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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
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along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
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- $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.15 2002/09/09 19:39:59 guus Exp $
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+ $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.16 2002/09/09 21:24:45 guus Exp $
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*/
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#include "config.h"
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@@ -53,533 +53,544 @@
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#include "system.h"
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-int send_id(connection_t *c)
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+int send_id(connection_t * c)
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{
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- cp();
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- return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_version);
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+ cp();
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+
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+ return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name,
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+ myself->connection->protocol_version);
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}
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-int id_h(connection_t *c)
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+int id_h(connection_t * c)
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{
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- char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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- int bla;
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- cp();
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- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING" %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2)
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ID", c->name, c->hostname);
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- return -1;
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- }
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-
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- /* Check if identity is a valid name */
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-
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- if(check_id(name))
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s"), "ID", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid name");
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- return -1;
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- }
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-
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- /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */
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-
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- if(c->name)
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- {
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- if(strcmp(c->name, name))
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name, c->name);
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- return -1;
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- }
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- }
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- else
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- c->name = xstrdup(name);
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-
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- /* Check if version matches */
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-
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- if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version)
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d"),
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- c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
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- return -1;
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- }
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-
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- if(bypass_security)
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- {
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- if(!c->config_tree)
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- init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
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- c->allow_request = ACK;
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- return send_ack(c);
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- }
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-
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- if(!c->config_tree)
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- {
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- init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
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-
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- bla = read_connection_config(c);
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-
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- if(bla)
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)"), c->hostname, c->name);
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- return -1;
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- }
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- }
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-
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- if(read_rsa_public_key(c))
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- {
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- return -1;
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- }
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-
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- /* Check some options */
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-
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- if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
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- c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
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-
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- if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
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- c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
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-
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- c->allow_request = METAKEY;
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- cp();
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- return send_metakey(c);
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+ char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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+ int bla;
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+
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+ cp();
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+
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+ if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ID", c->name,
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+ c->hostname);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Check if identity is a valid name */
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+
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+ if(check_id(name)) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s"), "ID", c->name,
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+ c->hostname, "invalid name");
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */
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+
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+ if(c->name) {
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+ if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name,
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+ c->name);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+ } else
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+ c->name = xstrdup(name);
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+
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+ /* Check if version matches */
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+
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+ if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d"),
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+ c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ if(bypass_security) {
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+ if(!c->config_tree)
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+ init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
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+ c->allow_request = ACK;
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+ return send_ack(c);
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+ }
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+
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+ if(!c->config_tree) {
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+ init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
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+
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+ bla = read_connection_config(c);
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+
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+ if(bla) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)"), c->hostname,
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+ c->name);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ if(read_rsa_public_key(c)) {
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Check some options */
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+
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+ if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
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+ c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
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+
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+ if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
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+ c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
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+
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+ c->allow_request = METAKEY;
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+
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+ return send_metakey(c);
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}
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-int send_metakey(connection_t *c)
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+int send_metakey(connection_t * c)
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{
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- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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- int len, x;
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- cp();
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- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
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-
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- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
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-
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- if(!c->outkey)
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- c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
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-
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- if(!c->outctx)
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- c->outctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->outctx));
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- cp();
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- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
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-
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- RAND_bytes(c->outkey, len);
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-
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- /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
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- By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
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-
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- 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
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-
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- Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
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- This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
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- This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
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- */
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-
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- c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
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-
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- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
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- {
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- bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
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- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
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- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
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- }
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-
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- /* Encrypt the random data
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-
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- We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
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- This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
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- with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
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- */
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-
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- if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len)
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), c->name, c->hostname);
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- return -1;
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- }
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- cp();
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- /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
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-
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- bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
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- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
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-
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- /* Send the meta key */
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-
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- x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
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- c->outcipher?c->outcipher->nid:0, c->outdigest?c->outdigest->type:0,
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- c->outmaclength, c->outcompression, buffer);
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-
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- /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
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-
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- if(c->outcipher)
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- {
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- EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
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- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
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- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len - c->outcipher->iv_len);
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-
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- c->status.encryptout = 1;
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- }
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- cp();
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- return x;
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+ char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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+ int len, x;
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+
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+ cp();
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+
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+ len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
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+
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+ /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
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+
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+ if(!c->outkey)
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+ c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
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+
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+ if(!c->outctx)
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+ c->outctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->outctx));
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+ cp();
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+ /* Copy random data to the buffer */
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+
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+ RAND_bytes(c->outkey, len);
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+
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+ /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
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+ By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
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+
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+ 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
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+
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+ Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
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+ This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
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+ This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
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+ */
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+
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+ c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
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+
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+ if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
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+ bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
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+ buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
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+ syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s"),
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+ buffer);
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Encrypt the random data
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+
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+ We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
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+ This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
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+ with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
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+ */
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+
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+ if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
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+ c->name, c->hostname);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
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+
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+ bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
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+ buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
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+
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+ /* Send the meta key */
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+
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+ x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
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+ c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0,
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+ c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength,
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+ c->outcompression, buffer);
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+
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+ /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
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+
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+ if(c->outcipher) {
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+ EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
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+ c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
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+ c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
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+ c->outcipher->iv_len);
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+
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+ c->status.encryptout = 1;
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+ }
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+
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+ return x;
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}
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-int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
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+int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
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{
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- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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- int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
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- int len;
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- cp();
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- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d "MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5)
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
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- return -1;
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- }
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- cp();
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- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
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-
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- /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
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-
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- if(strlen(buffer) != len*2)
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
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- return -1;
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- }
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-
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- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
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- cp();
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- if(!c->inkey)
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- c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
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-
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- if(!c->inctx)
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- c->inctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->inctx));
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-
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- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
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- cp();
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- hex2bin(buffer,buffer,len);
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-
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- /* Decrypt the meta key */
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- cp();
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- if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) /* See challenge() */
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), c->name, c->hostname);
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- return -1;
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- }
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-
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- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
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- {
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- bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
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- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
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- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
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- }
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-
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- /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
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- cp();
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- /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
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-
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- if(cipher)
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- {
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- c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
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- if(!c->incipher)
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- {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname);
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- return -1;
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+ char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
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+ int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
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+ int len;
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+
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+ cp();
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+
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+ if(sscanf
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+ (c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength,
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+ &compression, buffer) != 5) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name,
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+ c->hostname);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
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+
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+ /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
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+
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+ if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
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+ c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
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|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(!c->inkey)
|
|
|
+ c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(!c->inctx)
|
|
|
+ c->inctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->inctx));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Decrypt the meta key */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
|
|
|
+ c->name, c->hostname);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
|
|
|
+ bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
|
|
|
+ buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"),
|
|
|
+ buffer);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
|
|
|
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
|
|
|
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len - c->incipher->iv_len);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- c->status.decryptin = 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- c->incipher = NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- c->inmaclength = maclength;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if(digest)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
|
|
|
- if(!c->indigest)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
+ /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(cipher) {
|
|
|
+ c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(!c->incipher) {
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
|
|
|
+ c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
|
|
|
+ c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
|
|
|
+ c->incipher->iv_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ c->status.decryptin = 1;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ c->incipher = NULL;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ c->inmaclength = maclength;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(digest) {
|
|
|
+ c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(!c->indigest) {
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ c->indigest = NULL;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- c->indigest = NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- c->incompression = compression;
|
|
|
+ c->incompression = compression;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- return send_challenge(c);
|
|
|
+ return send_challenge(c);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-int send_challenge(connection_t *c)
|
|
|
+int send_challenge(connection_t * c)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
- int len, x;
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
|
|
|
+ char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
+ int len, x;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
|
|
|
+ cp();
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
|
|
|
+ /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if(!c->hischallenge)
|
|
|
- c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len);
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
|
|
|
+ len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- RAND_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
|
|
|
+ /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- /* Convert to hex */
|
|
|
+ if(!c->hischallenge)
|
|
|
+ c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
|
|
|
- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
|
|
|
+ /* Copy random data to the buffer */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- /* Send the challenge */
|
|
|
+ RAND_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- x = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- return x;
|
|
|
+ /* Convert to hex */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
|
|
|
+ buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Send the challenge */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ x = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return x;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-int challenge_h(connection_t *c)
|
|
|
+int challenge_h(connection_t * c)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
- int len;
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
+ int len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
|
|
|
+ cp();
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
|
|
|
+ if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if(strlen(buffer) != len*2)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
|
|
|
+ /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if(!c->mychallenge)
|
|
|
- c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len);
|
|
|
+ if(!c->mychallenge)
|
|
|
+ c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
|
|
|
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- hex2bin(buffer,c->mychallenge,len);
|
|
|
+ hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
|
|
|
+ c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- return send_chal_reply(c);
|
|
|
+ /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return send_chal_reply(c);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-int send_chal_reply(connection_t *c)
|
|
|
+int send_chal_reply(connection_t * c)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2+1];
|
|
|
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
|
|
|
+ char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
|
|
|
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ cp();
|
|
|
|
|
|
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest);
|
|
|
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key));
|
|
|
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL);
|
|
|
+ /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
|
|
|
+ EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest);
|
|
|
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge,
|
|
|
+ RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key));
|
|
|
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- bin2hex(hash,hash,c->indigest->md_size);
|
|
|
- hash[c->indigest->md_size*2] = '\0';
|
|
|
+ /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Send the reply */
|
|
|
+ bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size);
|
|
|
+ hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
|
|
|
+ /* Send the reply */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-int chal_reply_h(connection_t *c)
|
|
|
+int chal_reply_h(connection_t * c)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
- char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, c->hostname);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size*2)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply length"));
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Convert the hash to binary format */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest);
|
|
|
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key));
|
|
|
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size))
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply"));
|
|
|
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
|
|
- hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH*2] = '\0';
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Expected challenge reply: %s"), hishash);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Identity has now been positively verified.
|
|
|
- Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- c->allow_request = ACK;
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- return send_ack(c);
|
|
|
+ char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
+ char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ cp();
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) {
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply length"));
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Convert the hash to binary format */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest);
|
|
|
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key));
|
|
|
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply"));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
|
|
|
+ bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
|
|
+ hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2] = '\0';
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Expected challenge reply: %s"), hishash);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Identity has now been positively verified.
|
|
|
+ Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ c->allow_request = ACK;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return send_ack(c);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-int send_ack(connection_t *c)
|
|
|
+int send_ack(connection_t * c)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
|
|
|
- to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- int x;
|
|
|
- struct timeval now;
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- /* Estimate weight */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
|
|
|
- c->estimated_weight = (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec - c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
|
|
|
- x = send_request(c, "%d %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, c->options);
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- return x;
|
|
|
+ /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
|
|
|
+ to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ int x;
|
|
|
+ struct timeval now;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ cp();
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Estimate weight */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
|
|
|
+ c->estimated_weight =
|
|
|
+ (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec -
|
|
|
+ c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
|
|
|
+ x = send_request(c, "%d %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight,
|
|
|
+ c->options);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return x;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-void send_everything(connection_t *c)
|
|
|
+void send_everything(connection_t * c)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- avl_node_t *node, *node2;
|
|
|
- node_t *n;
|
|
|
- subnet_t *s;
|
|
|
- edge_t *e;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Send all known subnets and edges */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- n = (node_t *)node->data;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- s = (subnet_t *)node2->data;
|
|
|
- send_add_subnet(c, s);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for(node2 = n->edge_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- e = (edge_t *)node2->data;
|
|
|
- send_add_edge(c, e);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ avl_node_t *node, *node2;
|
|
|
+ node_t *n;
|
|
|
+ subnet_t *s;
|
|
|
+ edge_t *e;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Send all known subnets and edges */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
|
|
|
+ n = (node_t *) node->data;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
|
|
|
+ s = (subnet_t *) node2->data;
|
|
|
+ send_add_subnet(c, s);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ for(node2 = n->edge_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
|
|
|
+ e = (edge_t *) node2->data;
|
|
|
+ send_add_edge(c, e);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-int ack_h(connection_t *c)
|
|
|
+int ack_h(connection_t * c)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
- char *hisaddress, *dummy;
|
|
|
- int weight;
|
|
|
- long int options;
|
|
|
- node_t *n;
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING" %d %lx", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- n = lookup_node(c->name);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if(!n)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- n = new_node();
|
|
|
- n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
|
|
|
- node_add(n);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if(n->connection)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
|
|
|
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"), n->name, n->hostname);
|
|
|
- terminate_connection(n->connection, 0);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- n->connection = c;
|
|
|
- c->node = n;
|
|
|
- c->options |= options;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Activate this connection */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- c->allow_request = ALL;
|
|
|
- c->status.active = 1;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
|
|
|
- syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), c->name, c->hostname);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Send him everything we know */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- send_everything(c);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Create an edge_t for this connection */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- c->edge = new_edge();
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- c->edge->from = myself;
|
|
|
- c->edge->to = n;
|
|
|
- sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, &dummy);
|
|
|
- c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
|
|
|
- free(hisaddress);
|
|
|
- free(dummy);
|
|
|
- c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
|
|
|
- c->edge->connection = c;
|
|
|
- c->edge->options = c->options;
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- edge_add(c->edge);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- /* Notify everyone of the new edge */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- send_add_edge(broadcast, c->edge);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- graph();
|
|
|
- cp();
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
+ char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
+ char *hisaddress, *dummy;
|
|
|
+ int weight;
|
|
|
+ long int options;
|
|
|
+ node_t *n;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ cp();
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(sscanf
|
|
|
+ (c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %lx", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ACK", c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ n = lookup_node(c->name);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(!n) {
|
|
|
+ n = new_node();
|
|
|
+ n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
|
|
|
+ node_add(n);
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ if(n->connection) {
|
|
|
+ /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
|
|
|
+ if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"),
|
|
|
+ n->name, n->hostname);
|
|
|
+ terminate_connection(n->connection, 0);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ n->connection = c;
|
|
|
+ c->node = n;
|
|
|
+ c->options |= options;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Activate this connection */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ c->allow_request = ALL;
|
|
|
+ c->status.active = 1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
|
|
|
+ syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), c->name,
|
|
|
+ c->hostname);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Send him everything we know */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ send_everything(c);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Create an edge_t for this connection */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ c->edge = new_edge();
|
|
|
+ cp();
|
|
|
+ c->edge->from = myself;
|
|
|
+ c->edge->to = n;
|
|
|
+ sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, &dummy);
|
|
|
+ c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
|
|
|
+ free(hisaddress);
|
|
|
+ free(dummy);
|
|
|
+ c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
|
|
|
+ c->edge->connection = c;
|
|
|
+ c->edge->options = c->options;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ edge_add(c->edge);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Notify everyone of the new edge */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ send_add_edge(broadcast, c->edge);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ graph();
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|