12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637383940414243444546474849505152535455565758596061626364656667686970717273747576777879808182838485868788899091929394959697989910010110210310410510610710810911011111211311411511611711811912012112212312412512612712812913013113213313413513613713813914014114214314414514614714814915015115215315415515615715815916016116216316416516616716816917017117217317417517617717817918018118218318418518618718818919019119219319419519619719819920020120220320420520620720820921021121221321421521621721821922022122222322422522622722822923023123223323423523623723823924024124224324424524624724824925025125225325425525625725825926026126226326426526626726826927027127227327427527627727827928028128228328428528628728828929029129229329429529629729829930030130230330430530630730830931031131231331431531631731831932032132232332432532632732832933033133233333433533633733833934034134234334434534634734834935035135235335435535635735835936036136236336436536636736836937037137237337437537637737837938038138238338438538638738838939039139239339439539639739839940040140240340440540640740840941041141241341441541641741841942042142242342442542642742842943043143243343443543643743843944044144244344444544644744844945045145245345445545645745845946046146246346446546646746846947047147247347447547647747847948048148248348448548648748848949049149249349449549649749849950050150250350450550650750850951051151251351451551651751851952052152252352452552652752852953053153253353453553653753853954054154254354454554654754854955055155255355455555655755855956056156256356456556656756856957057157257357457557657757857958058158258358458558658758858959059159259359459559659759859960060160260360460560660760860961061161261361461561661761861962062162262362462562662762862963063163263363463563663763863964064164264364464564664764864965065165265365465565665765865966066166266366466566666766866967067167267367467567667767867968068168268368468568668768868969069169269369469569669769869970070170270370470570670770870971071171271371471571671771871972072172272372472572672772872973073173273373473573673773873974074174274374474574674774874975075175275375475575675775875976076176276376476576676776876977077177277377477577677777877978078178278378478578678778878979079179279379479579679779879980080180280380480580680780880981081181281381481581681781881982082182282382482582682782882983083183283383483583683783883984084184284384484584684784884985085185285385485585685785885986086186286386486586686786886987087187287387487587687787887988088188288388488588688788888989089189289389489589689789889990090190290390490590690790890991091191291391491591691791891992092192292392492592692792892993093193293393493593693793893994094194294394494594694794894995095195295395495595695795895996096196296396496596696796896997097197297397497597697797897998098198298398498598698798898999099199299399499599699799899910001001100210031004100510061007100810091010101110121013101410151016101710181019102010211022102310241025102610271028102910301031103210331034103510361037103810391040104110421043104410451046104710481049105010511052105310541055105610571058105910601061106210631064106510661067106810691070107110721073107410751076107710781079108010811082108310841085108610871088108910901091109210931094109510961097109810991100110111021103110411051106110711081109111011111112111311141115111611171118111911201121112211231124112511261127112811291130113111321133113411351136113711381139114011411142114311441145114611471148114911501151115211531154115511561157115811591160116111621163116411651166116711681169117011711172117311741175117611771178117911801181118211831184118511861187118811891190119111921193119411951196119711981199120012011202120312041205120612071208120912101211121212131214121512161217121812191220122112221223122412251226122712281229123012311232123312341235123612371238123912401241124212431244124512461247124812491250125112521253125412551256125712581259126012611262126312641265126612671268126912701271127212731274127512761277127812791280128112821283128412851286128712881289129012911292129312941295129612971298129913001301130213031304130513061307130813091310131113121313131413151316131713181319132013211322132313241325132613271328132913301331133213331334133513361337133813391340134113421343134413451346134713481349135013511352135313541355135613571358135913601361136213631364136513661367136813691370137113721373137413751376137713781379138013811382138313841385138613871388138913901391139213931394139513961397139813991400140114021403140414051406140714081409141014111412141314141415141614171418141914201421142214231424142514261427142814291430143114321433143414351436143714381439144014411442144314441445144614471448144914501451145214531454145514561457145814591460146114621463146414651466146714681469147014711472147314741475147614771478147914801481148214831484148514861487148814891490149114921493149414951496149714981499150015011502150315041505150615071508150915101511151215131514151515161517151815191520152115221523152415251526152715281529153015311532153315341535153615371538153915401541154215431544154515461547154815491550155115521553155415551556155715581559156015611562156315641565156615671568156915701571157215731574157515761577157815791580158115821583158415851586158715881589159015911592159315941595159615971598159916001601160216031604160516061607160816091610161116121613161416151616161716181619162016211622162316241625162616271628162916301631163216331634163516361637163816391640164116421643164416451646164716481649165016511652165316541655165616571658165916601661166216631664166516661667166816691670167116721673167416751676167716781679168016811682168316841685168616871688168916901691169216931694169516961697169816991700170117021703170417051706170717081709171017111712171317141715171617171718171917201721172217231724172517261727172817291730173117321733173417351736173717381739174017411742174317441745174617471748174917501751175217531754175517561757175817591760176117621763176417651766176717681769177017711772177317741775177617771778177917801781178217831784178517861787178817891790179117921793179417951796179717981799180018011802180318041805180618071808180918101811181218131814181518161817181818191820182118221823182418251826182718281829183018311832183318341835183618371838183918401841184218431844184518461847184818491850185118521853185418551856185718581859186018611862186318641865186618671868186918701871187218731874187518761877187818791880188118821883188418851886188718881889189018911892189318941895189618971898189919001901190219031904190519061907190819091910191119121913191419151916191719181919192019211922192319241925192619271928192919301931193219331934193519361937193819391940194119421943194419451946194719481949195019511952195319541955195619571958195919601961196219631964196519661967196819691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982198319841985198619871988198919901991199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024202520262027202820292030203120322033203420352036203720382039204020412042204320442045204620472048204920502051205220532054205520562057205820592060206120622063206420652066206720682069207020712072207320742075207620772078207920802081208220832084208520862087208820892090209120922093209420952096209720982099210021012102210321042105210621072108210921102111211221132114211521162117211821192120212121222123212421252126212721282129213021312132213321342135213621372138213921402141214221432144214521462147214821492150215121522153215421552156215721582159216021612162216321642165216621672168216921702171217221732174217521762177217821792180218121822183218421852186218721882189219021912192219321942195219621972198219922002201220222032204220522062207220822092210221122122213221422152216221722182219222022212222222322242225222622272228222922302231223222332234223522362237223822392240224122422243224422452246224722482249225022512252225322542255225622572258225922602261226222632264226522662267226822692270227122722273227422752276227722782279228022812282228322842285228622872288228922902291229222932294229522962297229822992300230123022303230423052306230723082309231023112312231323142315231623172318231923202321232223232324232523262327232823292330233123322333233423352336233723382339234023412342234323442345234623472348234923502351235223532354235523562357235823592360236123622363236423652366236723682369237023712372237323742375237623772378237923802381238223832384238523862387238823892390239123922393239423952396239723982399240024012402240324042405240624072408240924102411241224132414241524162417241824192420242124222423242424252426242724282429243024312432243324342435243624372438243924402441244224432444244524462447244824492450245124522453245424552456245724582459246024612462246324642465246624672468246924702471247224732474247524762477247824792480248124822483248424852486248724882489249024912492249324942495249624972498249925002501250225032504250525062507250825092510251125122513251425152516251725182519252025212522252325242525252625272528252925302531253225332534253525362537253825392540254125422543254425452546254725482549255025512552255325542555255625572558255925602561256225632564256525662567256825692570257125722573257425752576257725782579258025812582258325842585258625872588258925902591259225932594259525962597259825992600260126022603260426052606260726082609261026112612261326142615261626172618261926202621262226232624262526262627262826292630263126322633263426352636263726382639264026412642264326442645264626472648264926502651265226532654265526562657265826592660266126622663266426652666266726682669267026712672267326742675267626772678267926802681268226832684268526862687268826892690269126922693269426952696269726982699270027012702270327042705270627072708270927102711271227132714271527162717271827192720272127222723272427252726272727282729273027312732273327342735273627372738273927402741274227432744274527462747274827492750275127522753275427552756275727582759276027612762276327642765276627672768276927702771277227732774277527762777277827792780278127822783278427852786278727882789279027912792279327942795279627972798279928002801280228032804280528062807280828092810281128122813281428152816281728182819282028212822282328242825282628272828282928302831283228332834283528362837283828392840284128422843284428452846284728482849285028512852285328542855285628572858285928602861286228632864286528662867286828692870287128722873287428752876287728782879288028812882288328842885288628872888288928902891289228932894289528962897289828992900290129022903290429052906290729082909291029112912291329142915291629172918291929202921292229232924292529262927292829292930293129322933293429352936293729382939294029412942294329442945294629472948294929502951295229532954295529562957295829592960296129622963296429652966296729682969297029712972297329742975297629772978297929802981298229832984298529862987298829892990299129922993299429952996299729982999300030013002300330043005300630073008300930103011301230133014301530163017301830193020302130223023302430253026302730283029303030313032303330343035303630373038303930403041304230433044304530463047304830493050305130523053305430553056305730583059306030613062306330643065306630673068306930703071307230733074307530763077307830793080308130823083308430853086308730883089309030913092309330943095309630973098309931003101310231033104310531063107310831093110311131123113311431153116311731183119312031213122312331243125312631273128312931303131313231333134313531363137313831393140314131423143314431453146314731483149315031513152315331543155315631573158315931603161316231633164316531663167316831693170317131723173317431753176317731783179318031813182318331843185318631873188318931903191319231933194319531963197319831993200320132023203320432053206320732083209321032113212321332143215321632173218321932203221322232233224322532263227322832293230323132323233323432353236323732383239324032413242324332443245324632473248324932503251325232533254325532563257325832593260326132623263326432653266326732683269327032713272327332743275327632773278327932803281328232833284328532863287328832893290329132923293329432953296329732983299330033013302330333043305330633073308330933103311331233133314331533163317331833193320332133223323332433253326332733283329333033313332333333343335333633373338333933403341334233433344334533463347334833493350335133523353335433553356335733583359336033613362336333643365336633673368336933703371337233733374337533763377337833793380338133823383338433853386338733883389339033913392339333943395339633973398339934003401340234033404340534063407340834093410341134123413341434153416341734183419342034213422342334243425342634273428342934303431343234333434343534363437343834393440344134423443344434453446344734483449345034513452345334543455345634573458345934603461346234633464346534663467346834693470347134723473347434753476347734783479348034813482348334843485348634873488348934903491349234933494349534963497349834993500350135023503350435053506350735083509351035113512351335143515351635173518351935203521352235233524352535263527352835293530353135323533353435353536353735383539354035413542354335443545354635473548354935503551355235533554355535563557355835593560356135623563356435653566356735683569357035713572357335743575357635773578357935803581358235833584358535863587358835893590359135923593359435953596359735983599360036013602360336043605360636073608360936103611361236133614361536163617361836193620362136223623362436253626362736283629363036313632363336343635363636373638363936403641364236433644364536463647364836493650365136523653365436553656365736583659366036613662366336643665366636673668366936703671367236733674367536763677367836793680368136823683368436853686368736883689369036913692369336943695369636973698369937003701370237033704370537063707370837093710371137123713371437153716371737183719372037213722372337243725372637273728372937303731373237333734373537363737373837393740374137423743374437453746374737483749375037513752375337543755375637573758375937603761376237633764376537663767376837693770377137723773377437753776377737783779378037813782378337843785378637873788378937903791379237933794379537963797379837993800380138023803380438053806380738083809381038113812381338143815381638173818381938203821382238233824382538263827382838293830383138323833383438353836383738383839384038413842384338443845384638473848384938503851385238533854385538563857385838593860386138623863386438653866386738683869387038713872387338743875387638773878387938803881388238833884388538863887388838893890389138923893389438953896389738983899390039013902390339043905390639073908390939103911391239133914391539163917391839193920392139223923392439253926392739283929393039313932393339343935393639373938393939403941394239433944394539463947394839493950395139523953395439553956395739583959396039613962396339643965396639673968396939703971397239733974397539763977397839793980398139823983398439853986398739883989399039913992399339943995399639973998399940004001400240034004400540064007400840094010401140124013401440154016401740184019402040214022402340244025402640274028402940304031403240334034403540364037403840394040404140424043404440454046404740484049405040514052405340544055405640574058405940604061406240634064406540664067406840694070407140724073407440754076407740784079408040814082408340844085408640874088408940904091409240934094409540964097409840994100410141024103410441054106410741084109411041114112411341144115411641174118411941204121412241234124412541264127412841294130413141324133413441354136413741384139414041414142414341444145414641474148414941504151415241534154415541564157415841594160416141624163416441654166416741684169417041714172417341744175417641774178417941804181418241834184418541864187418841894190419141924193419441954196419741984199420042014202420342044205420642074208420942104211421242134214421542164217421842194220422142224223422442254226422742284229423042314232423342344235423642374238423942404241424242434244424542464247424842494250425142524253425442554256425742584259426042614262426342644265426642674268426942704271427242734274427542764277427842794280428142824283428442854286428742884289429042914292429342944295429642974298429943004301430243034304430543064307430843094310431143124313431443154316431743184319432043214322432343244325432643274328432943304331433243334334433543364337433843394340434143424343434443454346434743484349435043514352435343544355435643574358435943604361436243634364436543664367436843694370437143724373437443754376437743784379438043814382438343844385438643874388438943904391439243934394439543964397439843994400440144024403440444054406440744084409441044114412441344144415441644174418441944204421 |
- /*
- * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "../ssl_local.h"
- #include "statem_local.h"
- #include "internal/constant_time.h"
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
- #include <openssl/buffer.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/objects.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/rsa.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/trace.h>
- #include <openssl/core_names.h>
- #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
- #include <openssl/comp.h>
- #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
- typedef struct {
- ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
- ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
- } GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
- DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
- ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
- ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
- } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
- IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
- static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- WPACKET *pkt);
- static ossl_inline int received_client_cert(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
- {
- return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
- }
- /*
- * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
- * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
- * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
- * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
- *
- * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
- * (transition not allowed)
- */
- static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- /*
- * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
- * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
- * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
- */
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- break;
- case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
- if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- }
- /* Fall through */
- case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
- return 1;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
- && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
- return 1;
- }
- #endif
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
- if (!received_client_cert(s)) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /*
- * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
- * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
- */
- if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
- break;
- if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
- return 1;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
- && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
- return 1;
- }
- #endif
- }
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- }
- /* No valid transition found */
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
- * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
- * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
- * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
- *
- * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
- * (transition not allowed)
- */
- int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
- goto err;
- return 1;
- }
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- break;
- case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- /*
- * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
- * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
- * OR
- * 2) If we did request one then
- * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
- * AND
- * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
- * list if we requested a certificate)
- */
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
- && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
- /*
- * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
- * not going to accept it because we require a client
- * cert.
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- return 0;
- }
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- }
- } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
- /*
- * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
- * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
- * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
- * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
- * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
- * set.
- */
- if (!received_client_cert(s) || st->no_cert_verify) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- /*
- * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
- * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
- * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
- * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
- */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- #endif
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- }
- #endif
- break;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- #endif
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- }
- err:
- /* No valid transition found */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- BIO *rbio;
- /*
- * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
- * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
- */
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
- return 0;
- }
- SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
- static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- /*
- * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
- * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
- * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
- * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
- * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
- * key exchange.
- */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
- /*
- * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
- * provided
- */
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
- || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
- && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
- /* For other PSK always send SKE */
- || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
- || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
- #endif
- ) {
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Used to determine if we should send a CompressedCertificate message
- *
- * Returns the algorithm to use, TLSEXT_comp_cert_none means no compression
- */
- static int get_compressed_certificate_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
- {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
- int *alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer;
- if (sc->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
- return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
- for (; *alg != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; alg++) {
- if (sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[*alg] != NULL)
- return *alg;
- }
- #endif
- return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
- }
- /*
- * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Yes
- * 0: No
- */
- int send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- if (
- /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
- s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
- /*
- * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
- * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
- */
- && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
- || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
- /*
- * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
- * a second time:
- */
- && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
- /*
- * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
- * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
- * RFC 2246):
- */
- && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
- /*
- * ... except when the application insists on
- * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
- * this for SSL 3)
- */
- || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
- && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
- /*
- * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
- * are omitted
- */
- && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
- {
- /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't attempt to compress it */
- return sc->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
- && get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc) != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
- }
- /*
- * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
- * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
- * client.
- */
- static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- /*
- * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
- * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
- */
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Try to read from the client instead */
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
- && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
- else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
- if (s->hit)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
- else if (send_certificate_request(s))
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
- else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
- if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
- s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- } else if (do_compressed_cert(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
- s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
- s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
- /*
- * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
- * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
- * immediately.
- */
- if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
- s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
- } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
- /*
- * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
- * handshake at this point.
- */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
- case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
- * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
- * been configured for.
- */
- if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
- /* We've written enough tickets out. */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- }
- /*
- * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
- * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
- */
- WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- /*
- * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
- * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
- */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
- return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
- /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
- st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
- if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
- }
- /* Fall through */
- case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
- /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
- && (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
- st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
- /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- if (s->hit) {
- if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
- } else {
- /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
- /* normal PSK or SRP */
- if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
- (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
- } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
- } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
- }
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- if (s->ext.status_expected) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
- if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
- case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
- if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
- s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
- if (s->hit) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
- } else {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
- }
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (s->hit) {
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- }
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
- * the server to the client.
- */
- WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- /* No pre work to be done */
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
- s->shutdown = 0;
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
- dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
- break;
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- s->shutdown = 0;
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
- /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
- st->use_timer = 0;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
- * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
- */
- st->use_timer = 1;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))) {
- /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
- return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
- }
- #endif
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
- && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
- /*
- * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
- * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
- * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
- *
- * Calls SSLfatal as required.
- */
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
- * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
- */
- st->use_timer = 0;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
- break;
- /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
- if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
- s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
- } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
- * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
- * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
- * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
- */
- st->use_timer = 0;
- }
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
- if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
- && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
- /* Fall through */
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
- }
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
- }
- static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
- {
- switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
- #if defined(EPIPE)
- case EPIPE:
- return 1;
- #endif
- #if defined(ECONNRESET)
- case ECONNRESET:
- return 1;
- #endif
- #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
- case WSAECONNRESET:
- return 1;
- #endif
- default:
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
- * server to the client.
- */
- WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
- s->init_num = 0;
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- /* No post work to be done */
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- break;
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- /*
- * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
- * treat like it was the first packet
- */
- s->first_packet = 1;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
- && statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- break;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
- unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
- char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
- size_t labellen;
- /*
- * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
- * SCTP used.
- */
- memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
- sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
- /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
- labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
- labellen += 1;
- if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- labellen, NULL, 0,
- 0) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
- }
- #endif
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
- && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
- break;
- /* Fall through */
- case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
- if (!statem_flush(s))
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- break;
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
- || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
- && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- /*
- * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
- * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
- * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
- */
- if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
- s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 1);
- break;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
- #endif
- if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
- dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
- #endif
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
- size_t dummy;
- if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
- &dummy)
- || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
- if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- } else {
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
- s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
- if (!s->hit && !send_certificate_request(s)) {
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
- s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- clear_sys_error();
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
- if (SSL_get_error(ssl, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
- && conn_is_closed()) {
- /*
- * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
- * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
- * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
- * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
- * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- break;
- }
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- }
- break;
- }
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
- }
- /*
- * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
- * server
- *
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Success
- * 0: Error
- */
- int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
- return 0;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
- *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
- else
- *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
- break;
- case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
- *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
- *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
- /* No construction function needed */
- *confunc = NULL;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
- case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
- *confunc = tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- #endif
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
- *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
- *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
- *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
- *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
- *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
- *confunc = NULL;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
- *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
- break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
- *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
- break;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
- * calculated as follows:
- *
- * 2 + # client_version
- * 32 + # only valid length for random
- * 1 + # length of session_id
- * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
- * 2 + # length of cipher suites
- * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
- * 1 + # length of compression_methods
- * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
- * 2 + # length of extensions
- * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
- */
- #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
- #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
- #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
- /*
- * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
- * reading. Excludes the message header.
- */
- size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return 0;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
- return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
- return s->max_cert_list;
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
- return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
- return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
- return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
- #endif
- case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
- return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
- return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
- return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
- */
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- PACKET *pkt)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
- return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
- return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
- case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
- return tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
- #endif
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
- return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
- return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
- #endif
- case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
- return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
- return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
- return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
- }
- }
- /*
- * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
- * from the client
- */
- WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- WORK_STATE wst)
- {
- OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- switch (st->hand_state) {
- default:
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return WORK_ERROR;
- case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
- return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
- }
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
- static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- int ret;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
- (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
- /*
- * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
- * login name
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- return -1;
- } else {
- ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al);
- if (ret < 0)
- return 0;
- if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
- SSLfatal(s, al,
- al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
- ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
- : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- }
- return 1;
- }
- #endif
- int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
- size_t cookie_len)
- {
- /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
- CON_FUNC_RETURN dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- unsigned int cookie_leni;
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- if (sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL
- || sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), s->d1->cookie,
- &cookie_leni) == 0
- || cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
- if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- }
- /*-
- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
- * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
- * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
- * SNI,
- * elliptic_curves
- * ec_point_formats
- * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
- *
- * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
- * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
- * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
- * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
- */
- static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
- {
- static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
- 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
- 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
- 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
- 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
- 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
- 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
- 0x01, /* 1 point format */
- 0x00, /* uncompressed */
- /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
- 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
- 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
- 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
- 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
- 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
- };
- /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
- static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
- unsigned int type;
- PACKET sni, tmppkt;
- size_t ext_len;
- tmppkt = hello->extensions;
- if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
- return;
- }
- if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- return;
- ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(
- SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
- sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
- s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
- ext_len);
- }
- #define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
- ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
- && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
- PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
- static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
- CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
- /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
- if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
- if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
- || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
- && (s->options
- & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
- }
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->new_session = 1;
- }
- clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
- if (clienthello == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
- */
- clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
- PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
- if (clienthello->isv2) {
- unsigned int mt;
- if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
- || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto err;
- }
- /*-
- * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
- * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
- * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
- * the rest right through. Its format is:
- * Byte Content
- * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
- * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
- * 3-4 version
- * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
- * 7-8 session_id_length
- * 9-10 challenge_length
- * ... ...
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
- || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- /*
- * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
- * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
- * in the first place
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Parse the message and load client random. */
- if (clienthello->isv2) {
- /*
- * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
- * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
- * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
- */
- unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
- PACKET challenge;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
- ciphersuite_len)
- || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
- /* No extensions. */
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
- /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
- * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
- * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
- */
- challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
- memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
- clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
- challenge_len, challenge_len)
- /* Advertise only null compression. */
- || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
- } else {
- /* Regular ClientHello. */
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
- || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
- SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
- &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
- DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
- &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
- * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
- * So check cookie length...
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
- return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
- }
- }
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Could be empty. */
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
- PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
- } else {
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
- MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
- &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
- extensions = clienthello->extensions;
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
- &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal already been called */
- goto err;
- }
- s->clienthello = clienthello;
- return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- err:
- if (clienthello != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
- OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- unsigned int j;
- int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- int protverr;
- size_t loop;
- unsigned long id;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
- #endif
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
- CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
- DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
- /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
- /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
- if (sctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
- /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
- switch (sctx->client_hello_cb(ssl, &al, sctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
- case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
- break;
- case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
- s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
- return -1;
- case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
- default:
- SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /* Set up the client_random */
- memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- /* Choose the version */
- if (clienthello->isv2) {
- if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
- || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
- != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
- /*
- * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
- * support it.
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- }
- /* SSLv3/TLS */
- s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
- }
- /*
- * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
- * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
- */
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
- } else if (ssl->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
- DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
- protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
- } else {
- protverr = 0;
- }
- if (protverr) {
- if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
- /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
- s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
- }
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
- goto err;
- }
- /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
- goto err;
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
- if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(ssl, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
- clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- /* else cookie verification succeeded */
- }
- /* default verification */
- } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
- || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
- }
- if (ssl->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
- if (protverr != 0) {
- s->version = s->client_version;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- s->hit = 0;
- if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
- clienthello->isv2) ||
- !ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers,
- &scsvs, clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
- /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
- if (scsvs != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
- if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
- if (s->renegotiate) {
- /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
- } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
- !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
- /*
- * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
- * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
- * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
- * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
- * an insecure downgrade.
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
- SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
- ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
- if (cipher == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
- && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
- || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
- /*
- * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
- * just selected. Something must have changed.
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
- }
- /* We need to do this before getting the session */
- if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
- SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
- * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
- *
- * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
- * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
- * ignore resumption requests with flag
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
- * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
- * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
- * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
- * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
- * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
- * ignored.
- */
- if (clienthello->isv2 ||
- (s->new_session &&
- (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
- if (i == 1) {
- /* previous session */
- s->hit = 1;
- } else if (i == -1) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- } else {
- /* i == 0 */
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
- s->clienthello->session_id_len);
- s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
- }
- /*
- * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
- * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
- */
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
- j = 0;
- id = s->session->cipher->id;
- OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
- BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
- }
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
- if (trc_out != NULL)
- BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
- if (c->id == id) {
- j = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (j == 0) {
- /*
- * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
- * to reuse it
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
- OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
- }
- for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
- if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
- break;
- }
- if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
- /* no compress */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
- /* TLS extensions */
- if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
- * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
- * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
- * processing to use it in key derivation.
- */
- {
- unsigned char *pos;
- pos = s->s3.server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (!s->hit
- && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
- && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
- && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
- /*
- * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
- * backwards compat reasons
- */
- int master_key_length;
- master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
- &master_key_length, ciphers,
- &pref_cipher,
- s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
- && master_key_length > 0) {
- s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
- s->hit = 1;
- s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
- s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- ciphers = NULL;
- /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
- if (pref_cipher == NULL)
- pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
- SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
- if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
- s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
- s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
- }
- }
- /*
- * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
- * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
- * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
- */
- s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- /*
- * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
- * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
- * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
- */
- if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
- else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
- unsigned int k;
- /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
- /* Can't disable compression */
- if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Look for resumed compression method */
- for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods); m++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
- if (comp_id == comp->id) {
- s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
- for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
- if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
- break;
- }
- if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (s->hit) {
- comp = NULL;
- } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && sctx->comp_methods) {
- /* See if we have a match */
- int m, nn, v, done = 0;
- unsigned int o;
- nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
- for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
- v = comp->id;
- for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
- if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
- done = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (done)
- break;
- }
- if (done)
- s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
- else
- comp = NULL;
- }
- #else
- /*
- * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
- * using compression.
- */
- if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto err;
- }
- #endif
- /*
- * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
- */
- if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
- s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
- if (ciphers == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- ciphers = NULL;
- }
- if (!s->hit) {
- #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
- #else
- s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
- #endif
- if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- }
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
- OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
- OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
- s->clienthello = NULL;
- return 1;
- err:
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
- OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
- OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
- s->clienthello = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
- * Upon failure, returns 0.
- */
- static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- s->ext.status_expected = 0;
- /*
- * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
- * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
- * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
- * influence which certificate is sent
- */
- if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && sctx != NULL
- && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
- int ret;
- /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
- /*
- * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
- * et al can pick it up.
- */
- s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
- ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
- sctx->ext.status_arg);
- switch (ret) {
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->ext.status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* status request response should be sent */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
- s->ext.status_expected = 1;
- break;
- /* something bad happened */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- default:
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
- * Upon failure, returns 0.
- */
- int tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
- unsigned char selected_len = 0;
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- if (sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
- int r = sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
- &selected, &selected_len,
- s->s3.alpn_proposed,
- (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
- sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
- s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
- s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
- #endif
- /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
- if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
- || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
- || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
- selected_len) != 0) {
- /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
- s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
- if (!s->hit) {
- /*
- * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
- * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
- * selected ALPN.
- */
- if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
- selected_len);
- if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
- }
- }
- return 1;
- } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
- SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
- * present.
- */
- }
- /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
- if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
- /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
- s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
- {
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
- SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
- int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
- if (rv == 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() was already called */
- goto err;
- }
- if (rv < 0)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- wst = WORK_MORE_B;
- }
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
- if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
- if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
- int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (rv == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rv < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return WORK_MORE_B;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- }
- /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- cipher =
- ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
- SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
- if (cipher == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
- }
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal already called */
- goto err;
- }
- /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
- if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
- s->session->not_resumable =
- s->not_resumable_session_cb(ssl,
- ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
- & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
- if (s->session->not_resumable)
- /* do not send a session ticket */
- s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
- }
- } else {
- /* Session-id reuse */
- s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
- }
- /*-
- * we now have the following setup.
- * client_random
- * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
- * ciphers - the client's preferred list of ciphers
- * compression - basically ignored right now
- * ssl version is set - sslv3
- * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
- * s->hit - session reuse flag
- * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
- */
- /*
- * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
- * certificate callbacks etc above.
- */
- if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
- * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
- * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
- * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
- */
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- wst = WORK_MORE_C;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
- int ret;
- if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
- /*
- * callback indicates further work to be done
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return WORK_MORE_C;
- }
- if (ret < 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- }
- #endif
- return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
- err:
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- int compm;
- size_t sl, len;
- int version;
- unsigned char *session_id;
- int usetls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
- version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
- /*
- * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
- * tls_process_client_hello()
- */
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
- s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
- ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- /*-
- * There are several cases for the session ID to send
- * back in the server hello:
- * - For session reuse from the session cache,
- * we send back the old session ID.
- * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
- * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
- * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
- * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
- * session ID.
- * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
- * we send back a 0-length session ID.
- * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
- * regardless
- * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
- * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
- * to send back.
- */
- if (s->session->not_resumable ||
- (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
- && !s->hit))
- s->session->session_id_length = 0;
- if (usetls13) {
- sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
- session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
- } else {
- sl = s->session->session_id_length;
- session_id = s->session->session_id;
- }
- if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- /* set up the compression method */
- #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- compm = 0;
- #else
- if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- compm = 0;
- else
- compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
- #endif
- if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
- || !SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher,
- pkt, &len)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
- ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
- : (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
- NULL, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
- /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = NULL;
- s->hit = 0;
- /*
- * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
- * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
- */
- if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
- && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */;
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- }
- CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- }
- return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- }
- CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- size_t encodedlen = 0;
- int curve_id = 0;
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
- int i;
- unsigned long type;
- BIGNUM *r[4];
- EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
- size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
- int freer = 0;
- CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (md_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
- if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
- } else
- #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
- if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
- CERT *cert = s->cert;
- EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
- if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
- pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
- if (pkdh == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- pkdhp = pkdh;
- } else {
- pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
- }
- #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
- if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
- pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
- 0, 1024));
- if (pkdh == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- pkdhp = pkdh;
- }
- #endif
- if (pkdhp == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
- EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
- if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
- pkdh = NULL;
- /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
- freer = 1;
- if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
- &r[0])
- || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
- &r[1])
- || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
- OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
- curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
- if (curve_id == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
- s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
- /* Generate a new key for this curve */
- s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
- if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- /* Encode the public key. */
- encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
- &encodedPoint);
- if (encodedlen == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
- * can set these to NULLs
- */
- r[0] = NULL;
- r[1] = NULL;
- r[2] = NULL;
- r[3] = NULL;
- } else
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
- if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
- goto err;
- }
- r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
- r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
- r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
- r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
- } else
- #endif
- {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
- || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
- lu = NULL;
- } else if (lu == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_PSK) {
- size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
- ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
- /*
- * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
- * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
- */
- if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
- len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- #endif
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
- unsigned char *binval;
- int res;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
- res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
- } else
- #endif
- res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
- if (!res) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /*-
- * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
- * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
- * as the prime
- */
- if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
- size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
- if (len > 0) {
- if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- memset(binval, 0, len);
- }
- }
- if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
- }
- if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- /*
- * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
- * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
- * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
- * point itself
- */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- encodedPoint = NULL;
- }
- /* not anonymous */
- if (lu != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
- size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
- if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
- if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* send signature algorithm */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
- md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
- sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
- NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
- s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
- paramlen);
- if (tbslen == 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
- || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
- || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
- || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
- || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
- OPENSSL_free(tbs);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(tbs);
- }
- ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
- if (freer) {
- BN_free(r[0]);
- BN_free(r[1]);
- BN_free(r[2]);
- BN_free(r[3]);
- }
- return ret;
- }
- CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
- if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
- s->pha_context_len = 32;
- if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
- s->pha_context_len = 0;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
- s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
- s->pha_context_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
- if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- } else {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- }
- if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
- 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- goto done;
- }
- /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
- if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
- || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- const uint16_t *psigs;
- size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
- if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
- || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- }
- if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- done:
- s->certreqs_sent++;
- s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
- return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- }
- static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
- size_t psklen;
- PACKET psk_identity;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- psklen = s->psk_server_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
- s->session->psk_identity,
- psk, sizeof(psk));
- if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- } else if (psklen == 0) {
- /*
- * PSK related to the given identity not found
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- return 0;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
- s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
- if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
- s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
- return 1;
- #else
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- #endif
- }
- static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- size_t outlen;
- PACKET enc_premaster;
- EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
- unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
- return 0;
- }
- /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- enc_premaster = *pkt;
- } else {
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
- if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, rsa, sctx->propq);
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
- * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
- * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
- * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automatically decrypt the
- * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
- * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
- * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
- * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
- * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
- */
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
- (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
- OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
- (unsigned int *)&s->version);
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
- || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
- PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
- PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
- * we double check anyway.
- */
- if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, outlen, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
- return ret;
- }
- static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
- unsigned int i;
- const unsigned char *data;
- EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto err;
- }
- skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
- if (skey == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
- /* We already checked we have enough data */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
- s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
- return ret;
- }
- static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
- EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
- /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto err;
- } else {
- unsigned int i;
- const unsigned char *data;
- /*
- * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
- * ClientKeyExchange message.
- */
- /* Get encoded point length */
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (skey == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
- ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
- s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
- return ret;
- }
- static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- unsigned int i;
- const unsigned char *data;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
- return 0;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- #else
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- #endif
- }
- static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
- unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
- const unsigned char *start;
- size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen;
- unsigned long alg_a;
- GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
- const unsigned char *ptr;
- int ret = 0;
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- /* Get our certificate private key */
- alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
- /*
- * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
- */
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
- if (pk == NULL) {
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
- }
- if (pk == NULL) {
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
- }
- } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
- }
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
- if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
- * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
- * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
- * client certificate for authorization only.
- */
- client_pub_pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
- if (client_pub_pkey) {
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
- /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
- * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
- pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
- if (pKX == NULL
- || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
- || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
- start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
- inlen) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Generate master secret */
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
- NULL) > 0)
- s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
- ret = 1;
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
- return ret;
- #else
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- #endif
- }
- static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
- unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
- const unsigned char *start = NULL;
- size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen = 0;
- int ret = 0;
- int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Get our certificate private key */
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
- s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
- s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
- if (pk == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
- goto err;
- }
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
- if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- goto err;
- }
- inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
- start = PACKET_data(pkt);
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Generate master secret */
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- return ret;
- #else
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- #endif
- }
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- PACKET *pkt)
- {
- unsigned long alg_k;
- alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
- if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- err:
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
- s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
- s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
- #endif
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- WORK_STATE wst)
- {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
- char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
- size_t labellen;
- /*
- * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
- * used.
- */
- memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
- sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
- /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
- labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
- labellen += 1;
- if (SSL_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
- sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- labellen, NULL, 0,
- 0) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- BIO_ctrl(s->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
- }
- }
- #endif
- if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !received_client_cert(s)) {
- /*
- * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
- * the handshake_buffer
- */
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
- } else {
- if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- /*
- * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
- * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
- */
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- }
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
- }
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk = NULL;
- if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
- /* SSLfatal already called */
- goto err;
- }
- if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
- if ((sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)
- && (sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
- SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, peer_rpk) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(sc, ssl_x509err2alert(sc->verify_result),
- SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
- * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
- * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
- * a new RPK (or certificate) is received via post-handshake authentication,
- * as the session may have already gone into the session cache.
- */
- if (sc->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
- if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(sc->session, 0)) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL_SESSION_free(sc->session);
- sc->session = new_sess;
- }
- /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
- X509_free(sc->session->peer);
- sc->session->peer = NULL;
- sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
- sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
- /* Save RPK */
- EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
- sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
- peer_rpk = NULL;
- sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
- /*
- * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
- * message
- */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(sc, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
- if (!ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
- sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
- &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */;
- goto err;
- }
- /* resend session tickets */
- sc->sent_tickets = 0;
- }
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(peer_rpk);
- return ret;
- }
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- PACKET *pkt)
- {
- int i;
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned long l;
- const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
- PACKET spkt, context;
- size_t chainidx;
- SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- /*
- * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
- * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than TLSv1.3
- */
- if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
- s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
- if (s->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
- return tls_process_client_rpk(s, pkt);
- if (s->ext.client_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
- || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
- || (s->pha_context != NULL
- && !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context,
- s->pha_context_len)))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
- if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- certstart = certbytes;
- x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
- if (x == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
- PACKET extensions;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
- NULL, chainidx == 0)
- || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- rawexts, x, chainidx,
- PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
- OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
- }
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- x = NULL;
- }
- if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
- /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
- else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
- SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
- if (i <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
- SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
- * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
- * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
- * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
- * session may have already gone into the session cache.
- */
- if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
- if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = new_sess;
- }
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
- s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
- OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
- s->session->peer_chain = sk;
- sk = NULL;
- /* Ensure there is no RPK */
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
- s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
- /*
- * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
- * message
- */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
- * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
- */
- /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
- sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
- &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- /* Resend session tickets */
- s->sent_tickets = 0;
- }
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- err:
- X509_free(x);
- OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk);
- return ret;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- PACKET tmppkt;
- BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
- if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
- ret = tls_process_client_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- return ret;
- }
- #endif
- CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
- if (cpk == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- /*
- * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
- * for the server Certificate message
- */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- switch (s->ext.server_cert_type) {
- case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
- if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
- if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- default:
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
- CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- int alg = get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc);
- OSSL_COMP_CERT *cc = sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[alg];
- if (!ossl_assert(cc != NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Server can't compress on-demand
- * Use pre-compressed certificate
- */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, cc->orig_len)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cc->data, cc->len)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
- return 0;
- sc->s3.tmp.cert->cert_comp_used++;
- return 1;
- }
- #endif
- static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- uint32_t age_add, unsigned char *tick_nonce)
- {
- uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(s->session->timeout);
- /*
- * Ticket lifetime hint:
- * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
- * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
- * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
- * resumed session (for simplicity).
- */
- #define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (ossl_time_compare(s->session->timeout,
- ossl_seconds2time(ONE_WEEK_SEC)) > 0)
- timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
- } else if (s->hit)
- timeout = 0;
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
- if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- static CON_FUNC_RETURN construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- WPACKET *pkt,
- uint32_t age_add,
- unsigned char *tick_nonce)
- {
- unsigned char *senc = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
- unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
- const unsigned char *const_p;
- int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- size_t hlen;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
- int iv_len;
- CON_FUNC_RETURN ok = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
- SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- /* get session encoding length */
- slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
- /*
- * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
- * long
- */
- if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
- if (senc == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
- if (hctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = senc;
- if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
- */
- const_p = senc;
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL, &const_p, slen_full, sctx->libctx,
- sctx->propq);
- if (sess == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
- if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
- /* shouldn't ever happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- goto err;
- }
- p = senc;
- if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- /*
- * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
- * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
- */
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
- if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
- #else
- if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
- #endif
- {
- int ret = 0;
- if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
- ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
- ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
- 1);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
- else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
- /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
- ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
- ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
- #endif
- if (ret == 0) {
- /*
- * In TLSv1.2 we construct a 0 length ticket. In TLSv1.3 a 0
- * length ticket is not allowed so we abort construction of the
- * ticket
- */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- ok = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
- goto err;
- }
- /* Put timeout and length */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
- return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- }
- if (ret < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
- if (iv_len < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
- sctx->propq);
- if (cipher == NULL) {
- /* Error is already recorded */
- SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
- if (iv_len < 0
- || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
- || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
- tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
- || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
- "SHA256")) {
- EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
- sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
- }
- if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
- /* Output key name */
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
- /* output IV */
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
- || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
- &encdata1)
- /* Encrypt session data */
- || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
- || encdata1 != encdata2
- || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
- || encdata1 + len != encdata2
- || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
- || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
- || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
- (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
- macendoffset - macoffset)
- || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
- || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
- || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
- || macdata1 != macdata2) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- ok = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
- return ok;
- }
- static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- uint32_t age_add,
- unsigned char *tick_nonce)
- {
- if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
- }
- if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
- s->session->session_id_length)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- static void tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
- {
- /*
- * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
- * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
- * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
- * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
- */
- s->sent_tickets++;
- s->next_ticket_nonce++;
- if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
- s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
- }
- CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
- unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
- union {
- unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
- uint32_t age_add;
- } age_add_u;
- CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- age_add_u.age_add = 0;
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- size_t i, hashlen;
- uint64_t nonce;
- static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
- const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
- int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
- /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
- if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
- /*
- * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
- * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
- * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
- */
- if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
- SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
- if (new_sess == NULL) {
- /* SSLfatal already called */
- goto err;
- }
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = new_sess;
- }
- if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
- age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
- nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
- for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
- tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
- nonce >>= 8;
- }
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
- nonce_label,
- sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
- tick_nonce,
- TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
- s->session->master_key,
- hashlen, 1)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
- s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
- ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
- if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
- OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
- if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
- }
- s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
- }
- if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
- tctx->generate_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
- tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
- * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
- * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
- */
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
- && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
- || (s->max_early_data > 0
- && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
- if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- CON_FUNC_RETURN tmpret;
- tmpret = construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
- tick_nonce);
- if (tmpret != CON_FUNC_SUCCESS) {
- if (tmpret == CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND) {
- /* Non-fatal. Abort construction but continue */
- ret = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
- /* We count this as a success so update the counts anwyay */
- tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
- }
- /* else SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- NULL, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
- }
- ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- err:
- return ret;
- }
- /*
- * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
- * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
- */
- int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
- s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /*
- * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
- * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
- */
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- PACKET next_proto, padding;
- size_t next_proto_len;
- /*-
- * The payload looks like:
- * uint8 proto_len;
- * uint8 proto[proto_len];
- * uint8 padding_len;
- * uint8 padding[padding_len];
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
- s->ext.npn_len = 0;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
- return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- }
- #endif
- static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
- WPACKET *pkt)
- {
- if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- NULL, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
- }
- return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
- }
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
- {
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
- && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- /*
- * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
- * a record boundary.
- */
- if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- }
- return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- }
|