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- /*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <limits.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include "../ssl_locl.h"
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/buffer.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include "record_locl.h"
- #include "../packet_locl.h"
- #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
- !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
- defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
- defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
- )
- # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
- # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
- #endif
- void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
- {
- rl->s = s;
- RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
- SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
- }
- void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- /*
- * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
- * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
- * that right?
- */
- rl->packet = NULL;
- rl->packet_length = 0;
- rl->wnum = 0;
- memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
- rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
- rl->wpend_tot = 0;
- rl->wpend_type = 0;
- rl->wpend_ret = 0;
- rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
- SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
- rl->numrpipes = 0;
- SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
- if (rl->d)
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
- }
- void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
- if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
- SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
- }
- /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
- int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
- }
- /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
- int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
- const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
- while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
- curr_rec++;
- return curr_rec < num_recs;
- }
- int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
- && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
- }
- void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
- }
- void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
- }
- size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
- {
- size_t i, num = 0;
- if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
- != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
- return 0;
- num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
- }
- return num;
- }
- void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
- {
- ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
- }
- void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
- {
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
- }
- const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
- {
- switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
- case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
- return "read header";
- case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
- return "read body";
- case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
- return "read done";
- default:
- return "unknown";
- }
- }
- const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
- {
- switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
- case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
- return "RH";
- case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
- return "RB";
- case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
- return "RD";
- default:
- return "unknown";
- }
- }
- /*
- * Return values are as per SSL_read()
- */
- int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
- size_t *readbytes)
- {
- /*
- * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
- * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
- * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
- * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
- * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
- * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
- * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
- */
- size_t len, left, align = 0;
- unsigned char *pkt;
- SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
- if (n == 0)
- return 0;
- rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
- if (rb->buf == NULL)
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- left = rb->left;
- #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
- align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
- #endif
- if (!extend) {
- /* start with empty packet ... */
- if (left == 0)
- rb->offset = align;
- else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /*
- * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
- * alignment...
- */
- pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
- if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
- && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
- /*
- * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
- * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
- * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
- * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
- * overrun can be triggered.
- */
- memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
- rb->offset = align;
- }
- }
- s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
- s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
- /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
- }
- len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
- pkt = rb->buf + align;
- /*
- * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
- * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
- */
- if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
- memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
- s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
- rb->offset = len + align;
- }
- /*
- * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
- * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
- * the buffer).
- */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (left == 0 && extend)
- return 0;
- if (left > 0 && n > left)
- n = left;
- }
- /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
- if (left >= n) {
- s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
- rb->left = left - n;
- rb->offset += n;
- *readbytes = n;
- return 1;
- }
- /* else we need to read more data */
- if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
- /* does not happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
- if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- /* ignore max parameter */
- max = n;
- else {
- if (max < n)
- max = n;
- if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
- max = rb->len - rb->offset;
- }
- while (left < n) {
- size_t bioread = 0;
- int ret;
- /*
- * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
- * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
- * possible)
- */
- clear_sys_error();
- if (s->rbio != NULL) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
- if (ret >= 0)
- bioread = ret;
- } else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
- SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
- ret = -1;
- }
- if (ret <= 0) {
- rb->left = left;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- if (len + left == 0)
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
- return ret;
- }
- left += bioread;
- /*
- * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
- * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
- * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
- */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (n > left)
- n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
- }
- }
- /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
- rb->offset += n;
- rb->left = left - n;
- s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- *readbytes = n;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
- * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
- */
- int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
- size_t *written)
- {
- const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
- size_t tot;
- size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
- #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
- size_t nw;
- #endif
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
- int i;
- size_t tmpwrit;
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
- /*
- * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
- * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
- * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
- * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
- * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
- * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
- * report the error in a way the user will notice
- */
- if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
- || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
- SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- return -1;
- }
- if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
- && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
- /*
- * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
- * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
- * messages yet.
- */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
- && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- if (i < 0)
- return i;
- if (i == 0) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
- * will happen with non blocking IO
- */
- if (wb->left != 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
- &tmpwrit);
- if (i <= 0) {
- /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
- s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
- return i;
- }
- tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
- }
- #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
- /*
- * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
- * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
- * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
- * compromise is considered worthy.
- */
- if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
- s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
- !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
- EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
- unsigned char aad[13];
- EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
- size_t packlen;
- int packleni;
- /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
- if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
- max_send_fragment -= 512;
- if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
- EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
- (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
- if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
- packlen *= 8;
- else
- packlen *= 4;
- if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- *written = tot;
- return 1;
- }
- n = (len - tot);
- for (;;) {
- if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- break;
- }
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
- i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (i <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
- return i;
- }
- }
- if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
- nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
- else
- nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
- memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
- aad[8] = type;
- aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
- aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
- aad[11] = 0;
- aad[12] = 0;
- mb_param.out = NULL;
- mb_param.inp = aad;
- mb_param.len = nw;
- packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
- EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
- sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
- packlen = (size_t)packleni;
- if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- break;
- }
- mb_param.out = wb->buf;
- mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
- mb_param.len = nw;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
- EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
- sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
- return -1;
- s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
- if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
- int j = 6;
- while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
- }
- wb->offset = 0;
- wb->left = packlen;
- s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
- s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
- s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
- s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
- i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
- if (i <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- }
- s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
- return i;
- }
- if (tmpwrit == n) {
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- *written = tot + tmpwrit;
- return 1;
- }
- n -= tmpwrit;
- tot += tmpwrit;
- }
- } else
- #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
- if (tot == len) { /* done? */
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- *written = tot;
- return 1;
- }
- n = (len - tot);
- max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
- split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
- /*
- * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
- * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
- * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
- * explicit IVs
- */
- maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
- if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
- /*
- * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
- * shouldn't get here
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- if (maxpipes == 0
- || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
- || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
- || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
- maxpipes = 1;
- if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
- || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
- /*
- * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
- * fragments so we shouldn't get here
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- for (;;) {
- size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
- size_t numpipes, j;
- if (n == 0)
- numpipes = 1;
- else
- numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
- if (numpipes > maxpipes)
- numpipes = maxpipes;
- if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
- /*
- * We have enough data to completely fill all available
- * pipelines
- */
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
- }
- } else {
- /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
- tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
- remain = n % numpipes;
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
- if (j < remain)
- pipelens[j]++;
- }
- }
- i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
- &tmpwrit);
- if (i <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
- s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
- return i;
- }
- if (tmpwrit == n ||
- (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
- /*
- * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
- * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
- */
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
- if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
- !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- *written = tot + tmpwrit;
- return 1;
- }
- n -= tmpwrit;
- tot += tmpwrit;
- }
- }
- int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
- int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
- {
- WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
- SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
- WPACKET *thispkt;
- SSL3_RECORD *thiswr;
- unsigned char *recordstart;
- int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
- size_t prefix_len = 0;
- int eivlen = 0;
- size_t align = 0;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
- size_t j;
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
- totlen += pipelens[j];
- /*
- * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
- * will happen with non blocking IO
- */
- if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
- /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
- return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
- }
- /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
- i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (i <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- return i;
- }
- /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
- }
- if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
- if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
- return 0;
- sess = s->session;
- if ((sess == NULL) ||
- (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
- clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
- mac_size = 0;
- } else {
- /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- if (mac_size < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /*
- * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
- */
- if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
- /*
- * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
- * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
- */
- if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
- /*
- * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
- * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
- * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
- * payload)
- */
- size_t tmppipelen = 0;
- int ret;
- ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- goto err;
- }
- if (prefix_len >
- (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
- /* insufficient space */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
- }
- if (create_empty_fragment) {
- wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
- #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
- /*
- * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
- * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
- * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
- */
- align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
- #endif
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- wpinited = 1;
- } else if (prefix_len) {
- wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
- + prefix_len, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- wpinited = 1;
- } else {
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- thispkt = &pkt[j];
- wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
- #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
- align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
- #endif
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- wpinited++;
- }
- }
- /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
- if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
- int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
- if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
- eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
- if (eivlen <= 1)
- eivlen = 0;
- } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
- eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- }
- }
- totlen = 0;
- /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
- memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
- : s->version;
- unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
- size_t maxcomplen;
- unsigned int rectype;
- thispkt = &pkt[j];
- thiswr = &wr[j];
- /*
- * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
- * record type
- */
- if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
- && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
- && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
- || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
- rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
- else
- rectype = type;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
- /*
- * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
- * and record version number > TLS 1.0
- */
- if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
- && !s->renegotiate
- && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION
- && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
- version = TLS1_VERSION;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
- maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
- if (s->compress != NULL)
- maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
- /* write the header */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
- || (eivlen > 0
- && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
- || (maxcomplen > 0
- && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
- &compressdata))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* lets setup the record stuff. */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
- totlen += pipelens[j];
- /*
- * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
- * thiswr->data
- */
- /* first we compress */
- if (s->compress != NULL) {
- if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
- }
- if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
- && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
- && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
- || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
- size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
- /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
- max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
- rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
- if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
- size_t padding = 0;
- size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
- if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
- padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
- } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
- size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
- size_t remainder;
- /* optimize for power of 2 */
- if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
- remainder = rlen & mask;
- else
- remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
- /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
- if (remainder == 0)
- padding = 0;
- else
- padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
- }
- if (padding > 0) {
- /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
- if (padding > max_padding)
- padding = max_padding;
- if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
- }
- }
- }
- /*
- * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
- * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
- * in the wb->buf
- */
- if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
- unsigned char *mac;
- if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
- * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
- * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
- */
- if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
- NULL)
- /*
- * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
- * sub-packet
- */
- || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
- recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
- SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
- }
- if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
- /*
- * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
- * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
- */
- if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
- if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- }
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
- if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- }
- goto err;
- }
- }
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- size_t origlen;
- thispkt = &pkt[j];
- thiswr = &wr[j];
- /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
- if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
- /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
- || origlen > thiswr->length
- || (thiswr->length > origlen
- && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
- thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
- unsigned char *mac;
- if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
- }
- if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
- || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
- - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
- unsigned char ctype = type;
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
- &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
- }
- if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
- * is thiswr->length long
- */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
- * debugging */
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
- if (create_empty_fragment) {
- /*
- * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
- * out anything here
- */
- if (j > 0) {
- /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
- return 1;
- }
- /* now let's set up wb */
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
- prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
- }
- /*
- * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
- * retries later
- */
- s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
- s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
- s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
- s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
- /* we now just need to write the buffer */
- return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
- err:
- for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
- WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
- return -1;
- }
- /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
- *
- * Return values are as per SSL_write()
- */
- int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
- size_t *written)
- {
- int i;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
- size_t currbuf = 0;
- size_t tmpwrit = 0;
- if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
- || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
- && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
- || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
- SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
- return -1;
- }
- for (;;) {
- /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
- && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
- currbuf++;
- continue;
- }
- clear_sys_error();
- if (s->wbio != NULL) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
- i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
- &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
- [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
- (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
- if (i >= 0)
- tmpwrit = i;
- } else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
- SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
- i = -1;
- }
- if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
- SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
- if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
- continue;
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
- return 1;
- } else if (i <= 0) {
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
- * using a datagram service
- */
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
- }
- return i;
- }
- SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
- SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
- }
- }
- /*-
- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
- * 'type' is one of the following:
- *
- * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
- * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
- * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
- *
- * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
- * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
- *
- * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
- * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
- * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
- * argument is non NULL.
- * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
- * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
- * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
- * Change cipher spec protocol
- * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
- * Alert protocol
- * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
- * Handshake protocol
- * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
- * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
- * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
- * Application data protocol
- * none of our business
- */
- int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
- size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
- {
- int i, j, ret;
- size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
- int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
- rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
- if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
- /* Not initialized yet */
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
- && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
- && (type !=
- SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
- /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
- {
- unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
- unsigned char *dst = buf;
- unsigned int k;
- /* peek == 0 */
- n = 0;
- while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
- *dst++ = *src++;
- len--;
- s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
- n++;
- }
- /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
- for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
- s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
- if (recvd_type != NULL)
- *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
- *readbytes = n;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
- */
- if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
- /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- if (i < 0)
- return i;
- if (i == 0)
- return -1;
- }
- start:
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- /*-
- * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
- * rr[i].type - is the type of record
- * rr[i].data, - data
- * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
- * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
- */
- rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
- num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
- do {
- /* get new records if necessary */
- if (num_recs == 0) {
- ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- return ret;
- }
- num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
- if (num_recs == 0) {
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /* Skip over any records we have already read */
- for (curr_rec = 0;
- curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
- curr_rec++) ;
- if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
- RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
- num_recs = 0;
- curr_rec = 0;
- }
- } while (num_recs == 0);
- rr = &rr[curr_rec];
- /*
- * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
- * record that isn't an alert.
- */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
- && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
- s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
- /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
- * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
- && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
- * 'peek' mode)
- */
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- return 0;
- }
- if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
- || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
- && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
- && !is_tls13)) {
- /*
- * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
- * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
- * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
- */
- /*
- * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
- * doing a handshake for the first time
- */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
- return -1;
- }
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
- && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
- && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- return -1;
- }
- if (recvd_type != NULL)
- *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
- if (len == 0) {
- /*
- * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
- * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
- * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
- */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- return 0;
- }
- totalbytes = 0;
- do {
- if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
- n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
- else
- n = len - totalbytes;
- memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
- buf += n;
- if (peek) {
- /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- } else {
- SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
- SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
- s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- }
- }
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
- || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
- curr_rec++;
- rr++;
- }
- totalbytes += n;
- } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
- && totalbytes < len);
- if (totalbytes == 0) {
- /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
- goto start;
- }
- if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
- && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
- && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
- *readbytes = totalbytes;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
- * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
- * were actually expecting a CCS).
- */
- /*
- * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
- */
- if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- /*
- * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
- * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
- * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
- * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
- && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
- /*
- * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
- * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
- * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
- * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
- */
- s->version = rr->rec_version;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
- /*-
- * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
- * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
- */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
- unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
- + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
- PACKET alert;
- if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
- || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
- || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
- || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
- return -1;
- }
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
- if (cb != NULL) {
- j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
- }
- if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
- || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
- s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- s->rlayer.alert_count++;
- if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
- * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
- */
- if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
- goto start;
- } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
- && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- return 0;
- } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
- char tmp[16];
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
- return 0;
- } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
- /*
- * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
- * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
- * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
- * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
- * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
- * the peer refused it where we carry on.
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- return -1;
- } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
- /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
- goto start;
- }
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
- return -1;
- }
- if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- BIO *rbio;
- /*
- * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
- * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
- * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
- * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
- * sent close_notify.
- */
- if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
- goto start;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
- return -1;
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
- * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
- * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
- * above.
- * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
- */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
- * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
- * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
- * that we're just going to discard.
- */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
- unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
- size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
- n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
- n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
- /* now move 'n' bytes: */
- memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
- SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
- SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
- SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
- *dest_len += n;
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
- goto start; /* fragment was too small */
- }
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
- * protocol violation)
- */
- if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
- && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
- int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
- /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- if (i < 0)
- return i;
- if (i == 0) {
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
- * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
- * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
- */
- if (ined)
- return -1;
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
- /* no read-ahead left? */
- BIO *bio;
- /*
- * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
- * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
- * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
- * problems in the blocking world
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- goto start;
- }
- switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
- default:
- /*
- * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
- * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
- * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
- * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
- * record types, using up resources processing them.
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- return -1;
- case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
- case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
- case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
- /*
- * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
- * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
- * that should not happen when type != rr->type
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
- /*
- * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
- * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
- * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
- * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
- * started), we will indulge it.
- */
- if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- return -1;
- } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
- /*
- * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
- * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
- * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
- * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
- * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
- * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
- * record.
- */
- if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
- EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- goto start;
- } else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- }
- void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
- {
- int i;
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
- * format and false otherwise.
- */
- int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
- }
- /*
- * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
- */
- size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
- {
- return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);
- }
|