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- =pod
- =head1 NAME
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc
- - X509 verification parameters
- =head1 SYNOPSIS
- #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- unsigned long flags);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- unsigned long flags);
- unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- uint32_t flags);
- uint32_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust);
- void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t);
- time_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies);
- void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
- void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- int auth_level);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- const char *name, size_t namelen);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- const char *name, size_t namelen);
- void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- unsigned int flags);
- unsigned int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
- char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- const char *email, size_t emaillen);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen);
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc);
- =head1 DESCRIPTION
- These functions manipulate the B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure associated with
- a certificate verification operation.
- The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags() function sets the flags in B<param> by oring
- it with B<flags>. See the B<VERIFICATION FLAGS> section for a complete
- description of values the B<flags> parameter can take.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the flags in B<param>.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags() returns the inheritance flags in B<param>
- which specifies how verification flags are copied from one structure to
- another. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags() sets the inheritance flags.
- See the B<INHERITANCE FLAGS> section for a description of these bits.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags() clears the flags B<flags> in B<param>.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose() sets the verification purpose in B<param>
- to B<purpose>. This determines the acceptable purpose of the certificate
- chain, for example SSL client or SSL server.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust() sets the trust setting in B<param> to
- B<trust>.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
- B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
- by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
- by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
- policy set is cleared. The B<policies> parameter can be B<NULL> to clear
- an existing policy set.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() sets the maximum verification depth to B<depth>.
- That is the maximum number of intermediate CA certificates that can appear in a
- chain.
- A maximal depth chain contains 2 more certificates than the limit, since
- neither the end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor count against this
- limit.
- Thus a B<depth> limit of 0 only allows the end-entity certificate to be signed
- directly by the trust-anchor, while with a B<depth> limit of 1 there can be one
- intermediate CA certificate between the trust-anchor and the end-entity
- certificate.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() sets the authentication security level to
- B<auth_level>.
- The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and public
- key strength when verifying certificate chains.
- For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
- must meet the specified security level.
- The signature algorithm security level is not enforced for the chain's I<trust
- anchor> certificate, which is either directly trusted or validated by means other
- than its signature.
- See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available
- levels.
- The default security level is -1, or "not set".
- At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
- Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
- interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
- shorter than 1024 bits.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to
- B<name> clearing any previously specified host name or names. If
- B<name> is NULL, or empty the list of hostnames is cleared, and
- name checks are not performed on the peer certificate. If B<name>
- is NUL-terminated, B<namelen> may be zero, otherwise B<namelen>
- must be set to the length of B<name>.
- When a hostname is specified,
- certificate verification automatically invokes L<X509_check_host(3)>
- with flags equal to the B<flags> argument given to
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags() (default zero). Applications
- are strongly advised to use this interface in preference to explicitly
- calling L<X509_check_host(3)>, hostname checks may be out of scope
- with the DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the internal check will
- be suppressed as appropriate when DANE verification is enabled.
- When the subject CommonName will not be ignored, whether as a result of the
- B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT> host flag, or because no DNS subject
- alternative names are present in the certificate, any DNS name constraints in
- issuer certificates apply to the subject CommonName as well as the subject
- alternative name extension.
- When the subject CommonName will be ignored, whether as a result of the
- B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT> host flag, or because some DNS subject
- alternative names are present in the certificate, DNS name constraints in
- issuer certificates will not be applied to the subject DN.
- As described in X509_check_host(3) the B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT>
- flag takes precendence over the B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT> flag.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() returns any host flags previously set via a
- call to X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags().
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host() adds B<name> as an additional reference
- identifier that can match the peer's certificate. Any previous names
- set via X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() or X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host()
- are retained, no change is made if B<name> is NULL or empty. When
- multiple names are configured, the peer is considered verified when
- any name matches.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername() returns the DNS hostname or subject
- CommonName from the peer certificate that matched one of the reference
- identifiers. When wildcard matching is not disabled, or when a
- reference identifier specifies a parent domain (starts with ".")
- rather than a hostname, the peer name may be a wildcard name or a
- sub-domain of the reference identifier respectively. The return
- string is allocated by the library and is no longer valid once the
- associated B<param> argument is freed. Applications must not free
- the return value.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email() sets the expected RFC822 email address to
- B<email>. If B<email> is NUL-terminated, B<emaillen> may be zero, otherwise
- B<emaillen> must be set to the length of B<email>. When an email address
- is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
- L<X509_check_email(3)>.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() sets the expected IP address to B<ip>.
- The B<ip> argument is in binary format, in network byte-order and
- B<iplen> must be set to 4 for IPv4 and 16 for IPv6. When an IP
- address is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
- L<X509_check_ip(3)>.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() sets the expected IP address to
- B<ipasc>. The B<ipasc> argument is a NUL-terminal ASCII string:
- dotted decimal quad for IPv4 and colon-separated hexadecimal for
- IPv6. The condensed "::" notation is supported for IPv6 addresses.
- =head1 RETURN VALUES
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(),
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(),
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(),
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(),
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(),
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() and
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() return 1 for success and 0 for
- failure.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the current verification flags.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() returns any current host flags.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags() returns the current inheritance flags.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() do not return
- values.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth() returns the current verification depth.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level() returns the current authentication security
- level.
- =head1 VERIFICATION FLAGS
- The verification flags consists of zero or more of the following flags
- ored together.
- B<X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK> enables CRL checking for the certificate chain leaf
- certificate. An error occurs if a suitable CRL cannot be found.
- B<X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL> enables CRL checking for the entire certificate
- chain.
- B<X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL> disabled critical extension checking. By default
- any unhandled critical extensions in certificates or (if checked) CRLs results
- in a fatal error. If this flag is set unhandled critical extensions are
- ignored. B<WARNING> setting this option for anything other than debugging
- purposes can be a security risk. Finer control over which extensions are
- supported can be performed in the verification callback.
- The B<X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT> flag disables workarounds for some broken
- certificates and makes the verification strictly apply B<X509> rules.
- B<X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS> enables proxy certificate verification.
- B<X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK> enables certificate policy checking, by default
- no policy checking is performed. Additional information is sent to the
- verification callback relating to policy checking.
- B<X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY>, B<X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY> and
- B<X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP> set the B<require explicit policy>, B<inhibit any
- policy> and B<inhibit policy mapping> flags respectively as defined in
- B<RFC3280>. Policy checking is automatically enabled if any of these flags
- are set.
- If B<X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY> is set and the policy checking is successful
- a special status code is set to the verification callback. This permits it
- to examine the valid policy tree and perform additional checks or simply
- log it for debugging purposes.
- By default some additional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by
- different keys are disabled. If B<X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT> is set
- they are enabled.
- If B<X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS> is set delta CRLs (if present) are used to
- determine certificate status. If not set deltas are ignored.
- B<X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE> enables checking of the root CA self signed
- certificate signature. By default this check is disabled because it doesn't
- add any additional security but in some cases applications might want to
- check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the root CA
- signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root CA
- are not treated as fatal errors.
- When B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> is set, construction of the certificate chain
- in L<X509_verify_cert(3)> will search the trust store for issuer certificates
- before searching the provided untrusted certificates.
- Local issuer certificates are often more likely to satisfy local security
- requirements and lead to a locally trusted root.
- This is especially important when some certificates in the trust store have
- explicit trust settings (see "TRUST SETTINGS" in L<x509(1)>).
- As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default.
- The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative
- chains.
- By default, unless B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> is set, when building a
- certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then
- OpenSSL will attempt to replace untrusted certificates supplied by the peer
- with certificates from the trust store to see if an alternative chain can be
- found that is trusted.
- As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> always set, this option
- has no effect.
- The B<X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> flag causes intermediate certificates in the
- trust store to be treated as trust-anchors, in the same way as the self-signed
- root CA certificates.
- This makes it possible to trust certificates issued by an intermediate CA
- without having to trust its ancestor root CA.
- With OpenSSL 1.1.0 and later and <X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> set, chain
- construction stops as soon as the first certificate from the trust store is
- added to the chain, whether that certificate is a self-signed "root"
- certificate or a not self-signed intermediate certificate.
- Thus, when an intermediate certificate is found in the trust store, the
- verified chain passed to callbacks may be shorter than it otherwise would
- be without the B<X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> flag.
- The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME> flag suppresses checking the validity period
- of certificates and CRLs against the current time. If X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time()
- is used to specify a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
- =head1 INHERITANCE FLAGS
- These flags specify how parameters are "inherited" from one structure to
- another.
- If B<X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE> is set then the current setting is zeroed
- after the next call.
- If B<X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED> is set then no values are copied. This overrides
- all of the following flags.
- If B<X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT> is set then anything set in the source is copied
- to the destination. Effectively the values in "to" become default values
- which will be used only if nothing new is set in "from". This is the
- default.
- If B<X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE> is set then all value are copied across whether
- they are set or not. Flags is still Ored though.
- If B<X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS> is set then the flags value is copied instead
- of ORed.
- =head1 NOTES
- The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
- instead of functions which work in specific structures such as
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags() which are likely to be deprecated in a future
- release.
- =head1 BUGS
- Delta CRL checking is currently primitive. Only a single delta can be used and
- (partly due to limitations of B<X509_STORE>) constructed CRLs are not
- maintained.
- If CRLs checking is enable CRLs are expected to be available in the
- corresponding B<X509_STORE> structure. No attempt is made to download
- CRLs from the CRL distribution points extension.
- =head1 EXAMPLE
- Enable CRL checking when performing certificate verification during SSL
- connections associated with an B<SSL_CTX> structure B<ctx>:
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
- param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
- SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, param);
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(param);
- =head1 SEE ALSO
- L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
- L<X509_check_host(3)>,
- L<X509_check_email(3)>,
- L<X509_check_ip(3)>,
- L<x509(1)>
- =head1 HISTORY
- The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
- The flag B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> was deprecated in
- OpenSSL 1.1.0, and has no effect.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
- =head1 COPYRIGHT
- Copyright 2009-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
- =cut
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