SECURITY 4.7 KB

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  6. curl security for developers
  7. ============================
  8. This document is intended to provide guidance to curl developers on how
  9. security vulnerabilities should be handled.
  10. Publishing Information
  11. ----------------------
  12. All known and public curl or libcurl related vulnerabilities are listed on
  13. [the curl web site security page](http://curl.haxx.se/docs/security.html).
  14. Security vulnerabilities should not be entered in the project's public bug
  15. tracker unless the necessary configuration is in place to limit access to the
  16. issue to only the reporter and the project's security team.
  17. Vulnerability Handling
  18. ----------------------
  19. The typical process for handling a new security vulnerability is as follows.
  20. No information should be made public about a vulnerability until it is
  21. formally announced at the end of this process. That means, for example that a
  22. bug tracker entry must NOT be created to track the issue since that will make
  23. the issue public and it should not be discussed on any of the project's public
  24. mailing lists. Also messages associated with any commits should not make
  25. any reference to the security nature of the commit if done prior to the public
  26. announcement.
  27. - The person discovering the issue, the reporter, reports the vulnerability
  28. privately to `curl-security@haxx.se`. That's an email alias that reaches a
  29. handful of selected and trusted people.
  30. - Messages that do not relate to the reporting or managing of an undisclosed
  31. security vulnerability in curl or libcurl are ignored and no further action
  32. is required.
  33. - A person in the security team sends an e-mail to the original reporter to
  34. acknowledge the report.
  35. - The security team investigates the report and either rejects it or accepts
  36. it.
  37. - If the report is rejected, the team writes to the reporter to explain why.
  38. - If the report is accepted, the team writes to the reporter to let him/her
  39. know it is accepted and that they are working on a fix.
  40. - The security team discusses the problem, works out a fix, considers the
  41. impact of the problem and suggests a release schedule. This discussion
  42. should involve the reporter as much as possible.
  43. - The release of the information should be "as soon as possible" and is most
  44. often synced with an upcoming release that contains the fix. If the
  45. reporter, or anyone else, thinks the next planned release is too far away
  46. then a separate earlier release for security reasons should be considered.
  47. - Write a security advisory draft about the problem that explains what the
  48. problem is, its impact, which versions it affects, solutions or
  49. workarounds, when the release is out and make sure to credit all
  50. contributors properly.
  51. - Request a CVE number from distros@openwall[1] when also informing and
  52. preparing them for the upcoming public security vulnerability announcement -
  53. attach the advisory draft for information. Note that 'distros' won't accept
  54. an embargo longer than 19 days.
  55. - Update the "security advisory" with the CVE number.
  56. - The security team commits the fix in a private branch. The commit message
  57. should ideally contain the CVE number. This fix is usually also distributed
  58. to the 'distros' mailing list to allow them to use the fix prior to the
  59. public announcement.
  60. - At the day of the next release, the private branch is merged into the master
  61. branch and pushed. Once pushed, the information is accessible to the public
  62. and the actual release should follow suit immediately afterwards.
  63. - The project team creates a release that includes the fix.
  64. - The project team announces the release and the vulnerability to the world in
  65. the same manner we always announce releases. It gets sent to the
  66. curl-announce, curl-library and curl-users mailing lists.
  67. - The security web page on the web site should get the new vulnerability
  68. mentioned.
  69. [1] = http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros
  70. CURL-SECURITY (at haxx dot se)
  71. ------------------------------
  72. Who is on this list? There are a couple of criteria you must meet, and then we
  73. might ask you to join the list or you can ask to join it. It really isn't very
  74. formal. We basically only require that you have a long-term presence in the
  75. curl project and you have shown an understanding for the project and its way
  76. of working. You must've been around for a good while and you should have no
  77. plans in vanishing in the near future.
  78. We do not make the list of partipants public mostly because it tends to vary
  79. somewhat over time and a list somewhere will only risk getting outdated.