cores. * TF-A assumes that all the cores in the platform has architecture feature parity * and hence the context is setup on different core (e.g. primary sets up the * context for secondary cores).This assumption may not be true for systems where * cores are not conforming to same Arch version or there is CPU Erratum which * requires certain feature to be be disabled only on a given core. * * This function is called on secondary cores to override any disparity in context * setup by primary, this would be called during warmboot path. *********************************************************************************/ void cm_handle_asymmetric_features(void) { cpu_context_t *ctx __maybe_unused = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); assert(ctx != NULL); #if ENABLE_SPE_FOR_NS == FEAT_STATE_CHECK_ASYMMETRIC if (is_feat_spe_supported()) { spe_enable(ctx); } else { spe_disable(ctx); } #endif #if ERRATA_A520_2938996 || ERRATA_X4_2726228 if (check_if_affected_core() == ERRATA_APPLIES) { if (is_feat_trbe_supported()) { trbe_disable(ctx); } } #endif #if ENABLE_FEAT_TCR2 == FEAT_STATE_CHECK_ASYMMETRIC el3_state_t *el3_state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); u_register_t spsr = read_ctx_reg(el3_state, CTX_SPSR_EL3); if (is_feat_tcr2_supported() && (GET_RW(spsr) == MODE_RW_64)) { tcr2_enable(ctx); } else { tcr2_disable(ctx); } #endif } #endif /******************************************************************************* * This function is used to exit to Non-secure world. If CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS * is enabled, it restores EL1 and EL2 sysreg contexts instead of directly * updating EL1 and EL2 registers. Otherwise, it calls the generic * cm_prepare_el3_exit function. ******************************************************************************/ void cm_prepare_el3_exit_ns(void) { #if IMAGE_BL31 /* * Check and handle Architecture feature asymmetry among cores. * * In warmboot path secondary cores context is initialized on core which * did CPU_ON SMC call, if there is feature asymmetry in these cores handle * it in this function call. * For Symmetric cores this is an empty function. */ cm_handle_asymmetric_features(); #endif #if (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) #if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); assert(ctx != NULL); /* Assert that EL2 is used. */ u_register_t scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCR_EL3); assert(((scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT) != 0UL) && (el_implemented(2U) != EL_IMPL_NONE)); #endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ /* Restore EL2 sysreg contexts */ cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); #else cm_prepare_el3_exit(NON_SECURE); #endif /* (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) */ } #if ((IMAGE_BL1) || (IMAGE_BL31 && (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS))) /******************************************************************************* * The next set of six functions are used by runtime services to save and restore * EL1 context on the 'cpu_context' structure for the specified security state. ******************************************************************************/ static void el1_sysregs_context_save(el1_sysregs_t *ctx) { write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, spsr_el1, read_spsr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, elr_el1, read_elr_el1()); #if (!ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT) write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, sctlr_el1, read_sctlr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tcr_el1, read_tcr_el1()); #endif /* (!ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT) */ write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, cpacr_el1, read_cpacr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, csselr_el1, read_csselr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, sp_el1, read_sp_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, esr_el1, read_esr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr0_el1, read_ttbr0_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr1_el1, read_ttbr1_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mair_el1, read_mair_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, amair_el1, read_amair_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, actlr_el1, read_actlr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el1, read_tpidr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el0, read_tpidr_el0()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidrro_el0, read_tpidrro_el0()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, par_el1, read_par_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, far_el1, read_far_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, afsr0_el1, read_afsr0_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, afsr1_el1, read_afsr1_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, contextidr_el1, read_contextidr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, vbar_el1, read_vbar_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mdccint_el1, read_mdccint_el1()); write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mdscr_el1, read_mdscr_el1()); if (CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS) { /* Save Aarch32 registers */ write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_abt, read_spsr_abt()); write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_und, read_spsr_und()); write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_irq, read_spsr_irq()); write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_fiq, read_spsr_fiq()); write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, dacr32_el2, read_dacr32_el2()); write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, ifsr32_el2, read_ifsr32_el2()); } if (NS_TIMER_SWITCH) { /* Save NS Timer registers */ write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntp_ctl_el0, read_cntp_ctl_el0()); write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntp_cval_el0, read_cntp_cval_el0()); write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntv_ctl_el0, read_cntv_ctl_el0()); write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntv_cval_el0, read_cntv_cval_el0()); write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntkctl_el1, read_cntkctl_el1()); } if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, tfsre0_el1, read_tfsre0_el1()); write_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, tfsr_el1, read_tfsr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, rgsr_el1, read_rgsr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, gcr_el1, read_gcr_el1()); } if (is_feat_ras_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_ras(ctx, disr_el1, read_disr_el1()); } if (is_feat_s1pie_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_s1pie(ctx, pire0_el1, read_pire0_el1()); write_el1_ctx_s1pie(ctx, pir_el1, read_pir_el1()); } if (is_feat_s1poe_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_s1poe(ctx, por_el1, read_por_el1()); } if (is_feat_s2poe_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_s2poe(ctx, s2por_el1, read_s2por_el1()); } if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_tcr2(ctx, tcr2_el1, read_tcr2_el1()); } if (is_feat_trf_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_trf(ctx, trfcr_el1, read_trfcr_el1()); } if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_csv2_2(ctx, scxtnum_el0, read_scxtnum_el0()); write_el1_ctx_csv2_2(ctx, scxtnum_el1, read_scxtnum_el1()); } if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcscr_el1, read_gcscr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcscre0_el1, read_gcscre0_el1()); write_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcspr_el1, read_gcspr_el1()); write_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcspr_el0, read_gcspr_el0()); } if (is_feat_the_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_the(ctx, rcwmask_el1, read_rcwmask_el1()); write_el1_ctx_the(ctx, rcwsmask_el1, read_rcwsmask_el1()); } if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_sctlr2(ctx, sctlr2_el1, read_sctlr2_el1()); } if (is_feat_ls64_accdata_supported()) { write_el1_ctx_ls64(ctx, accdata_el1, read_accdata_el1()); } } static void el1_sysregs_context_restore(el1_sysregs_t *ctx) { write_spsr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, spsr_el1)); write_elr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, elr_el1)); #if (!ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT) write_sctlr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, sctlr_el1)); write_tcr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tcr_el1)); #endif /* (!ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT) */ write_cpacr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, cpacr_el1)); write_csselr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, csselr_el1)); write_sp_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, sp_el1)); write_esr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, esr_el1)); write_ttbr0_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr0_el1)); write_ttbr1_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr1_el1)); write_mair_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mair_el1)); write_amair_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, amair_el1)); write_actlr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, actlr_el1)); write_tpidr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el1)); write_tpidr_el0(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el0)); write_tpidrro_el0(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidrro_el0)); write_par_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, par_el1)); write_far_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, far_el1)); write_afsr0_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, afsr0_el1)); write_afsr1_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, afsr1_el1)); write_contextidr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, contextidr_el1)); write_vbar_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, vbar_el1)); write_mdccint_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mdccint_el1)); write_mdscr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mdscr_el1)); if (CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS) { /* Restore Aarch32 registers */ write_spsr_abt(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_abt)); write_spsr_und(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_und)); write_spsr_irq(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_irq)); write_spsr_fiq(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_fiq)); write_dacr32_el2(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, dacr32_el2)); write_ifsr32_el2(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, ifsr32_el2)); } if (NS_TIMER_SWITCH) { /* Restore NS Timer registers */ write_cntp_ctl_el0(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntp_ctl_el0)); write_cntp_cval_el0(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntp_cval_el0)); write_cntv_ctl_el0(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntv_ctl_el0)); write_cntv_cval_el0(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntv_cval_el0)); write_cntkctl_el1(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntkctl_el1)); } if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) { write_tfsre0_el1(read_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, tfsre0_el1)); write_tfsr_el1(read_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, tfsr_el1)); write_rgsr_el1(read_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, rgsr_el1)); write_gcr_el1(read_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, gcr_el1)); } if (is_feat_ras_supported()) { write_disr_el1(read_el1_ctx_ras(ctx, disr_el1)); } if (is_feat_s1pie_supported()) { write_pire0_el1(read_el1_ctx_s1pie(ctx, pire0_el1)); write_pir_el1(read_el1_ctx_s1pie(ctx, pir_el1)); } if (is_feat_s1poe_supported()) { write_por_el1(read_el1_ctx_s1poe(ctx, por_el1)); } if (is_feat_s2poe_supported()) { write_s2por_el1(read_el1_ctx_s2poe(ctx, s2por_el1)); } if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) { write_tcr2_el1(read_el1_ctx_tcr2(ctx, tcr2_el1)); } if (is_feat_trf_supported()) { write_trfcr_el1(read_el1_ctx_trf(ctx, trfcr_el1)); } if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) { write_scxtnum_el0(read_el1_ctx_csv2_2(ctx, scxtnum_el0)); write_scxtnum_el1(read_el1_ctx_csv2_2(ctx, scxtnum_el1)); } if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) { write_gcscr_el1(read_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcscr_el1)); write_gcscre0_el1(read_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcscre0_el1)); write_gcspr_el1(read_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcspr_el1)); write_gcspr_el0(read_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcspr_el0)); } if (is_feat_the_supported()) { write_rcwmask_el1(read_el1_ctx_the(ctx, rcwmask_el1)); write_rcwsmask_el1(read_el1_ctx_the(ctx, rcwsmask_el1)); } if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) { write_sctlr2_el1(read_el1_ctx_sctlr2(ctx, sctlr2_el1)); } if (is_feat_ls64_accdata_supported()) { write_accdata_el1(read_el1_ctx_ls64(ctx, accdata_el1)); } } /******************************************************************************* * The next couple of functions are used by runtime services to save and restore * EL1 context on the 'cpu_context' structure for the specified security state. ******************************************************************************/ void cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(uint32_t security_state) { cpu_context_t *ctx; ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); el1_sysregs_context_save(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx)); #if IMAGE_BL31 if (security_state == SECURE) PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_exited_secure_world); else PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_exited_normal_world); #endif } void cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(uint32_t security_state) { cpu_context_t *ctx; ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); el1_sysregs_context_restore(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx)); #if IMAGE_BL31 if (security_state == SECURE) PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_entering_secure_world); else PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_entering_normal_world); #endif } #endif /* ((IMAGE_BL1) || (IMAGE_BL31 && (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS))) */ /******************************************************************************* * This function populates ELR_EL3 member of 'cpu_context' pertaining to the * given security state with the given entrypoint ******************************************************************************/ void cm_set_elr_el3(uint32_t security_state, uintptr_t entrypoint) { cpu_context_t *ctx; el3_state_t *state; ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); /* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */ state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entrypoint); } /******************************************************************************* * This function populates ELR_EL3 and SPSR_EL3 members of 'cpu_context' * pertaining to the given security state ******************************************************************************/ void cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(uint32_t security_state, uintptr_t entrypoint, uint32_t spsr) { cpu_context_t *ctx; el3_state_t *state; ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); /* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */ state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entrypoint); write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SPSR_EL3, spsr); } /******************************************************************************* * This function updates a single bit in the SCR_EL3 member of the 'cpu_context' * pertaining to the given security state using the value and bit position * specified in the parameters. It preserves all other bits. ******************************************************************************/ void cm_write_scr_el3_bit(uint32_t security_state, uint32_t bit_pos, uint32_t value) { cpu_context_t *ctx; el3_state_t *state; u_register_t scr_el3; ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); /* Ensure that the bit position is a valid one */ assert(((1UL << bit_pos) & SCR_VALID_BIT_MASK) != 0U); /* Ensure that the 'value' is only a bit wide */ assert(value <= 1U); /* * Get the SCR_EL3 value from the cpu context, clear the desired bit * and set it to its new value. */ state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3); scr_el3 &= ~(1UL << bit_pos); scr_el3 |= (u_register_t)value << bit_pos; write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3); } /******************************************************************************* * This function retrieves SCR_EL3 member of 'cpu_context' pertaining to the * given security state. ******************************************************************************/ u_register_t cm_get_scr_el3(uint32_t security_state) { cpu_context_t *ctx; el3_state_t *state; ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); /* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */ state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); return read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3); } /******************************************************************************* * This function is used to program the context that's used for exception * return. This initializes the SP_EL3 to a pointer to a 'cpu_context' set for * the required security state ******************************************************************************/ void cm_set_next_eret_context(uint32_t security_state) { cpu_context_t *ctx; ctx = cm_get_context(security_state); assert(ctx != NULL); cm_set_next_context(ctx); }