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CMS_decrypt.pod 3.0 KB

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  1. =pod
  2. =head1 NAME
  3. CMS_decrypt - decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure
  4. =head1 SYNOPSIS
  5. #include <openssl/cms.h>
  6. int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
  7. BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
  8. =head1 DESCRIPTION
  9. CMS_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a CMS EnvelopedData
  10. structure. B<pkey> is the private key of the recipient, B<cert> is the
  11. recipient's certificate, B<out> is a BIO to write the content to and
  12. B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
  13. The B<dcont> parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content
  14. is detached. It will normally be set to NULL.
  15. =head1 NOTES
  16. Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is
  17. needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS
  18. structure.
  19. If B<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however
  20. is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on
  21. PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or
  22. not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt
  23. the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed
  24. to) ultimately return a padding error only. If CMS_decrypt() just returned an
  25. error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could
  26. use this in a timing attack. If the special flag B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> is set
  27. then the above behaviour is modified and an error B<is> returned if no
  28. recipient encrypted key can be decrypted B<without> generating a random
  29. content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with
  30. B<extreme caution> especially in automated gateways as it can leave them
  31. open to attack.
  32. It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for
  33. example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure
  34. in advance using the CMS utility functions such as CMS_set1_pkey(). In this
  35. case both B<cert> and B<pkey> should be set to NULL.
  36. To process KEKRecipientInfo types CMS_set1_key() or CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key()
  37. and CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() should be called before CMS_decrypt() and
  38. B<cert> and B<pkey> set to NULL.
  39. The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
  40. If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
  41. from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
  42. returned.
  43. =head1 RETURN VALUES
  44. CMS_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
  45. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)
  46. =head1 BUGS
  47. The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as
  48. mentioned in CMS_verify() also applies to CMS_decrypt().
  49. =head1 SEE ALSO
  50. L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
  51. =head1 COPYRIGHT
  52. Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  53. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
  54. this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
  55. in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
  56. L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
  57. =cut