/* * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../ssl_local.h" #include #include #include #include #include "record_local.h" #include "internal/packet.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ ) # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 #endif void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL_CONNECTION *s) { rl->s = s; } void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { rl->wnum = 0; memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; rl->wpend_tot = 0; rl->wpend_type = 0; rl->wpend_ret = 0; rl->wpend_buf = NULL; ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); if (rl->rrlmethod != NULL) rl->rrlmethod->free(rl->rrl); /* Ignore return value */ BIO_free(rl->rrlnext); rl->rrlmethod = NULL; rl->rrlnext = NULL; if (rl->d) DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); } void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { if (rl->numwpipes > 0) ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); } /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) { return rl->rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(rl->rrl); } /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) { return (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs) || rl->rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(rl->rrl); } int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) { return (rl->numwpipes > 0) && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; } void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); } size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) { size_t i, num = 0; const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); if (sc == NULL) return 0; if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) { TLS_RECORD *rdata; pitem *item, *iter; iter = pqueue_iterator(sc->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q); while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) { rdata = item->data; num += rdata->length; } } for (i = 0; i < sc->rlayer.num_recs; i++) { if (sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) return num; num += sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].length; } num += sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->app_data_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl); return num; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) { ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; } void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) { SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); if (sc == NULL) return; sc->rlayer.default_read_buf_len = len; } const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) { const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); const char *lng; if (sc == NULL) return NULL; if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL) return "unknown"; sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, NULL, &lng); return lng; } const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) { const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); const char *shrt; if (sc == NULL) return NULL; if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL) return "unknown"; sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, &shrt, NULL); return shrt; } /* * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, size_t *written) { const unsigned char *buf = buf_; size_t tot; size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK size_t nw; #endif SSL3_BUFFER *wb; int i; size_t tmpwrit; SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl); if (s == NULL) return -1; wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; tot = s->rlayer.wnum; /* * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and * report the error in a way the user will notice */ if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum) || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return -1; } if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return -1; } s->rlayer.wnum = 0; /* * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish * doing that first. */ if (wb->left == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)) ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); /* * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those * messages yet. */ if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) { i = s->handshake_func(ssl); /* SSLfatal() already called */ if (i < 0) return i; if (i == 0) { return -1; } } /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (wb->left != 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot, &tmpwrit); if (i <= 0) { /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ s->rlayer.wnum = tot; return i; } tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */ } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK /* * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the * compromise is considered worthy. */ if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) && s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) != 0) { unsigned char aad[13]; EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; size_t packlen; int packleni; /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) max_send_fragment -= 512; if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, (int)max_send_fragment, NULL); if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8; else packlen *= 4; if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return -1; } } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); *written = tot; return 1; } n = (len - tot); for (;;) { if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); break; } if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) { i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl); if (i <= 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ s->rlayer.wnum = tot; return i; } } if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); else nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); aad[8] = type; aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); aad[11] = 0; aad[12] = 0; mb_param.out = NULL; mb_param.inp = aad; mb_param.len = nw; packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); packlen = (size_t)packleni; if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */ /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); break; } mb_param.out = wb->buf; mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; mb_param.len = nw; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) return -1; s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { int j = 6; while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; } wb->offset = 0; wb->left = packlen; s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit); if (i <= 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); } s->rlayer.wnum = tot; return i; } if (tmpwrit == n) { /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); *written = tot + tmpwrit; return 1; } n -= tmpwrit; tot += tmpwrit; } } else #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */ if (tot == len) { /* done? */ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); *written = tot; return 1; } n = (len - tot); max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s); /* * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using * explicit IVs */ maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { /* * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we * shouldn't get here */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if (maxpipes == 0 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) maxpipes = 1; if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { /* * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send * fragments so we shouldn't get here */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } for (;;) { size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; size_t numpipes, j; if (n == 0) numpipes = 1; else numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; if (numpipes > maxpipes) numpipes = maxpipes; if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) { /* * We have enough data to completely fill all available * pipelines */ for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment; } } else { /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ tmppipelen = n / numpipes; remain = n % numpipes; for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; if (j < remain) pipelens[j]++; } } i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0, &tmpwrit); if (i <= 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ s->rlayer.wnum = tot; return i; } if (tmpwrit == n || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { /* * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 0; if (tmpwrit == n && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); *written = tot + tmpwrit; return 1; } n -= tmpwrit; tot += tmpwrit; } } int do_ssl3_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes, int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written) { WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; WPACKET *thispkt; SSL3_RECORD *thiswr; unsigned char *recordstart; int i, mac_size, clear = 0; size_t prefix_len = 0; int eivlen = 0; size_t align = 0; SSL3_BUFFER *wb; SSL_SESSION *sess; size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0; size_t j; int using_ktls; SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) totlen += pipelens[j]; /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); } /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) { i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl); if (i <= 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ return i; } /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) { if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return -1; } } if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ mac_size = 0; } else { mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash); if (mac_size < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } /* * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3.empty_fragment_done) { /* * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (s->s3.need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual * payload) */ size_t tmppipelen = 0; int ret; ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len); if (ret <= 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ goto err; } if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { /* insufficient space */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 1; } using_ktls = BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio); if (using_ktls) { /* * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to * discard the const qualifier. * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when * switching to ktls. */ SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf); SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0); SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1); goto wpacket_init_complete; } if (create_empty_fragment) { wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 /* * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. */ align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); #endif SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } wpinited = 1; } else if (prefix_len) { wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) + prefix_len, NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } wpinited = 1; } else { for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { thispkt = &pkt[j]; wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); #endif SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } wpinited++; } } /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_CONNECTION_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); if (eivlen < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } if (eivlen <= 1) eivlen = 0; } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } } wpacket_init_complete: totlen = 0; /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; unsigned char *compressdata = NULL; size_t maxcomplen; unsigned int rectype; thispkt = &pkt[j]; thiswr = &wr[j]; /* * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the * record type */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; else rectype = type; SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype); /* * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes * and record version number > TLS 1.0 */ if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(ssl) > TLS1_VERSION && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) version = TLS1_VERSION; SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version); maxcomplen = pipelens[j]; if (s->compress != NULL) maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; /* * When using offload kernel will write the header. * Otherwise write the header now */ if (!using_ktls && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt) || (eivlen > 0 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL)) || (maxcomplen > 0 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen, &compressdata)))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* lets setup the record stuff. */ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata); SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]); SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); totlen += pipelens[j]; /* * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into * thiswr->data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr) || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { if (using_ktls) { SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]); } else { if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); } } if (SSL_CONNECTION_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && !using_ktls && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { size_t rlen, max_send_fragment; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1); /* Add TLS1.3 padding */ max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); if (rlen < max_send_fragment) { size_t padding = 0; size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen; if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) { padding = s->record_padding_cb(ssl, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg); } else if (s->block_padding > 0) { size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1; size_t remainder; /* optimize for power of 2 */ if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0) remainder = rlen & mask; else remainder = rlen % s->block_padding; /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */ if (remainder == 0) padding = 0; else padding = s->block_padding - remainder; } if (padding > 0) { /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */ if (padding > max_padding) padding = max_padding; if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding); } } } /* * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points * in the wb->buf */ if (!using_ktls && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { unsigned char *mac; if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } /* * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case. */ if (!using_ktls) { if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL) /* * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this * sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */ recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len; SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart); SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr); SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len); } } if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) { /* * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function. */ if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) { if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); } goto err; } } else { if (!using_ktls) { if (ssl->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) { if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); } goto err; } } } for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { size_t origlen; thispkt = &pkt[j]; thiswr = &wr[j]; if (using_ktls) goto mac_done; /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */ if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen) /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */ || origlen > thiswr->length || (thiswr->length > origlen && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { unsigned char *mac; if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size); } if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len) || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (s->msg_callback) { recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; s->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_CONNECTION_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { unsigned char ctype = type; s->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, &ctype, 1, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg); } } if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); if (create_empty_fragment) { /* * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write * out anything here */ if (j > 0) { /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); return 1; } mac_done: /* * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which * is thiswr->length long */ SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for * debugging */ /* now let's set up wb */ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr)); } /* * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write * retries later */ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); err: for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++) WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]); return -1; } /* if SSL3_BUFFER_get_left() != 0, we need to call this * * Return values are as per SSL_write() */ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *written) { int i; SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; size_t currbuf = 0; size_t tmpwrit = 0; if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len) || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); return -1; } for (;;) { /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { currbuf++; continue; } clear_sys_error(); if (s->wbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; /* * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages, * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO */ if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { i = BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (i <= 0) return i; BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type); } i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); if (i >= 0) tmpwrit = i; } else { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } /* * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS, * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value. * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte * writes to permit this case. */ if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) continue; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret; return 1; } else if (i <= 0) { if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in * using a datagram service */ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); } return i; } SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); } } int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int ret, char *file, int line) { SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; ret = -1; } else { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) { SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY; } else { ERR_new(); ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0); ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING, NULL); } } else if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL) { int al = s->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_alert_code(s->rlayer.rrl); if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) { ERR_new(); ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0); ossl_statem_fatal(s, al, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE, NULL); } /* * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno. */ } /* * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal * err and retry. Upper layers do not. * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct, * otherwise we need to convert the return value. */ if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR || ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) ret = 0; else if (ret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR) ret = -1; } return ret; } void ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rr) { if (rr->rechandle != NULL) { /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */ s->rlayer.rrlmethod->release_record(s->rlayer.rrl, rr->rechandle); } else { /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */ OPENSSL_free(rr->data); } s->rlayer.curr_rec++; } /*- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type| * argument is non NULL. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) { int i, j, ret; size_t n, curr_rec, totalbytes; TLS_RECORD *rr; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; int is_tls13; SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl); is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s); if ((type != 0 && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; if (recvd_type != NULL) *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; *readbytes = n; return 1; } /* * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(ssl)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i = s->handshake_func(ssl); /* SSLfatal() already called */ if (i < 0) return i; if (i == 0) return -1; } start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /*- * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] * rr[i].type - is the type of record * rr[i].data, - data * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. */ /* get new records if necessary */ if (s->rlayer.curr_rec >= s->rlayer.num_recs) { s->rlayer.curr_rec = s->rlayer.num_recs = 0; do { rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.num_recs]; ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_RETURN(s, s->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(s->rlayer.rrl, &rr->rechandle, &rr->version, &rr->type, &rr->data, &rr->length, NULL, NULL)); if (ret <= 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ return ret; } rr->off = 0; s->rlayer.num_recs++; } while (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(s->rlayer.rrl) && s->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); } rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.curr_rec]; if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0 && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA); return -1; } /* * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty * record that isn't an alert. */ if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); return -1; } /* * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in * 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { s->rlayer.curr_rec++; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return 0; } if (type == rr->type || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL && !is_tls13)) { /* * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC */ /* * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are * doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); return -1; } if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return -1; } if (recvd_type != NULL) *recvd_type = rr->type; if (len == 0) { /* * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. */ if (rr->length == 0) ssl_release_record(s, rr); return 0; } totalbytes = 0; curr_rec = s->rlayer.curr_rec; do { if (len - totalbytes > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = len - totalbytes; memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); buf += n; if (peek) { /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ if (rr->length == 0) ssl_release_record(s, rr); } else { if (s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT) OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr->data[rr->off]), n); rr->length -= n; rr->off += n; if (rr->length == 0) ssl_release_record(s, rr); } if (rr->length == 0 || (peek && n == rr->length)) { rr++; curr_rec++; } totalbytes += n; } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs && totalbytes < len); if (totalbytes == 0) { /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ goto start; } *readbytes = totalbytes; return 1; } /* * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we * were actually expecting a CCS). */ /* * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record */ if (rr->version == SSL2_VERSION) { /* * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if (ssl->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { /* * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello * if we are a server. */ s->version = rr->version; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return -1; } /*- * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off; PACKET alert; if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length) || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); return -1; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if ((!is_tls13 && alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) { s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr; ssl_release_record(s, rr); s->rlayer.alert_count++; if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); return -1; } } /* * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore. */ if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) { goto start; } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return 0; } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr, "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr); s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; ssl_release_record(s, rr); SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); return 0; } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { /* * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if * the peer refused it where we carry on. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); return -1; } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */ goto start; } SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); return -1; } if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { BIO *rbio; /* * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them * because we are unable to write any response due to having already * sent close_notify. */ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { ssl_release_record(s, rr); if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0) goto start; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); return -1; } } else { /* * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled * above. * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify */ ssl_release_record(s, rr); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY); return -1; } } /* * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data * that we're just going to discard. */ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ if (rr->length < n) n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ /* now move 'n' bytes: */ memcpy(dest + *dest_len, rr->data + rr->off, n); rr->off += n; rr->length -= n; *dest_len += n; if (rr->length == 0) ssl_release_record(s, rr); if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) goto start; /* fragment was too small */ } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return -1; } /* * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or * protocol violation) */ if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING); /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); i = s->handshake_func(ssl); /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ if (i < 0) return i; if (i == 0) { return -1; } /* * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now. */ if (ined) return -1; if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, but we * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty * problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return -1; } } goto start; } switch (rr->type) { default: /* * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised * record types, using up resources processing them. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); return -1; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but * that should not happen when type != rr->type */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet * started), we will indulge it. */ if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2; return -1; } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { /* * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data, * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next * record. */ if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length, EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return -1; } ssl_release_record(s, rr); goto start; } else { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); return -1; } } } void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) { int i; for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { ++seq[i]; if (seq[i] != 0) break; } } /* * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible * format and false otherwise. */ int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s)) return 0; return rl->tlsrecs[0].version == SSL2_VERSION; } static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper; static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, void *cbarg) { SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg; SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); if (s->msg_callback != NULL) s->msg_callback(write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg); } static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper; static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg; return ssl_security(s, op, bits, nid, other); } static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch[] = { { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data }, { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper }, { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper }, { 0, NULL } }; static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int level) { if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) { if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) return &ossl_dtls_record_method; return &ossl_tls_record_method; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */ if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) != 0 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))) return &ossl_ktls_record_method; #endif /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */ return s->rlayer.rrlmethod; } static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod == &ossl_ktls_record_method) { /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */ SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION); } #endif if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL) s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 1); if (s->max_pipelines != 0 && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_max_pipelines != NULL) s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_max_pipelines(s->rlayer.rrl, s->max_pipelines); return 1; } int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, int direction, int level, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen, const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen, int mactype, const EVP_MD *md, const SSL_COMP *comp) { OSSL_PARAM options[5], *opts = options; OSSL_PARAM settings[6], *set = settings; const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *origmeth = s->rlayer.rrlmethod; SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth; int use_etm, stream_mac = 0, tlstree = 0; unsigned int maxfrag = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; int use_early_data = 0; uint32_t max_early_data; meth = ssl_select_next_record_layer(s, level); if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod != NULL && !s->rlayer.rrlmethod->free(s->rlayer.rrl)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->rlayer.rrl = NULL; if (meth != NULL) s->rlayer.rrlmethod = meth; if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.rrlmethod != NULL)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */ *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS, &s->options); *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE, &s->mode); *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN, &s->rlayer.default_read_buf_len); *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD, &s->rlayer.read_ahead); *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */ if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) { use_etm = SSL_READ_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0; if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM) != 0) stream_mac = 1; if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0) tlstree = 1; } else { use_etm = SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0; if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) != 0) stream_mac = 1; if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0) tlstree = 1; } if (use_etm) *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM, &use_etm); if (stream_mac) *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC, &stream_mac); if (tlstree) *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE, &tlstree); if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)) maxfrag = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session); if (maxfrag != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN, &maxfrag); /* * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force. */ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Check this when doing the "write" record layer */ if (s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) { use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY || level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE); } else if (!s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) { use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY); } if (use_early_data) { max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s); if (max_early_data != 0) *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA, &max_early_data); } *set = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); for (;;) { int rlret; BIO *prev = s->rlayer.rrlnext; unsigned int epoch = 0;; if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer) + 1; /* new epoch */ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) s->rlayer.rrlnext = BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem()); else s->rlayer.rrlnext = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (s->rlayer.rrlnext == NULL) { BIO_free(prev); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } rlret = s->rlayer.rrlmethod->new_record_layer(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, version, s->server, direction, level, epoch, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, mackey, mackeylen, ciph, taglen, mactype, md, comp, prev, s->rbio, s->rlayer.rrlnext, NULL, NULL, settings, options, rlayer_dispatch, s, &s->rlayer.rrl); BIO_free(prev); switch (rlret) { case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL: SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE); return 0; case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR: if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod != origmeth && origmeth != NULL) { /* * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out, * so we fallback to the original method and try again */ s->rlayer.rrlmethod = origmeth; continue; } SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER); return 0; case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS: break; default: /* Should not happen */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } break; } return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s); }