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- /* ssl/statem/statem_lib.c */
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
- #include <limits.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "../ssl_locl.h"
- #include "statem_locl.h"
- #include <openssl/buffer.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/objects.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
- /*
- * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
- * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- */
- int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
- {
- int ret;
- ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- s->init_num);
- if (ret < 0)
- return (-1);
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- /*
- * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
- * ignore the result anyway
- */
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- ret);
- if (ret == s->init_num) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
- (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- return (1);
- }
- s->init_off += ret;
- s->init_num -= ret;
- return (0);
- }
- int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- int i;
- unsigned long l;
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- sender, slen,
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
- if (i <= 0)
- return 0;
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
- memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
- l = i;
- /*
- * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
- */
- if (!s->server) {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
- } else {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
- }
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /*
- * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
- * to far.
- */
- static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
- {
- const char *sender;
- int slen;
- /*
- * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
- * the appropriate error.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
- return;
- if (!s->server) {
- sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
- slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
- } else {
- sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
- slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- sender,
- slen,
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
- }
- #endif
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- int al;
- long remain;
- remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
- /*
- * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
- * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
- * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
- */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
- && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
- || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
- && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
- SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- if (remain != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
- SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
- if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
- if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
- * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
- * SCTP is used
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
- #endif
- }
- return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- int al, i;
- /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
- if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /*
- * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
- */
- if (s->server) {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
- } else {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
- }
- return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *p = SSL3_MT_CCS;
- s->init_num = 1;
- s->init_off = 0;
- return 1;
- }
- unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
- if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l))
- return 0;
- l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- l2n3(l, p);
- l += 3;
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
- }
- WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
- {
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- WORK_STATE ret;
- ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
- if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
- return ret;
- }
- #endif
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
- * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
- */
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
- }
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
- s->init_num = 0;
- if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
- /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
- s->renegotiate = 0;
- s->new_session = 0;
- if (s->server) {
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
- s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
- } else {
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
- if (s->hit)
- s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
- s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
- }
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* done with handshaking */
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
- }
- }
- return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
- }
- int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
- {
- /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
- int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned long l;
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- do {
- while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
- &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0);
- if (i <= 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- return 0;
- }
- if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
- s->init_num = i - 1;
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
- return 1;
- } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->init_num += i;
- }
- skip_message = 0;
- if (!s->server)
- if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
- /*
- * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
- * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
- * MAC.
- */
- if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
- s->init_num = 0;
- skip_message = 1;
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
- } while (skip_message);
- /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
- *mt = *p;
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
- if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
- /*
- * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
- * ClientHello
- */
- /*
- * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
- * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
- */
- l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
- + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
- s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
- s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- } else {
- n2l3(p, l);
- /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
- if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
- (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
- s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_num = 0;
- }
- return 1;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return 0;
- }
- int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len)
- {
- long n;
- unsigned char *p;
- int i;
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- /* We've already read everything in */
- *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
- return 1;
- }
- p = s->init_msg;
- n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
- while (n > 0) {
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
- &p[s->init_num], n, 0);
- if (i <= 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- *len = 0;
- return 0;
- }
- s->init_num += i;
- n -= i;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /*
- * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
- * Finished verification.
- */
- if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
- ssl3_take_mac(s);
- #endif
- /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
- if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
- (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- } else {
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
- s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
- (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
- /*
- * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
- * unsigned
- */
- if (s->init_num < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *len = 0;
- return 0;
- }
- *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
- return 1;
- }
- int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *pk;
- int ret = -1, i;
- if (pkey == NULL)
- pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- else
- pk = pkey;
- if (pk == NULL)
- goto err;
- i = EVP_PKEY_id(pk);
- if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- ret = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
- } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- ret = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- }
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
- ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
- } else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256) {
- ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
- } else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
- ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
- }
- #endif
- err:
- if (!pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
- return (ret);
- }
- int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
- {
- int al;
- switch (type) {
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
- al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
- al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
- case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
- case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
- al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- default:
- al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
- break;
- }
- return (al);
- }
- int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
- return 0;
- return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
- }
- static int version_cmp(SSL *s, int a, int b)
- {
- int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
- if (a == b)
- return 0;
- if (!dtls)
- return a < b ? -1 : 1;
- return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
- }
- typedef struct {
- int version;
- const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth)(void);
- const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth)(void);
- } version_info;
- #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
- # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
- #endif
- static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
- { TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_client_method, TLSv1_2_server_method },
- #else
- { TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL },
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
- { TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_client_method, TLSv1_1_server_method },
- #else
- { TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL },
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
- { TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_client_method, TLSv1_server_method },
- #else
- { TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL },
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- { SSL3_VERSION, SSLv3_client_method, SSLv3_server_method },
- #else
- { SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL },
- #endif
- { 0, NULL, NULL },
- };
- #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
- # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
- #endif
- static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
- { DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLSv1_2_client_method, DTLSv1_2_server_method },
- #else
- { DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL },
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
- { DTLS1_VERSION, DTLSv1_client_method, DTLSv1_server_method },
- #else
- { DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL },
- #endif
- { 0, NULL, NULL },
- };
- /*
- * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
- *
- * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
- * @method: the intended method.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
- */
- static int ssl_method_error(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
- {
- int version = method->version;
- if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
- version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
- ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
- return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
- if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
- version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
- return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
- if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
- return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
- if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
- return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
- else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
- return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
- * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
- * supported protocol version.
- *
- * @s server SSL handle.
- *
- * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
- */
- int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
- {
- const version_info *vent;
- const version_info *table;
- /*
- * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
- * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
- * s->method).
- */
- if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
- return 1;
- /*
- * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
- * highest protocol version).
- */
- if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
- table = tls_version_table;
- else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
- table = dtls_version_table;
- else {
- /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
- return 0;
- }
- for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
- if (vent->smeth != NULL &&
- ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
- return s->version == vent->version;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
- * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
- * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
- * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
- *
- * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
- * @version: the intended limit.
- * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
- int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
- {
- if (version == 0) {
- *bound = version;
- return 1;
- }
- /*-
- * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
- * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
- * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
- *
- * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
- * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
- * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
- * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
- * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
- */
- switch (method_version) {
- default:
- /*
- * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
- * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
- * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
- * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
- * versions.
- */
- return 0;
- case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
- if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
- return 0;
- break;
- case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
- if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
- DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_VERSION))
- return 0;
- break;
- }
- *bound = version;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
- * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
- * the version specific method.
- *
- * @s: server SSL handle.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
- */
- int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
- {
- /*-
- * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
- *
- * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
- * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
- *
- * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
- * handle version.
- */
- int server_version = s->method->version;
- int client_version = s->client_version;
- const version_info *vent;
- const version_info *table;
- int disabled = 0;
- switch (server_version) {
- default:
- if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
- return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
- /*
- * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
- * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
- * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
- * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
- * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
- */
- return 0;
- case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
- table = tls_version_table;
- break;
- case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
- table = dtls_version_table;
- break;
- }
- for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
- const SSL_METHOD *method;
- if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
- version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
- continue;
- method = vent->smeth();
- if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
- s->version = vent->version;
- s->method = method;
- return 0;
- }
- disabled = 1;
- }
- return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
- }
- /*
- * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
- * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
- * the version specific method.
- *
- * @s: client SSL handle.
- * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
- */
- int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
- {
- const version_info *vent;
- const version_info *table;
- switch (s->method->version) {
- default:
- if (version != s->version)
- return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
- /*
- * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
- * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
- * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
- * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
- * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
- */
- s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
- return 0;
- case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
- table = tls_version_table;
- break;
- case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
- table = dtls_version_table;
- break;
- }
- for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
- const SSL_METHOD *method;
- int err;
- if (version != vent->version)
- continue;
- if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
- break;
- method = vent->cmeth();
- err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
- if (err != 0)
- return err;
- s->method = method;
- s->session->ssl_version = s->version = version;
- return 0;
- }
- return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
- }
- /*-
- * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
- * the initial ClientHello if the version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We
- * apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol
- * configuration commands, any Suite B or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor
- * imposed by the security level here, so we don't advertise the wrong protocol
- * version to only reject the outcome later.
- *
- * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
- * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
- * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
- *
- * @s: client SSL handle.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
- */
- int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
- {
- int version;
- int hole;
- const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
- const SSL_METHOD *method;
- const version_info *table;
- const version_info *vent;
- switch (s->method->version) {
- default:
- /*
- * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
- * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
- * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
- * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
- * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
- */
- s->client_version = s->version;
- return 0;
- case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
- table = tls_version_table;
- break;
- case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
- table = dtls_version_table;
- break;
- }
- /*
- * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
- * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
- * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
- * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
- *
- * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
- * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
- * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
- *
- * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
- * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
- * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
- *
- * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
- * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
- * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
- * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
- * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
- * selected, as we start from scratch.
- */
- version = 0;
- hole = 1;
- for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
- /*
- * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
- * "version capability" vector.
- */
- if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
- hole = 1;
- continue;
- }
- method = vent->cmeth();
- if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
- hole = 1;
- } else if (!hole) {
- single = NULL;
- } else {
- version = (single = method)->version;
- hole = 0;
- }
- }
- /* Fail if everything is disabled */
- if (version == 0)
- return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
- if (single != NULL)
- s->method = single;
- s->client_version = s->version = version;
- return 0;
- }
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