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@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
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signed char dest_exists = 0;
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signed char ovr;
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+/* Inverse of cp -d ("cp without -d") */
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#define FLAGS_DEREF (flags & FILEUTILS_DEREFERENCE)
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if ((FLAGS_DEREF ? stat : lstat)(source, &source_stat) < 0) {
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@@ -229,12 +230,22 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
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return 0;
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}
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- if (S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode)
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- /* DEREF uses stat, which never returns S_ISLNK() == true. */
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+ if (/* "cp thing1 thing2" without -R: just open and read() from thing1 */
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+ !(flags & FILEUTILS_RECUR)
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+ /* "cp [-opts] regular_file thing2" */
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+ || S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode)
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+ /* DEREF uses stat, which never returns S_ISLNK() == true.
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+ * So the below is never true: */
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/* || (FLAGS_DEREF && S_ISLNK(source_stat.st_mode)) */
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) {
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int src_fd;
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int dst_fd;
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+ mode_t new_mode;
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+
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+ if (!FLAGS_DEREF && S_ISLNK(source_stat.st_mode)) {
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+ /* "cp -d symlink dst": create a link */
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+ goto dont_cat;
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+ }
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if (ENABLE_FEATURE_PRESERVE_HARDLINKS && !FLAGS_DEREF) {
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const char *link_target;
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@@ -258,18 +269,24 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
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if (src_fd < 0)
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return -1;
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+ /* Do not try to open with weird mode fields */
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+ new_mode = source_stat.st_mode;
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+ if (!S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode))
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+ new_mode = 0666;
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+
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/* POSIX way is a security problem versus symlink attacks,
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* we do it only for non-symlinks, and only for non-recursive,
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* non-interactive cp. NB: it is still racy
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* for "cp file /home/bad_user/file" case
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* (user can rm file and create a link to /etc/passwd) */
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if (DO_POSIX_CP
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- || (dest_exists && !(flags & (FILEUTILS_RECUR|FILEUTILS_INTERACTIVE))
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+ || (dest_exists
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+ && !(flags & (FILEUTILS_RECUR|FILEUTILS_INTERACTIVE))
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&& !S_ISLNK(dest_stat.st_mode))
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) {
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- dst_fd = open(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, source_stat.st_mode);
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+ dst_fd = open(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, new_mode);
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} else /* safe way: */
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- dst_fd = open(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, source_stat.st_mode);
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+ dst_fd = open(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, new_mode);
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if (dst_fd == -1) {
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ovr = ask_and_unlink(dest, flags);
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if (ovr <= 0) {
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@@ -277,7 +294,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
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return ovr;
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}
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/* It shouldn't exist. If it exists, do not open (symlink attack?) */
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- dst_fd = open3_or_warn(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, source_stat.st_mode);
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+ dst_fd = open3_or_warn(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, new_mode);
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if (dst_fd < 0) {
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close(src_fd);
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return -1;
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@@ -285,8 +302,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
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}
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#if ENABLE_SELINUX
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- if (((flags & FILEUTILS_PRESERVE_SECURITY_CONTEXT)
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- || (flags & FILEUTILS_SET_SECURITY_CONTEXT))
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+ if ((flags & (FILEUTILS_PRESERVE_SECURITY_CONTEXT|FILEUTILS_SET_SECURITY_CONTEXT))
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&& is_selinux_enabled() > 0
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) {
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security_context_t con;
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@@ -313,8 +329,13 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
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}
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/* ...but read size is already checked by bb_copyfd_eof */
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close(src_fd);
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+ /* "cp /dev/something new_file" should not
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+ * copy mode of /dev/something */
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+ if (!S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode))
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+ return retval;
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goto preserve_mode_ugid_time;
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}
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+ dont_cat:
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/* Source is a symlink or a special file */
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/* We are lazy here, a bit lax with races... */
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