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- /* ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c */
- /*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #define USE_SOCKETS
- #include "../ssl_locl.h"
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/buffer.h>
- #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include "record_locl.h"
- int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
-
- if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL)
- return (0);
- rl->d = d;
- d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
- d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
- d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
- if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL
- || d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) {
- pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
- pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q);
- pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q);
- OPENSSL_free(d);
- rl->d = NULL;
- return (0);
- }
- return 1;
- }
- void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
- pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
- pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q);
- pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q);
- OPENSSL_free(rl->d);
- rl->d = NULL;
- }
- void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
- pitem *item = NULL;
- DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
- pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
- pqueue processed_rcds;
- pqueue buffered_app_data;
- d = rl->d;
-
- while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
- rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
- OPENSSL_free(item->data);
- pitem_free(item);
- }
- while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
- rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
- OPENSSL_free(item->data);
- pitem_free(item);
- }
- while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
- rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
- OPENSSL_free(item->data);
- pitem_free(item);
- }
- unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q;
- processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q;
- buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
- memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
- d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
- d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
- d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
- }
- void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e)
- {
- if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) {
- memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
- rl->write_sequence,
- sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
- memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
- rl->d->last_write_sequence,
- sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
- } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) {
- memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence,
- rl->write_sequence,
- sizeof(unsigned char[8]));
- memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
- rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
- sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
- }
- rl->d->w_epoch = e;
- }
- void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
- }
- void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq)
- {
- memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
- }
- static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
- int len, int peek);
- /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
- static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
- {
- DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
- rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
- SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf);
- s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet;
- s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
- memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
- memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
- /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
- memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
- return (1);
- }
- int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
- {
- DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
- pitem *item;
- /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
- if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
- return 0;
- rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
- item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
- if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(rdata);
- pitem_free(item);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet;
- rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length;
- memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
- memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
- item->data = rdata;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
- (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
- || SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) {
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
- sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
- }
- #endif
- s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
- s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
- memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf));
- memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec));
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
- OPENSSL_free(rdata);
- pitem_free(item);
- return (-1);
- }
- /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
- if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
- OPENSSL_free(rdata);
- pitem_free(item);
- return (-1);
- }
- return (1);
- }
- int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
- {
- pitem *item;
- item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
- if (item) {
- dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
- OPENSSL_free(item->data);
- pitem_free(item);
- return (1);
- }
- return (0);
- }
- /*
- * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
- * processed yet
- */
- #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
- dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
- &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds))
- int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
- {
- pitem *item;
- item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
- if (item) {
- /* Check if epoch is current. */
- if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
- return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
- /* Process all the records. */
- while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
- dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
- if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
- return (0);
- if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
- SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(&s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0)
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
- * processed
- */
- s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
- s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
- return (1);
- }
- /*-
- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
- * 'type' is one of the following:
- *
- * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
- * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
- * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
- *
- * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
- * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
- *
- * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
- * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
- * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
- * argument is non NULL.
- * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
- * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
- * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
- * Change cipher spec protocol
- * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
- * Alert protocol
- * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
- * Handshake protocol
- * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
- * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
- * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
- * Application data protocol
- * none of our business
- */
- int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
- int len, int peek)
- {
- int al, i, j, ret;
- unsigned int n;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
- if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
- /* Not initialized yet */
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
- return (-1);
- }
- if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
- (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
- (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
- */
- if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
- return ret;
- /*
- * Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
- * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
- */
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
- * SCTP.
- */
- if ((!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
- (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))
- && ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)
- && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
- #else
- if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s))
- #endif
- {
- /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0)
- return (i);
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return (-1);
- }
- }
- start:
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- /*-
- * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
- * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
- * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
- */
- rr = &s->rlayer.rrec;
- /*
- * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
- * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
- */
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
- pitem *item;
- item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
- if (item) {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
- sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
- }
- #endif
- dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
- OPENSSL_free(item->data);
- pitem_free(item);
- }
- }
- /* Check for timeout */
- if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
- goto start;
- /* get new packet if necessary */
- if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
- || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
- ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
- /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
- if (ret <= 0)
- return (ret);
- else
- goto start;
- }
- }
- /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
- * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
- && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
- /*
- * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
- * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
- * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
- */
- if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data),
- SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- goto start;
- }
- /*
- * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
- * 'peek' mode)
- */
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- return (0);
- }
- if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
- || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
- && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
- /*
- * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
- * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
- * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
- */
- /*
- * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
- * doing a handshake for the first time
- */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (recvd_type != NULL)
- *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
- if (len <= 0)
- return (len);
- if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
- n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
- else
- n = (unsigned int)len;
- memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n);
- if (!peek) {
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
- SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
- s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
- }
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
- * data first, so retry.
- */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
- SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- }
- /*
- * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
- * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
- * anymore, finally set shutdown.
- */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
- s->d1->shutdown_received
- && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- return (0);
- }
- #endif
- return (n);
- }
- /*
- * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
- * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
- */
- /*
- * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
- * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
- */
- {
- unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
- unsigned char *dest = NULL;
- unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
- dest = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
- dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len;
- } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment);
- dest = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment;
- dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
- /* We allow a 0 return */
- if (dtls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr),
- SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) {
- return -1;
- }
- /* Exit and notify application to read again */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- return (-1);
- }
- #endif
- /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
- else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- /*
- * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
- * reading.
- */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
- BIO *bio;
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
- return (-1);
- }
- /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
- /*
- * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
- * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
- */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) {
- #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
- /*
- * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
- * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
- * non-existing alert...
- */
- FIX ME
- #endif
- s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- goto start;
- }
- /* now move 'n' bytes: */
- for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
- dest[k] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
- SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
- }
- *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
- }
- }
- /*-
- * s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
- * s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
- * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
- */
- /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
- if ((!s->server) &&
- (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
- (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
- (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
- s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
- if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
- (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
- (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /*
- * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
- */
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
- !s->s3->renegotiate) {
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
- s->new_session = 1;
- ssl3_renegotiate(s);
- if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0)
- return (i);
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return (-1);
- }
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
- /* no read-ahead left? */
- BIO *bio;
- /*
- * In the case where we try to read application data,
- * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
- * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
- * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
- return (-1);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- /*
- * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
- * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
- */
- goto start;
- }
- if (s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- int alert_level = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[0];
- int alert_descr = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[1];
- s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len = 0;
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
- s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment, 2, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
- if (cb != NULL) {
- j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
- }
- if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
- s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
- if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
- * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
- * that nothing gets discarded.
- */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
- BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- return -1;
- }
- #endif
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- return (0);
- }
- #if 0
- /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
- /* now check if it's a missing record */
- if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
- unsigned short seq;
- unsigned int frag_off;
- unsigned char *p = &(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[2]);
- n2s(p, seq);
- n2l3(p, frag_off);
- dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
- dtls1_get_queue_priority
- (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
- &found);
- if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
- /*
- * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
- */
- /*
- * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
- * ourselves
- */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
- DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
- }
- }
- #endif
- } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
- char tmp[16];
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
- return (0);
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- goto start;
- }
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
- * shutdown */
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- return (0);
- }
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- /*
- * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
- * are still missing, so just drop it.
- */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- goto start;
- }
- /*
- * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
- */
- if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
- !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
- struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
- /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
- dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) {
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- goto start;
- }
- /*
- * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
- * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
- */
- if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
- return -1;
- dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- goto start;
- }
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->new_session = 1;
- }
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0)
- return (i);
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return (-1);
- }
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
- /* no read-ahead left? */
- BIO *bio;
- /*
- * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
- * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
- * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
- * problems in the blocking world
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
- return (-1);
- }
- }
- goto start;
- }
- switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
- default:
- /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
- if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- goto start;
- }
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
- case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
- case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
- /*
- * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
- * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
- * that should not happen when type != rr->type
- */
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
- /*
- * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
- * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
- * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
- * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
- * started), we will indulge it.
- */
- if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
- (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
- ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- return (-1);
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- /* not reached */
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return (-1);
- }
- /*
- * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
- * is started.
- */
- static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
- int len, int peek)
- {
- if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
- /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
- {
- unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
- unsigned char *dst = buf;
- unsigned int k, n;
- /* peek == 0 */
- n = 0;
- while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
- *dst++ = *src++;
- len--;
- s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len--;
- n++;
- }
- /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
- for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
- s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
- return n;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
- * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
- */
- int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
- {
- int i;
- OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
- return i;
- }
- int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
- {
- unsigned char *p, *pseq;
- int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
- int prefix_len = 0;
- int eivlen;
- SSL3_RECORD *wr;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
- /*
- * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
- * will happen with non blocking IO
- */
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
- return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
- }
- /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
- i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (i <= 0)
- return (i);
- /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
- }
- if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
- return 0;
- wr = &s->rlayer.wrec;
- sess = s->session;
- if ((sess == NULL) ||
- (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
- clear = 1;
- if (clear)
- mac_size = 0;
- else {
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- if (mac_size < 0)
- goto err;
- }
- p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len;
- /* write the header */
- *(p++) = type & 0xff;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type);
- /*
- * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
- * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
- * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
- */
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
- *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
- } else {
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
- }
- /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
- pseq = p;
- p += 10;
- /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
- if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
- int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
- if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
- eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
- if (eivlen <= 1)
- eivlen = 0;
- }
- /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
- else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
- eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- else
- eivlen = 0;
- } else
- eivlen = 0;
- /* lets setup the record stuff. */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(wr, (int)len);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_input(wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
- /*
- * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
- */
- /* first we compress */
- if (s->compress != NULL) {
- if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(wr),
- SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr));
- SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
- }
- /*
- * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
- * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
- * wb->buf
- */
- if (mac_size != 0) {
- if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,
- &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr) + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
- goto err;
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, mac_size);
- }
- /* this is true regardless of mac size */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p);
- SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
- if (eivlen)
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, eivlen);
- if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
- goto err;
- /* record length after mac and block padding */
- /*
- * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
- * SSL_in_init(s)))
- */
- /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
- s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq);
- /* XDTLS: ?? */
- /*
- * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
- */
- memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6);
- pseq += 6;
- s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr), pseq);
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- /*
- * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
- * wr->length long
- */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
- ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0]));
- if (create_empty_fragment) {
- /*
- * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
- * out anything here
- */
- return wr->length;
- }
- /* now let's set up wb */
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr));
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0);
- /*
- * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
- * retries later
- */
- s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
- s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
- s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
- s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
- /* we now just need to write the buffer */
- return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
- err:
- return -1;
- }
- DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
- unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
- {
- *is_next_epoch = 0;
- /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
- if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
- return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap;
- /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
- else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) &&
- (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
- *is_next_epoch = 1;
- return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap;
- }
- return NULL;
- }
- void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
- {
- unsigned char *seq;
- unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence);
- if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
- seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence;
- s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++;
- memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap,
- sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap));
- memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0,
- sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap));
- } else {
- seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence;
- memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq,
- sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence));
- s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++;
- }
- memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes);
- }
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