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@@ -8,25 +8,34 @@
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*/
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#include <stdlib.h>
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+#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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+#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "internal/evp_int.h"
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+#include "internal/numbers.h"
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+#include "kdf_local.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
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+static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
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+static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
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static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result);
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+static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
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+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
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+ uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
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+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
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-typedef struct {
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+struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
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unsigned char *pass;
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size_t pass_len;
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unsigned char *salt;
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size_t salt_len;
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- uint64_t N, r, p;
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+ uint64_t N;
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+ uint32_t r, p;
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uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
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-} SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX;
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+};
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/* Custom uint64_t parser since we do not have strtoull */
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static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result)
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@@ -53,51 +62,53 @@ static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result)
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return 1;
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}
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-static int pkey_scrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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+static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_scrypt_new(void)
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{
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- SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
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+ EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
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- kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx));
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- if (kctx == NULL) {
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- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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- return 0;
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+ impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
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+ if (impl == NULL) {
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+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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+ return NULL;
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}
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+ kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
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+ return impl;
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+}
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- /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
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- * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
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- * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * (N + p) bytes).
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- */
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- kctx->N = 1 << 20;
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- kctx->r = 8;
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- kctx->p = 1;
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- kctx->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
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-
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- ctx->data = kctx;
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-
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- return 1;
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+static void kdf_scrypt_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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+{
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+ kdf_scrypt_reset(impl);
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+ OPENSSL_free(impl);
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}
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-static void pkey_scrypt_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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+static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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{
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- SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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+ OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
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+ OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
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+ memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
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+ kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
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+}
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- OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len);
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- OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->pass, kctx->pass_len);
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- OPENSSL_free(kctx);
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+static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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+{
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+ /* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
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+ * original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
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+ * for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
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+ */
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+ impl->N = 1 << 20;
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+ impl->r = 8;
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+ impl->p = 1;
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+ impl->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
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}
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-static int pkey_scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
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- const unsigned char *new_buffer,
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- const int new_buflen)
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+static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
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+ const unsigned char *new_buffer,
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+ size_t new_buflen)
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{
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if (new_buffer == NULL)
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return 1;
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- if (new_buflen < 0)
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- return 0;
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-
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- if (*buffer != NULL)
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- OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
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+ OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
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if (new_buflen > 0) {
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*buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
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@@ -105,7 +116,7 @@ static int pkey_scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
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*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
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}
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if (*buffer == NULL) {
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- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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+ KDFerr(KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -118,149 +129,378 @@ static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
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return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
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}
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-static int pkey_scrypt_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
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+static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
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{
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- SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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uint64_t u64_value;
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-
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- switch (type) {
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- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PASS:
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- return pkey_scrypt_set_membuf(&kctx->pass, &kctx->pass_len, p2, p1);
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-
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- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_SALT:
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- return pkey_scrypt_set_membuf(&kctx->salt, &kctx->salt_len, p2, p1);
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-
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- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_N:
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- u64_value = *((uint64_t *)p2);
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+ uint32_t value;
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+ const unsigned char *p;
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+ size_t len;
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+
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+ switch (cmd) {
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+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
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+ p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
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+ len = va_arg(args, size_t);
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+ return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
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+
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+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
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+ p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
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+ len = va_arg(args, size_t);
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+ return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
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+
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+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N:
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+ u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
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if ((u64_value <= 1) || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
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return 0;
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- kctx->N = u64_value;
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+
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+ impl->N = u64_value;
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return 1;
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- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_R:
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- u64_value = *((uint64_t *)p2);
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- if (u64_value < 1)
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+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R:
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+ value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
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+ if (value < 1)
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return 0;
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- kctx->r = u64_value;
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+
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+ impl->r = value;
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return 1;
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- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_P:
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- u64_value = *((uint64_t *)p2);
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- if (u64_value < 1)
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+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P:
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+ value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
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+ if (value < 1)
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return 0;
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- kctx->p = u64_value;
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+
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+ impl->p = value;
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return 1;
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- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_MAXMEM_BYTES:
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- u64_value = *((uint64_t *)p2);
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+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES:
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+ u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
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if (u64_value < 1)
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return 0;
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- kctx->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
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+
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+ impl->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
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return 1;
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default:
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return -2;
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
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+ const char *value)
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+{
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+ int int_value = atoi(value);
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+ if (int_value < 0 || (uint64_t)int_value > UINT32_MAX) {
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+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT32, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
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+ return 0;
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}
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+ return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, (uint32_t)int_value);
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}
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-static int pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type,
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- const char *value)
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+static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
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+ const char *value)
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{
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- uint64_t int_value;
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+ uint64_t u64_value;
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- if (!atou64(value, &int_value)) {
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- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
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+ if (!atou64(value, &u64_value)) {
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+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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- return pkey_scrypt_ctrl(ctx, type, 0, &int_value);
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+ return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, u64_value);
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}
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-static int pkey_scrypt_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type,
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- const char *value)
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+static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
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+ const char *value)
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{
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if (value == NULL) {
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- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
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+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
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return 0;
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}
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if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
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- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PASS, value);
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+ return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
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+ value);
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if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
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- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PASS, value);
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+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
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+ value);
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if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
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- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_SALT, value);
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+ return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
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+ value);
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if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
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- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_SALT, value);
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+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
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+ value);
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if (strcmp(type, "N") == 0)
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- return pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_N, value);
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+ return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "r") == 0)
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- return pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_R, value);
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+ return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "p") == 0)
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- return pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_P, value);
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+ return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "maxmem_bytes") == 0)
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- return pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_MAXMEM_BYTES,
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- value);
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+ return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES,
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+ value);
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- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE);
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return -2;
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}
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-static int pkey_scrypt_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
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- size_t *keylen)
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+static int kdf_scrypt_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
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+ size_t keylen)
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{
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- SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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-
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- if (kctx->pass == NULL) {
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- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
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+ if (impl->pass == NULL) {
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+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
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return 0;
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}
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- if (kctx->salt == NULL) {
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- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
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+ if (impl->salt == NULL) {
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+ KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
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return 0;
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}
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- return EVP_PBE_scrypt((char *)kctx->pass, kctx->pass_len, kctx->salt,
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- kctx->salt_len, kctx->N, kctx->r, kctx->p,
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- kctx->maxmem_bytes, key, *keylen);
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+ return scrypt_alg((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len, impl->salt,
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+ impl->salt_len, impl->N, impl->r, impl->p,
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+ impl->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen);
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+}
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+
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+const EVP_KDF_METHOD scrypt_kdf_meth = {
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+ EVP_KDF_SCRYPT,
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+ kdf_scrypt_new,
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+ kdf_scrypt_free,
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+ kdf_scrypt_reset,
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+ kdf_scrypt_ctrl,
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+ kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str,
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+ NULL,
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+ kdf_scrypt_derive
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+};
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+
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+#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
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+static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
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+{
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+ int i;
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+ uint32_t x[16];
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+
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+ memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
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+ for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
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+ x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
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+ x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
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+ x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
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+ x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
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+ x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
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+ x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
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+ x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
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+ x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
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+ x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
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+ x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
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+ x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
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+ x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
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+ x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
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+ x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
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+ x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
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+ x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
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+ x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
|
|
|
+ x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
|
|
|
+ x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
|
|
|
+ x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
|
|
|
+ x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
|
|
|
+ x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
|
|
|
+ x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
|
|
|
+ x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
|
|
|
+ x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
|
|
|
+ x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
|
|
|
+ x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
|
|
|
+ x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
|
|
|
+ x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
|
|
|
+ x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
|
|
|
+ x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
|
|
|
+ x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
|
|
|
+ inout[i] += x[i];
|
|
|
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ uint64_t i, j;
|
|
|
+ uint32_t X[16], *pB;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
|
|
|
+ pB = B;
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
|
|
|
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
|
|
|
+ X[j] ^= *pB++;
|
|
|
+ salsa208_word_specification(X);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
|
|
|
+ uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *pB;
|
|
|
+ uint32_t *pV;
|
|
|
+ uint64_t i, k;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Convert from little endian input */
|
|
|
+ for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
|
|
|
+ *pV = *pB++;
|
|
|
+ *pV |= *pB++ << 8;
|
|
|
+ *pV |= *pB++ << 16;
|
|
|
+ *pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
|
|
|
+ scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
|
|
|
+ uint32_t j;
|
|
|
+ j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
|
|
|
+ pV = V + 32 * r * j;
|
|
|
+ for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
|
|
|
+ T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
|
|
|
+ scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ /* Convert output to little endian */
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
|
|
|
+ uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
|
|
|
+ *pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
|
|
|
+ *pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
|
|
|
+ *pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
|
|
|
+ *pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-const EVP_PKEY_METHOD scrypt_pkey_meth = {
|
|
|
- EVP_PKEY_SCRYPT,
|
|
|
- 0,
|
|
|
- pkey_scrypt_init,
|
|
|
- 0,
|
|
|
- pkey_scrypt_cleanup,
|
|
|
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
|
|
|
+# define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1)
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0, 0,
|
|
|
- 0, 0,
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
|
|
|
+ * most (all?) platforms.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0,
|
|
|
- 0,
|
|
|
+#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0,
|
|
|
- 0,
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Maximum value of p * r:
|
|
|
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
|
|
|
+ * p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
|
|
|
+ * p * r <= (2^30-1)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0, 0,
|
|
|
+#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX ((1 << 30) - 1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
|
|
+static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
|
|
|
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
|
|
|
+ uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ int rv = 0;
|
|
|
+ unsigned char *B;
|
|
|
+ uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
|
|
|
+ uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Sanity check parameters */
|
|
|
+ /* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
|
|
|
+ if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ /* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
|
|
|
+ if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
|
|
|
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0, 0,
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
|
|
|
+ * automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0, 0,
|
|
|
+ if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
|
|
|
+ if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
|
|
|
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0,
|
|
|
- pkey_scrypt_derive,
|
|
|
- pkey_scrypt_ctrl,
|
|
|
- pkey_scrypt_ctrl_str
|
|
|
-};
|
|
|
+ /* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * B size in section 5 step 1.S
|
|
|
+ * Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
|
|
|
+ * p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ Blen = p * 128 * r;
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
|
|
|
+ * have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
|
|
|
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
|
|
|
+ * This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
|
|
|
+ if (N + 2 > i / r) {
|
|
|
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
|
|
|
+ if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
|
|
|
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
|
|
|
+ if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
|
|
|
+ maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
|
|
|
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
|
|
|
+ if (key == NULL)
|
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
|
|
|
+ if (B == NULL) {
|
|
|
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
|
|
|
+ T = X + 32 * r;
|
|
|
+ V = T + 32 * r;
|
|
|
+ if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
|
|
|
+ (int)Blen, B) == 0)
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
|
|
|
+ scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
|
|
|
+ keylen, key) == 0)
|
|
|
+ goto err;
|
|
|
+ rv = 1;
|
|
|
+ err:
|
|
|
+ if (rv == 0)
|
|
|
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
|
|
|
+ return rv;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|