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@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ The Switch Header may be followed by three different types of packets:
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The CryptoAuth handshake packet contains the Session Handle (that should
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be used by the recipient to prefix CryptoAuth data packets sent after that),
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eventually followed by a Switch Data Header.
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-* Otherwise, these first four bytes are a Session Handle, which the receipient
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+* Otherwise, these first four bytes are a Session Handle, which the recipient
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of these packet chose earlier to identify the emitted. They are followed
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by a CryptoAuth Data Packet, containing a Switch Data Header.
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@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ Possible keys in a router message include:
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* `p` (integer): protocol version. Matches the cjdns version.
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* `tar` (byte string): the target address. If provided, contains an address
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the sender wants to reach.
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-* `txid` (byte string): transaction id. Opaque value choosen by senders of
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+* `txid` (byte string): transaction id. Opaque value chosen by senders of
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queries, which must be used in responses.
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The serialization of each item of the list of nodes `n` is:
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@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ assuming they are not “too late” and are not replays.
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To do that, it stores a 64-bit bitfield, with a bit for each of the 64
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nonces before the highest nonce received so far.
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Every time a packet is received with a nonce between `highestnonce - 64`
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-(excluded) and `highestnonce` (included), it substracts the packet's nonce
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+(excluded) and `highestnonce` (included), it subtracts the packet's nonce
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to the highest nonce, giving a number n, and looks at the n-th bit
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of the bitfield. If it is one, the packet is a replay and is dropped.
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If it is zero, the packet passes, and the bit is set to one.
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@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ of the hash of the password (counting indexes from 1). This is used as a sort
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of username so that the other end knows which password to try using in the
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handshake.
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-AuthType Two is prefered to this method because it may be harder to crack
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+AuthType Two is preferred to this method because it may be harder to crack
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(does not leak bytes of the value computing from the password).
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##### AuthType Two
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