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- =pod
- =head1 NAME
- CMS_verify, CMS_get0_signers - verify a CMS SignedData structure
- =head1 SYNOPSIS
- #include <openssl/cms.h>
- int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
- BIO *indata, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
- STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
- =head1 DESCRIPTION
- CMS_verify() verifies a CMS SignedData structure. B<cms> is the CMS_ContentInfo
- structure to verify. B<certs> is a set of certificates in which to search for
- the signing certificate(s). B<store> is a trusted certificate store used for
- chain verification. B<indata> is the detached content if the content is not
- present in B<cms>. The content is written to B<out> if it is not NULL.
- B<flags> is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify
- operation.
- CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from B<cms>, it must
- be called after a successful CMS_verify() operation.
- =head1 VERIFY PROCESS
- Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.
- Initially some sanity checks are performed on B<cms>. The type of B<cms> must
- be SignedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if
- the content is detached B<indata> cannot be B<NULL>.
- An attempt is made to locate all the signing certificate(s), first looking in
- the B<certs> parameter (if it is not NULL) and then looking in any
- certificates contained in the B<cms> structure itself. If any signing
- certificate cannot be located the operation fails.
- Each signing certificate is chain verified using the B<smimesign> purpose and
- the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates in the message
- are used as untrusted CAs. If CRL checking is enabled in B<store> any internal
- CRLs are used in addition to attempting to look them up in B<store>. If any
- chain verify fails an error code is returned.
- Finally the signed content is read (and written to B<out> is it is not NULL)
- and the signature's checked.
- If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful.
- Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags>
- parameter to change the default verify behaviour.
- If B<CMS_NOINTERN> is set the certificates in the message itself are not
- searched when locating the signing certificate(s). This means that all the
- signing certificates must be in the B<certs> parameter.
- If B<CMS_NOCRL> is set and CRL checking is enabled in B<store> then any
- CRLs in the message itself are ignored.
- If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
- from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
- returned.
- If B<CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY> is set the signing certificates are not
- verified.
- If B<CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY> is set the signed attributes signature is not
- verified.
- If B<CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY> is set then the content digest is not checked.
- =head1 NOTES
- One application of B<CMS_NOINTERN> is to only accept messages signed by
- a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed
- in the B<certs> parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of the
- certificates supplied in B<certs> then the verify will fail because the
- signer cannot be found.
- In some cases the standard techniques for looking up and validating
- certificates are not appropriate: for example an application may wish to
- lookup certificates in a database or perform customised verification. This
- can be achieved by setting and verifying the signers certificates manually
- using the signed data utility functions.
- Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example
- setting B<CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY> will totally disable all content verification
- and any modified content will be considered valid. This combination is however
- useful if one merely wishes to write the content to B<out> and its validity
- is not considered important.
- Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather
- than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the
- signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted
- timestamp).
- =head1 RETURN VALUES
- CMS_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and zero if an error
- occurred.
- CMS_get0_signers() returns all signers or NULL if an error occurred.
- The error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>
- =head1 BUGS
- The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signing certificate,
- this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current B<X509_STORE>
- functionality.
- The lack of single pass processing means that the signed content must all
- be held in memory if it is not detached.
- =head1 SEE ALSO
- L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>
- =head1 COPYRIGHT
- Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
- =cut
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