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- /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "cryptlib.h"
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/rsa.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/engine.h>
- #ifndef RSA_NULL
- static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
- static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
- static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
- static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
- static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
- static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
- static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
- static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
- "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
- RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
- RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
- RSA_eay_mod_exp,
- BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
- RSA_eay_init,
- RSA_eay_finish,
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL,
- 0, /* rsa_sign */
- 0 /* rsa_verify */
- };
- const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
- {
- return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
- }
- static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM f,ret;
- int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
- break;
- #endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
- if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
- {
- rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
- bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- }
- if (bn_mont_ctx)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- }
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
- * length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
- for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
- to[k]=0;
- r=num;
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
- /* signing */
- static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM f,ret;
- int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
- if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
- else
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
- /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
- * length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
- for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
- to[k]=0;
- r=num;
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
- static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM f,ret;
- int j,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
- /* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
- else
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
- p=buf;
- j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
- break;
- #endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
- /* signature verification */
- static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM f,ret;
- int i,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (buf == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
- if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
- {
- rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
- bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- }
- if (bn_mont_ctx)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- }
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- p=buf;
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
- static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
- {
- BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
- int ret=0;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- BN_init(&m1);
- BN_init(&r1);
- BN_init(&vrfy);
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
- {
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
- if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
- {
- rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
- bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- }
- if (bn_mont_ctx)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
- if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
- {
- rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
- bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- }
- if (bn_mont_ctx)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- }
- }
-
- if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
- /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
- * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
- if (BN_get_sign(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
- * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
- * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
- * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
- * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
- * they ensure p > q [steve]
- */
- if (BN_get_sign(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
- if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
- /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
- * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
- * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
- * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
- if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
- if (BN_get_sign(&vrfy))
- if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
- if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
- /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
- * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
- * mod_exp and return that instead. */
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
- }
- ret=1;
- err:
- BN_clear_free(&m1);
- BN_clear_free(&r1);
- BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return(ret);
- }
- static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
- {
- rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
- return(1);
- }
- static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
- {
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
- return(1);
- }
- #endif
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