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- =pod
- =head1 NAME
- CMS_decrypt - decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure
- =head1 SYNOPSIS
- #include <openssl/cms.h>
- int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
- =head1 DESCRIPTION
- CMS_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a CMS EnvelopedData
- structure. B<pkey> is the private key of the recipient, B<cert> is the
- recipient's certificate, B<out> is a BIO to write the content to and
- B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
- The B<dcont> parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content
- is detached. It will normally be set to NULL.
- =head1 NOTES
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() (or equivalent) should be called before using this
- function or errors about unknown algorithms will occur.
- Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is
- needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS
- structure.
- If B<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however
- is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on
- PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or
- not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt
- the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed
- to) ultimately return a padding error only. If CMS_decrypt() just returned an
- error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could
- use this in a timing attack. If the special flag B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> is set
- then the above behaviour is modified and an error B<is> returned if no
- recipient encrypted key can be decrypted B<without> generating a random
- content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with
- B<extreme caution> especially in automated gateways as it can leave them
- open to attack.
- It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for
- example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure
- in advance using the CMS utility functions such as CMS_set1_pkey(). In this
- case both B<cert> and B<pkey> should be set to NULL.
- To process KEKRecipientInfo types CMS_set1_key() or CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key()
- and CMS_ReceipientInfo_decrypt() should be called before CMS_decrypt() and
- B<cert> and B<pkey> set to NULL.
- The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
- If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
- from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
- returned.
- =head1 RETURN VALUES
- CMS_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
- The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)
- =head1 BUGS
- The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as
- mentioned in CMS_verify() also applies to CMS_decrypt().
- =head1 SEE ALSO
- L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_encrypt(3)|CMS_encrypt(3)>
- =head1 HISTORY
- CMS_decrypt() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.8
- =cut
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