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- /*
- * Copyright 2005-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include "../ssl_local.h"
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/buffer.h>
- #include "record_local.h"
- #include "internal/packet.h"
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
- int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
- if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL)
- return 0;
- rl->d = d;
- d->buffered_app_data = pqueue_new();
- if (d->buffered_app_data == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(d);
- rl->d = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- if (rl->d == NULL)
- return;
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
- pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data);
- OPENSSL_free(rl->d);
- rl->d = NULL;
- }
- void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
- pitem *item = NULL;
- TLS_RECORD *rec;
- pqueue *buffered_app_data;
- d = rl->d;
- while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data)) != NULL) {
- rec = (TLS_RECORD *)item->data;
- if (rl->s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(rec->allocdata, rec->length);
- OPENSSL_free(rec->allocdata);
- OPENSSL_free(item->data);
- pitem_free(item);
- }
- buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data;
- memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
- d->buffered_app_data = buffered_app_data;
- }
- static int dtls_buffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rec)
- {
- TLS_RECORD *rdata;
- pitem *item;
- struct pqueue_st *queue = s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data;
- /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
- if (pqueue_size(queue) >= 100)
- return 0;
- /* We don't buffer partially read records */
- if (!ossl_assert(rec->off == 0))
- return -1;
- rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
- item = pitem_new(rec->seq_num, rdata);
- if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(rdata);
- pitem_free(item);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- *rdata = *rec;
- /*
- * We will release the record from the record layer soon, so we take a copy
- * now. Copying data isn't good - but this should be infrequent so we
- * accept it here.
- */
- rdata->data = rdata->allocdata = OPENSSL_memdup(rec->data, rec->length);
- if (rdata->data == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(rdata);
- pitem_free(item);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * We use a NULL rechandle to indicate that the data field has been
- * allocated by us.
- */
- rdata->rechandle = NULL;
- item->data = rdata;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(s->rbio) &&
- (ossl_statem_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
- || ossl_statem_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) {
- BIO_ctrl(s->rbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
- sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
- }
- #endif
- if (pqueue_insert(queue, item) == NULL) {
- /* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->allocdata);
- OPENSSL_free(rdata);
- pitem_free(item);
- }
- return 1;
- }
- /* Unbuffer a previously buffered TLS_RECORD structure if any */
- static void dtls_unbuffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- TLS_RECORD *rdata;
- pitem *item;
- /* If we already have records to handle then do nothing */
- if (s->rlayer.curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs)
- return;
- item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data);
- if (item != NULL) {
- rdata = (TLS_RECORD *)item->data;
- s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0] = *rdata;
- s->rlayer.num_recs = 1;
- s->rlayer.curr_rec = 0;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(s->rbio)) {
- BIO_ctrl(s->rbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
- sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
- }
- #endif
- OPENSSL_free(item->data);
- pitem_free(item);
- }
- }
- /*-
- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
- * 'type' is one of the following:
- *
- * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
- * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
- * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
- *
- * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
- * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
- *
- * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
- * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
- * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
- * argument is non NULL.
- * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
- * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
- * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
- * Change cipher spec protocol
- * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
- * Alert protocol
- * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
- * Handshake protocol
- * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
- * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
- * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
- * Application data protocol
- * none of our business
- */
- int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, uint8_t type, uint8_t *recvd_type,
- unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
- int peek, size_t *readbytes)
- {
- int i, j, ret;
- size_t n;
- TLS_RECORD *rr;
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
- SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
- if (sc == NULL)
- return -1;
- if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
- (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
- (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
- /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
- i = sc->handshake_func(s);
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- if (i < 0)
- return i;
- if (i == 0)
- return -1;
- }
- start:
- sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- /*
- * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
- * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
- */
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s))
- dtls_unbuffer_record(sc);
- /* Check for timeout */
- if (dtls1_handle_timeout(sc) > 0) {
- goto start;
- } else if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc)) {
- /* dtls1_handle_timeout() has failed with a fatal error */
- return -1;
- }
- /* get new packet if necessary */
- if (sc->rlayer.curr_rec >= sc->rlayer.num_recs) {
- sc->rlayer.curr_rec = sc->rlayer.num_recs = 0;
- do {
- rr = &sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[sc->rlayer.num_recs];
- ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(sc,
- sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(sc->rlayer.rrl,
- &rr->rechandle,
- &rr->version, &rr->type,
- &rr->data, &rr->length,
- &rr->epoch, rr->seq_num));
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ret = dtls1_read_failed(sc, ret);
- /*
- * Anything other than a timeout is an error. SSLfatal() already
- * called if appropriate.
- */
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- else
- goto start;
- }
- rr->off = 0;
- sc->rlayer.num_recs++;
- } while (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)
- && sc->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
- }
- rr = &sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[sc->rlayer.curr_rec];
- /*
- * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
- * record that isn't an alert.
- */
- if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
- sc->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
- /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
- if (sc->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
- * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
- && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
- /*
- * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
- * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
- * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
- */
- if (dtls_buffer_record(sc, rr) < 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- goto start;
- }
- /*
- * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
- * 'peek' mode)
- */
- if (sc->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
- if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- return 0;
- }
- if (type == rr->type
- || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
- && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
- /*
- * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
- * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
- * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
- */
- /*
- * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
- * doing a handshake for the first time
- */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
- && (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc))) {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
- return -1;
- }
- if (recvd_type != NULL)
- *recvd_type = rr->type;
- if (len == 0) {
- /*
- * Release a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
- * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
- * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
- */
- if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- return 0;
- }
- if (len > rr->length)
- n = rr->length;
- else
- n = len;
- memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
- if (peek) {
- if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- } else {
- if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, n))
- return -1;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
- * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
- * anymore, finally set shutdown.
- */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
- sc->d1->shutdown_received
- && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)) <= 0) {
- sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- return 0;
- }
- #endif
- *readbytes = n;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
- * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
- */
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
- const unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off;
- PACKET alert;
- if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length)
- || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
- || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
- || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
- return -1;
- }
- if (sc->msg_callback)
- sc->msg_callback(0, sc->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
- sc->msg_callback_arg);
- if (sc->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = sc->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
- if (cb != NULL) {
- j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
- }
- if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
- sc->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
- if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- sc->rlayer.alert_count++;
- if (sc->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
- return -1;
- }
- if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
- * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
- * that nothing gets discarded.
- */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
- BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)) > 0) {
- sc->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
- sc->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- return -1;
- }
- #endif
- sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
- sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- sc->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
- SSLfatal_data(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
- SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
- "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
- sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(sc->session_ctx, sc->session);
- return 0;
- } else {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
- return -1;
- }
- goto start;
- }
- if (sc->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
- * shutdown */
- sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- return 0;
- }
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- /*
- * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
- * are still missing, so just drop it.
- */
- if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- goto start;
- }
- /*
- * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
- */
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc)) {
- struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
- /*
- * This may just be a stale retransmit. Also sanity check that we have
- * at least enough record bytes for a message header
- */
- if (rr->epoch != sc->rlayer.d->r_epoch
- || rr->length < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- goto start;
- }
- dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
- /*
- * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
- * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
- */
- if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(sc) < 0) {
- /* SSLfatal) already called */
- return -1;
- }
- if (dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(sc) <= 0) {
- /* Fail if we encountered a fatal error */
- if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc))
- return -1;
- }
- if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0))
- return -1;
- if (!(sc->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
- if (!sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)) {
- /* no read-ahead left? */
- BIO *bio;
- sc->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- goto start;
- }
- /*
- * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake
- * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init
- * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be
- * finished
- */
- if (!ossl_assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s))) {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(sc, 1);
- i = sc->handshake_func(s);
- /* SSLfatal() called if appropriate */
- if (i < 0)
- return i;
- if (i == 0)
- return -1;
- if (!(sc->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
- if (!sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)) {
- /* no read-ahead left? */
- BIO *bio;
- /*
- * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
- * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
- * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
- * problems in the blocking world
- */
- sc->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- goto start;
- }
- switch (rr->type) {
- default:
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- return -1;
- case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
- case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
- case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
- /*
- * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
- * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
- * that should not happen when type != rr->type
- */
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
- /*
- * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
- * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
- * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
- * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
- * started), we will indulge it.
- */
- if (sc->s3.in_read_app_data &&
- (sc->s3.total_renegotiations != 0) &&
- ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(sc)) {
- sc->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
- return -1;
- } else {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /* not reached */
- }
- /*
- * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
- * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
- */
- int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type, const void *buf,
- size_t len, size_t *written)
- {
- int i;
- if (!ossl_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, written);
- return i;
- }
- int do_dtls1_write(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, uint8_t type, const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t len, size_t *written)
- {
- int i;
- OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpl;
- SSL *s = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc);
- int ret;
- /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
- if (sc->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) {
- i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (i <= 0)
- return i;
- /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
- }
- if (len == 0)
- return 0;
- if (len > ssl_get_max_send_fragment(sc)) {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE);
- return 0;
- }
- tmpl.type = type;
- /*
- * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
- * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
- * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
- */
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION
- && sc->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- tmpl.version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- else
- tmpl.version = sc->version;
- tmpl.buf = buf;
- tmpl.buflen = len;
- ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(sc,
- sc->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(sc->rlayer.wrl, &tmpl, 1));
- if (ret > 0)
- *written = (int)len;
- return ret;
- }
- void dtls1_increment_epoch(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int rw)
- {
- if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
- s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++;
- /*
- * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous
- * epoch
- */
- dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
- } else {
- s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++;
- }
- }
- uint16_t dtls1_get_epoch(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int rw) {
- uint16_t epoch;
- if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
- epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
- else
- epoch = s->rlayer.d->w_epoch;
- return epoch;
- }
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