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- =pod
- =head1 NAME
- SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx,
- SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify,
- SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth,
- SSL_verify_cb,
- SSL_verify_client_post_handshake,
- SSL_set_post_handshake_auth,
- SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth
- - set various SSL/TLS parameters for peer certificate verification
- =head1 SYNOPSIS
- #include <openssl/ssl.h>
- typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
- void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
- void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
- SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);
- void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
- void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth);
- int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl);
- void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val);
- void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val);
- =head1 DESCRIPTION
- SSL_CTX_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B<ctx> to be B<mode> and
- specifies the B<verify_callback> function to be used. If no callback function
- shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>.
- SSL_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B<ssl> to be B<mode> and
- specifies the B<verify_callback> function to be used. If no callback function
- shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>. In
- this case last B<verify_callback> set specifically for this B<ssl> remains. If
- no special B<callback> was set before, the default callback for the underlying
- B<ctx> is used, that was valid at the time B<ssl> was created with
- L<SSL_new(3)>. Within the callback function,
- B<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx> can be called to get the data index
- of the current SSL object that is doing the verification.
- In client mode B<verify_callback> may also call the L<SSL_set_retry_verify(3)>
- function on the B<SSL> object set in the I<x509_store_ctx> ex data (see
- L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>) and return 1.
- This would be typically done in case the certificate verification was not yet
- able to succeed.
- This makes the handshake suspend and return control to the calling application
- with B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY>.
- The application can for instance fetch further certificates or cert status
- information needed for the verification.
- Calling L<SSL_connect(3)> again resumes the connection attempt by retrying the
- server certificate verification step.
- This process may even be repeated if need be.
- Note that the handshake may still be aborted if a subsequent invocation of the
- callback (e.g., at a lower depth, or for a separate error condition) returns 0.
- SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain
- verification that shall be allowed for B<ctx>.
- SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain
- verification that shall be allowed for B<ssl>.
- SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth() and SSL_set_post_handshake_auth() enable the
- Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be added to the ClientHello such that
- post-handshake authentication can be requested by the server. If B<val> is 0
- then the extension is not sent, otherwise it is. By default the extension is not
- sent. A certificate callback will need to be set via
- SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() if no certificate is provided at initialization.
- SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() causes a CertificateRequest message to be
- sent by a server on the given B<ssl> connection. The SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag must
- be set; the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE flag is optional.
- =head1 NOTES
- The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically
- or'ed B<mode> flags:
- =over 4
- =item SSL_VERIFY_NONE
- B<Server mode:> the server will not send a client certificate request to the
- client, so the client will not send a certificate.
- B<Client mode:> if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the
- server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the
- certificate verification process can be checked after the TLS/SSL handshake
- using the L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)> function.
- The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result.
- =item SSL_VERIFY_PEER
- B<Server mode:> the server sends a client certificate request to the client.
- The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process
- fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is
- immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
- the verification failure.
- The behaviour can be controlled by the additional
- SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE and
- SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE flags.
- B<Client mode:> the server certificate is verified. If the verification process
- fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is
- immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
- the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an
- anonymous cipher is used, SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored.
- =item SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
- B<Server mode:> if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL
- handshake is immediately terminated with a "handshake failure" alert.
- This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
- B<Client mode:> ignored (see BUGS)
- =item SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
- B<Server mode:> only request a client certificate once during the
- connection. Do not ask for a client certificate again during
- renegotiation or post-authentication if a certificate was requested
- during the initial handshake. This flag must be used together with
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
- B<Client mode:> ignored (see BUGS)
- =item SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
- B<Server mode:> the server will not send a client certificate request
- during the initial handshake, but will send the request via
- SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(). This allows the SSL_CTX or SSL
- to be configured for post-handshake peer verification before the
- handshake occurs. This flag must be used together with
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER. TLSv1.3 only; no effect on pre-TLSv1.3 connections.
- B<Client mode:> ignored (see BUGS)
- =back
- If the B<mode> is SSL_VERIFY_NONE none of the other flags may be set.
- The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in
- verification procedure or using another application provided verification
- function set with
- L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>.
- The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An
- application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information
- and the verify_callback() function, but the way this information is used
- may be different.
- SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() and SSL_set_verify_depth() set a limit on the
- number of certificates between the end-entity and trust-anchor certificates.
- Neither the
- end-entity nor the trust-anchor certificates count against B<depth>. If the
- certificate chain needed to reach a trusted issuer is longer than B<depth+2>,
- X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be issued.
- The depth count is "level 0:peer certificate", "level 1: CA certificate",
- "level 2: higher level CA certificate", and so on. Setting the maximum
- depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-entity and 3 the
- trust-anchor).
- The default depth limit is 100,
- allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate CA certificates and
- a final trust anchor certificate.
- The B<verify_callback> function is used to control the behaviour when the
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and
- receives two arguments: B<preverify_ok> indicates, whether the verification of
- the certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not
- (preverify_ok=0). B<x509_ctx> is a pointer to the complete context used
- for the certificate chain verification.
- The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level
- (the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate.
- At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever
- a verification error is found, the error number is stored in B<x509_ctx>
- and B<verify_callback> is called with B<preverify_ok>=0. By applying
- X509_CTX_store_* functions B<verify_callback> can locate the certificate
- in question and perform additional steps (see EXAMPLES). If no error is
- found for a certificate, B<verify_callback> is called with B<preverify_ok>=1
- before advancing to the next level.
- The return value of B<verify_callback> controls the strategy of the further
- verification process. If B<verify_callback> returns 0, the verification
- process is immediately stopped with "verification failed" state. If
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and
- the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If B<verify_callback> returns 1,
- the verification process is continued. If B<verify_callback> always returns
- 1, the TLS/SSL handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification
- failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can
- however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using
- L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)> or by maintaining its
- own error storage managed by B<verify_callback>.
- If no B<verify_callback> is specified, the default callback will be used.
- Its return value is identical to B<preverify_ok>, so that any verification
- failure will lead to a termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an
- alert message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set.
- After calling SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(), the client will need to add a
- certificate or certificate callback to its configuration before it can
- successfully authenticate. This must be called before SSL_connect().
- SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() requires that verify flags have been
- previously set, and that a client sent the post-handshake authentication
- extension. When the client returns a certificate the verify callback will be
- invoked. A write operation must take place for the Certificate Request to be
- sent to the client, this can be done with SSL_do_handshake() or SSL_write_ex().
- Only one certificate request may be outstanding at any time.
- When post-handshake authentication occurs, a refreshed NewSessionTicket
- message is sent to the client.
- =head1 BUGS
- In client mode, it is not checked whether the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag
- is set, but whether any flags other than SSL_VERIFY_NONE are set. This can
- lead to unexpected behaviour if SSL_VERIFY_PEER and other flags are not used as
- required.
- =head1 RETURN VALUES
- The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information.
- The SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() function returns 1 if the request
- succeeded, and 0 if the request failed. The error stack can be examined
- to determine the failure reason.
- =head1 EXAMPLES
- The following code sequence realizes an example B<verify_callback> function
- that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification
- failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with
- more informational output.
- All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain
- is printed on request.
- The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client
- certificates.
- The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data
- into/retrieve application data from the SSL structure
- (see L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>,
- L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>).
- ...
- typedef struct {
- int verbose_mode;
- int verify_depth;
- int always_continue;
- } mydata_t;
- int mydata_index;
- ...
- static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- char buf[256];
- X509 *err_cert;
- int err, depth;
- SSL *ssl;
- mydata_t *mydata;
- err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
- err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
- /*
- * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
- * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
- */
- ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
- mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
- /*
- * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
- * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
- * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
- * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
- * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
- * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
- * additional certificates would be logged.
- */
- if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) {
- preverify_ok = 0;
- err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
- }
- if (!preverify_ok) {
- printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
- } else if (mydata->verbose_mode) {
- printf("depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf);
- }
- /*
- * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
- * it for something special
- */
- if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) {
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
- printf("issuer= %s\n", buf);
- }
- if (mydata->always_continue)
- return 1;
- else
- return preverify_ok;
- }
- ...
- mydata_t mydata;
- ...
- mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);
- ...
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
- verify_callback);
- /*
- * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
- * an appropriate error in the logfile.
- */
- SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);
- /*
- * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL
- * structure.
- */
- mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
- SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);
- ...
- SSL_accept(ssl); /* check of success left out for clarity */
- if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {
- if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
- /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
- }
- }
- =head1 SEE ALSO
- L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_new(3)>,
- L<SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3)>,
- L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
- L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>,
- L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>,
- L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>,
- L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>,
- L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>,
- L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>
- =head1 HISTORY
- The SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE option, and the SSL_verify_client_post_handshake()
- and SSL_set_post_handshake_auth() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
- =head1 COPYRIGHT
- Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
- =cut
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