/* * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../ssl_local.h" #include "statem_local.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt); static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt); static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s); static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s); static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt); static ossl_inline int received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc) { return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL; } /* * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? * * Return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) return 0; return 1; } /* * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? * * Return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral * ciphersuite or for SRP */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSRP)) { return 1; } return 0; } /* * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error * (transition not allowed) */ static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; /* * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() */ switch (st->hand_state) { default: break; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: /* * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. */ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: if (s->hit) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; return 1; } } else { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT; return 1; } #endif } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT; return 1; } #endif break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_OK: if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; return 1; } if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/ # error Internal DTLS version error #endif if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) { s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; /* * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished? */ if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } } break; } /* No valid transition found */ return 0; } /* * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error * (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ske_expected; /* * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) goto err; return 1; } switch (st->hand_state) { default: break; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; return 1; } if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } } break; case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: /* * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a * HelloRetryRequest. */ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } } else { if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick != NULL && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if * the server is resuming. */ s->hit = 1; st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; return 1; } } else { ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; return 1; } } } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: /* * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if * |ext.status_expected| is set */ if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; return 1; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } goto err; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } goto err; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_OK: if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; return 1; } break; } err: /* No valid transition found */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { BIO *rbio; /* * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. */ s->init_num = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)); BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); return 0; } SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc) { /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't try to compress it */ return sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509 && sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; } /* * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the * server. */ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; /* * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). */ switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { if (do_compressed_cert(s)) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after * we already sent close_notify */ if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) { /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; else if (do_compressed_cert(s)) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now(); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; else if (do_compressed_cert(s)) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT: case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_OK: if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* Try to read from the server instead */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } } /* * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; /* * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until * later */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; case TLS_ST_OK: if (!s->renegotiate) { /* * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have * received a message from the server. Better read it. */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } /* Renegotiation */ /* fall thru */ case TLS_ST_BEFORE: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { /* * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't * actually selected a version yet. */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what * we will be sent */ s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now(); return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: /* * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one * because we did early data. */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now(); return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now(); if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: /* * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is * sent, but no verify packet is sent */ /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. */ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; } if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; } else { #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #endif } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: /* * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more * convenient time. */ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) { if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } } /* * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from * the client to the server. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* No pre work to be done */ break; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) { /* * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again. */ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, TLS_ANY_VERSION, OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE, OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { /* SSLfatal already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } break; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->hit) { /* * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these * messages unless we need to. */ st->use_timer = 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) { /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); } #endif } break; case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: /* * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. */ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1); case TLS_ST_OK: /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * client to the server. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); s->init_num = 0; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* No post work to be done */ break; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING && s->max_early_data > 0) { /* * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */ } else if (!statem_flush(s)) { return WORK_MORE_A; } if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ s->first_packet = 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) break; if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING && s->max_early_data > 0) { /* * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. */ if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) return WORK_ERROR; break; } s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) s->session->compress_meth = 0; else s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id; #endif if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_B; if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } } break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the * client * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); return 0; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; else *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; break; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; break; case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; break; case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: *confunc = NULL; *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT: *confunc = tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate; *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE; break; #endif case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; break; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; break; #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: *confunc = tls_construct_finished; *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; break; } return 1; } /* * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ return 0; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: /* * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs */ return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) return 3; return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12; case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; } } /* * Process a message that the client has received from the server. */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s, pkt); #endif case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); } } /* * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message * from the server */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); } } CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { unsigned char *p; size_t sess_id_len; int i, protverr; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; unsigned char *session_id; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); if (protverr != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } if (sess == NULL || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ p = s->s3.client_random; /* * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { size_t idx; i = 1; for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) { if (p[idx]) { i = 0; break; } } } else { i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE); } if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random), DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } /*- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can * choke if we initially report a higher version then * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports * 1.0. * * Possible scenario with previous logic: * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret * containing version 1.0. * * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. * * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } /* Session ID */ session_id = s->session->session_id; if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) { sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id); s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; session_id = s->tmp_session_id; if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } } else { sess_id_len = 0; } } else { assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); } } if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, sess_id_len)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } } /* Ciphers supported */ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)), pkt)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } /* COMPRESSION */ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && sctx->comp_methods && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods); for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } } } #endif /* Add the NULL method */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } /* TLS extensions */ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { size_t cookie_len; PACKET cookiepkt; if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; int i; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); if (c == NULL) { /* unknown cipher */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); return 0; } /* * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); return 0; } sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); if (i < 0) { /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); return 0; } if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); return 0; } /* * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is * set and use it for comparison. */ if (s->session->cipher != NULL) s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2); if (!ossl_assert(s->session->cipher != NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. */ if (md == NULL || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); return 0; } } else { /* * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same * ciphersuite. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); return 0; } } s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c; return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { PACKET session_id, extpkt; size_t session_id_len; const unsigned char *cipherchars; int hrr = 0; unsigned int compression; unsigned int sversion; unsigned int context; RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* load the server random */ if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) { if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto err; } s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */ if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } hrr = 1; if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } } else { if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } } /* Get the session-id. */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* TLS extensions */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) { PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto err; } if (!hrr) { if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, &extensions, NULL, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) { if (compression != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto err; } if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id, session_id_len) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID); goto err; } } if (hrr) { if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt); } /* * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions * are appropriate for this version. */ context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); goto err; } s->hit = 0; if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of * the message must be on a record boundary. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); goto err; } /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, NULL, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } else { /* * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake * message to see if the server wants to resume. */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; /* * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for * backwards compat reasons */ int master_key_length; master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key, &master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) && master_key_length > 0) { s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); } else { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, session_id_len) == 0) s->hit = 1; } if (s->hit) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { /* actually a client application bug */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto err; } } else { /* * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. */ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } s->session->ssl_version = s->version; /* * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be * used for resumption. */ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; /* session_id_len could be 0 */ if (session_id_len > 0) memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), session_id_len); } } /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed * version. */ s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version; s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version; if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (compression != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto err; } /* * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto err; } #else if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); goto err; } if (compression == 0) comp = NULL; else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); goto err; } else { comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods, compression); } if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto err; } else { s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp; } #endif if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; size_t labellen; /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) labellen += 1; if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif /* * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise * we're done with this message */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } /* * If we're not doing early-data and we're not going to send a dummy CCS * (i.e. no middlebox compat mode) then we can change the write keys * immediately. Otherwise we have to defer this until after all possible * early data is written. We could just always defer until the last * moment except QUIC needs it done at the same time as the read keys * are changed. Since QUIC doesn't do TLS early data or need middlebox * compat this doesn't cause a problem. */ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *extpkt) { RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; /* * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using * the old wrlmethod. */ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, TLS_ANY_VERSION, OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE, OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { /* SSLfatal already called */ goto err; } /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, TLS1_3_VERSION); if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, &extensions, NULL, 1) || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } OPENSSL_free(extensions); extensions = NULL; if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { /* * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next * ClientHello will not change */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); goto err; } /* * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. */ if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } /* * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now * for HRR messages. */ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; err: OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt) { EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk; if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (peer_rpk == NULL) { SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CERTIFICATE); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk); sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; } static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WORK_STATE wst) { size_t certidx; const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) { SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY); return WORK_ERROR; } if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk) > 0 && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) return WORK_MORE_A; if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc))) == NULL) { SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); return WORK_ERROR; } /* * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate * type. */ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { if ((clu->amask & sc->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_RPK_TYPE); return WORK_ERROR; } } /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */ X509_free(sc->session->peer); sc->session->peer = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free); sc->session->peer_chain = NULL; sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result; /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc) && !ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash, sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash), &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; X509 *x = NULL; const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; size_t chainidx; unsigned int context = 0; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk) return tls_process_server_rpk(s, pkt); if (s->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto err; } if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) || context != 0 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } certstart = certbytes; x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq); if (x == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; PACKET extensions; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto err; } if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, NULL, chainidx == 0) || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, rawexts, x, chainidx, PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { OPENSSL_free(rawexts); /* SSLfatal already called */ goto err; } OPENSSL_free(rawexts); } if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } x = NULL; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; err: X509_free(x); OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain); s->session->peer_chain = NULL; return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type. * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result. * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry. */ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst) { X509 *x; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; size_t certidx; int i; if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk) return tls_post_process_server_rpk(s, wst); if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain); if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) { return WORK_MORE_A; } /* * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was * reverted because at least one application *only* set * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. */ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); return WORK_ERROR; } ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c */ x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0); pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); return WORK_ERROR; } if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); return WORK_ERROR; } /* * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate * type. */ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); return WORK_ERROR; } } X509_free(s->session->peer); X509_up_ref(x); s->session->peer = x; s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; /* Ensure there is no RPK */ EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk); s->session->peer_rpk = NULL; /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */; return WORK_ERROR; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt) { MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; PACKET tmppkt; BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new(); if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR) ret = tls_process_server_certificate(sc, &tmppkt); BUF_MEM_free(buf); return ret; } #endif static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK PACKET psk_identity_hint; /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK * identity. */ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; #else SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } /* We must check if there is a certificate */ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); return 1; #else SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); int ret = 0; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL); bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new(); if (tmpl == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, bnpub_key) || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq); if (pctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq); if (pctx == NULL /* * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH, * we're ok with it not being a safe prime. * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check. */ || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto err; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp), 0, peer_tmp)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp; peer_tmp = NULL; /* * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this */ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ ret = 1; err: OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl); OSSL_PARAM_free(params); EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); BN_free(p); BN_free(g); BN_free(bnpub_key); return ret; } static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { PACKET encoded_pt; unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; /* * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } /* * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not * server has sent an invalid curve. */ if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return 0; } if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); return 0; } /* * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA * and ECDSA. */ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */ s->session->kex_group = curve_id; return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { long alg_k; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; PACKET save_param_start, signature; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; save_param_start = *pkt; EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp); s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL; if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } else if (alg_k) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto err; } /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { PACKET params; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; unsigned char *tbs; size_t tbslen; int rv; /* * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference * equals the length of the parameters. */ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { unsigned int sigalg; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED); goto err; } if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx, md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, NULL) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } } tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); if (tbslen == 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); OPENSSL_free(tbs); if (rv <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); md_ctx = NULL; } else { /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA); } /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } /* still data left over */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto err; } } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { /* Clear certificate validity flags */ if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags != NULL) memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t)); else s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t)); /* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */ if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL) return 0; if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { PACKET reqctx, extensions; RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { /* * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so * we just ignore it */ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype); s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL; s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0; OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); s->pha_context = NULL; s->pha_context_len = 0; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, &rawexts, NULL, 1) || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ OPENSSL_free(rawexts); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } OPENSSL_free(rawexts); if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { PACKET ctypes; /* get the certificate types */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { PACKET sigalgs; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. */ if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } /* get the CA RDNs */ if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1; /* * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in * client_cert_cb. */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { unsigned int ticklen; unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; unsigned int sess_len; RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; PACKET nonce; EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); PACKET_null_init(&nonce); if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce))) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen) : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never * be 0 here in that instance */ if (ticklen == 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; /* * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session * cache. */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { SSL_SESSION *new_sess; /* * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new * one */ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); goto err; } if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails */ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); } SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = new_sess; } s->session->time = ossl_time_now(); ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session); OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); s->session->ext.tick = NULL; s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { PACKET extpkt; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts, NULL, 1) || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the * ticket. */ sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq); if (sha256 == NULL) { /* Error is already recorded */ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t */ if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, s->session->session_id, &sess_len, sha256, NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } EVP_MD_free(sha256); sha256 = NULL; s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; s->session->not_resumable = 0; /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md); size_t hashlen; static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, nonce_label, sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, PACKET_data(&nonce), PACKET_remaining(&nonce), s->session->master_key, hashlen, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; OPENSSL_free(exts); ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: EVP_MD_free(sha256); OPENSSL_free(exts); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure */ int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { size_t resplen; unsigned int type; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); return 0; } s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; } /* * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 * on failure. */ int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); /* * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from * the server */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } /* * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise */ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), sctx->ext.status_arg); if (ret == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); return 0; } if (ret < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE); return 0; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } } #endif return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { /* should contain no data */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } #endif if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int ret = 0; /* * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating * strnlen. */ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; size_t identitylen = 0; unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; char *tmpidentity = NULL; size_t psklen = 0; if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); goto err; } memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), s->session->psk_identity_hint, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */ goto err; } else if (psklen == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); goto err; } identitylen = strlen(identity); if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk); s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk; s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen; tmppsk = NULL; OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; tmpidentity = NULL; if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); return ret; #else SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { unsigned char *encdata = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; size_t enclen; unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); if (!received_server_cert(s)) { /* * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); return 0; } pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB); goto err; } /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq); if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = NULL; /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 0; } static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; int prime_len; unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL; size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len; int ret = 0; skey = s->s3.peer_tmp; if (skey == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey); if (ckey == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } /* send off the data */ /* Generate encoding of server key */ encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub); if (encoded_pub_len == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length * as the prime. */ prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey); pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len; if (pad_len > 0) { if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len); } if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub); EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return ret; } static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; int ret = 0; skey = s->s3.peer_tmp; if (skey == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey); if (ckey == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); goto err; } if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } /* Generate encoding of client key */ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint); if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return ret; } static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST /* GOST key exchange message creation */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; size_t msglen; unsigned int md_len; unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; /* * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); return 0; } pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); return 0; } /* * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key * parameters match those of server certificate, use * certificate key for key exchange */ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ pmslen = 32; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 /* Generate session key */ || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; }; /* * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context * data */ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ukm_hash == NULL || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); ukm_hash = NULL; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ /* * Encapsulate it into sequence */ msglen = 255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; return 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); return 0; #else SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s) { if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0) return NID_magma_ctr; else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0) return NID_kuznyechik_ctr; return NID_undef; } int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf) { EVP_MD_CTX *hash = NULL; unsigned int md_len; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, sctx->propq); if (md == NULL) return 0; if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash); ssl_evp_md_free(md); return 0; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash); ssl_evp_md_free(md); return 1; } #endif static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */ unsigned char rnd_dgst[32]; unsigned char *encdata = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; size_t msglen; int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s); SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */ pmslen = 32; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); goto err; } pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; }; /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata) || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); pkey_ctx = NULL; s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; return 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); return 0; #else SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP unsigned char *abytes = NULL; if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), &abytes)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); return 0; } return 1; #else SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { unsigned long alg_k; alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so * no need to do so here. */ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) goto err; if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) { if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen); s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL; s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen); s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL; s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0; #endif return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; pms = s->s3.tmp.pms; pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Check for SRP */ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } return 1; } #endif if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); goto err; } if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ pms = NULL; pmslen = 0; goto err; } pms = NULL; pmslen = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; size_t labellen; SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP * used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) labellen += 1; if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL; s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0; return 0; } /* * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL) return 0; /* * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. */ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) return 0; return 1; } WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst) { X509 *x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int i; SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ if (s->cert->cert_cb) { i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_A; } if (i == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); return WORK_ERROR; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) { if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ wst = WORK_MORE_B; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { /* * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; * return(-1); We then get retied later */ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_B; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) i = 0; } else if (i == 1) { i = 0; ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } X509_free(x509); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) i = 0; if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } else { s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2; s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } } if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0) s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* Shouldn't ever get here */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; } CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (s->pha_context == NULL) { /* no context available, add 0-length context */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } } if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 2) cpk = s->cert->key; switch (s->ext.client_cert_type) { case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk: if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } break; case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509: if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } break; default: SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } /* * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible * moment. We need to do it now. */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { /* * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt) { SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc); WPACKET tmppkt; BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; size_t length; size_t max_length; COMP_METHOD *method; COMP_CTX *comp = NULL; int comp_len; int ret = 0; int alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0]; /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL || !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt, buf)) goto err; /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */ if (sc->pha_context == NULL) { /* no context available, add 0-length context */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt, 0)) goto err; } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len)) goto err; if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc, &tmppkt, sc->cert->key, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto out; } /* continue with the real |pkt| */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt, &length) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, length)) goto err; switch (alg) { case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib: method = COMP_zlib_oneshot(); break; case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli: method = COMP_brotli_oneshot(); break; case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd: method = COMP_zstd_oneshot(); break; default: goto err; } max_length = ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg, length); if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, max_length, NULL)) goto err; comp_len = COMP_compress_block(comp, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt), max_length, (unsigned char *)buf->data, length); if (comp_len <= 0) goto err; if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, comp_len, NULL) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) goto err; /* * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible * moment. We need to do it now. */ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc) && (sc->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE || (sc->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(sc, SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { /* * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. */ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); goto out; } ret = 1; goto out; err: SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); out: if (buf != NULL) { /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */ WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt); } BUF_MEM_free(buf); COMP_CTX_free(comp); return ret; } #endif int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; size_t idx; long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey; alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* we don't have a certificate */ if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) return 1; /* This is the passed certificate */ pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)); /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); return 0; } if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); return 0; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Early out to skip the checks below */ if (s->session->peer_rpk != NULL) return 1; if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) return 1; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { size_t len, padding_len; unsigned char *padding = NULL; len = s->ext.npn_len; padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } memset(padding, 0, padding_len); return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; } #endif MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { /* should contain no data */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } /* * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) SSL_renegotiate(ssl); else SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl); return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) { PACKET extensions; RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, NULL, 1) || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } OPENSSL_free(rawexts); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: OPENSSL_free(rawexts); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (sctx->client_cert_engine) { i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey); if (i != 0) return i; } #endif if (sctx->client_cert_cb) i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey); return i; } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) { int i; size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) || s->min_proto_version < TLS1_3_VERSION); SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); /* Set disabled masks for this session */ if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); return 0; } if (sk == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 # error Max cipher length too short # endif /* * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we * use TLS v1.2 */ if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; else #endif /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ maxlen = 0xfffe; if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) maxlen -= 2; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) maxlen -= 2; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip disabled ciphers */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) continue; if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ if (!maxverok) { int minproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls; int maxproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls; if (ssl_version_cmp(s, maxproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) >= 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s, minproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) <= 0) maxverok = 1; } totlen += len; } if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { const char *maxvertext = !maxverok ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version" : NULL; SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, maxvertext); return 0; } if (totlen != 0) { if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } return 1; } CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) { if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return CON_FUNC_ERROR; } s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; }