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- From 4e96a4be685c9e4445f6ee79ad0b36b9119b502a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
- From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
- Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 23:25:04 +0000
- Subject: Fix remote buffer overflow CERT VU#434904
- The problem is in the sort_rrset() function and allows a remote
- attacker to overwrite memory. Any dnsmasq instance with DNSSEC
- enabled is vulnerable.
- ---
- CHANGELOG | 7 +-
- src/dnssec.c | 273 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
- 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-)
- --- a/CHANGELOG
- +++ b/CHANGELOG
- @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
- + Fix a remote buffer overflow problem in the DNSSEC code. Any
- + dnsmasq with DNSSEC compiled in and enabled is vulnerable to this,
- + referenced by CERT VU#434904.
- +
- +
- +>>>>>>> Fix remote buffer overflow CERT VU#434904
- version 2.81
- Impove cache behaviour for TCP connections. For ease of
- implementaion, dnsmasq has always forked a new process to handle
- --- a/src/dnssec.c
- +++ b/src/dnssec.c
- @@ -222,138 +222,147 @@ static int check_date_range(u32 date_sta
- && serial_compare_32(curtime, date_end) == SERIAL_LT;
- }
-
- -/* Return bytes of canonicalised rdata, when the return value is zero, the remaining
- - data, pointed to by *p, should be used raw. */
- -static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *end, char *buff, int bufflen,
- - unsigned char **p, u16 **desc)
- +/* Return bytes of canonicalised rrdata one by one.
- + Init state->ip with the RR, and state->end with the end of same.
- + Init state->op to NULL.
- + Init state->desc to RR descriptor.
- + Init state->buff with a MAXDNAME * 2 buffer.
- +
- + After each call which returns 1, state->op points to the next byte of data.
- + On returning 0, the end has been reached.
- +*/
- +struct rdata_state {
- + u16 *desc;
- + size_t c;
- + unsigned char *end, *ip, *op;
- + char *buff;
- +};
- +
- +static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, struct rdata_state *state)
- {
- - int d = **desc;
- + int d;
-
- - /* No more data needs mangling */
- - if (d == (u16)-1)
- + if (state->op && state->c != 1)
- {
- - /* If there's more data than we have space for, just return what fits,
- - we'll get called again for more chunks */
- - if (end - *p > bufflen)
- - {
- - memcpy(buff, *p, bufflen);
- - *p += bufflen;
- - return bufflen;
- - }
- -
- - return 0;
- + state->op++;
- + state->c--;
- + return 1;
- }
- -
- - (*desc)++;
- -
- - if (d == 0 && extract_name(header, plen, p, buff, 1, 0))
- - /* domain-name, canonicalise */
- - return to_wire(buff);
- - else
- - {
- - /* plain data preceding a domain-name, don't run off the end of the data */
- - if ((end - *p) < d)
- - d = end - *p;
- +
- + while (1)
- + {
- + d = *(state->desc);
-
- - if (d != 0)
- + if (d == (u16)-1)
- {
- - memcpy(buff, *p, d);
- - *p += d;
- + /* all the bytes to the end. */
- + if ((state->c = state->end - state->ip) != 0)
- + {
- + state->op = state->ip;
- + state->ip = state->end;;
- + }
- + else
- + return 0;
- + }
- + else
- + {
- + state->desc++;
- +
- + if (d == (u16)0)
- + {
- + /* domain-name, canonicalise */
- + int len;
- +
- + if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, 1, 0) ||
- + (len = to_wire(state->buff)) == 0)
- + continue;
- +
- + state->c = len;
- + state->op = (unsigned char *)state->buff;
- + }
- + else
- + {
- + /* plain data preceding a domain-name, don't run off the end of the data */
- + if ((state->end - state->ip) < d)
- + d = state->end - state->ip;
- +
- + if (d == 0)
- + continue;
- +
- + state->op = state->ip;
- + state->c = d;
- + state->ip += d;
- + }
- }
-
- - return d;
- + return 1;
- }
- }
-
- -/* Bubble sort the RRset into the canonical order.
- - Note that the byte-streams from two RRs may get unsynced: consider
- - RRs which have two domain-names at the start and then other data.
- - The domain-names may have different lengths in each RR, but sort equal
- -
- - ------------
- - |abcde|fghi|
- - ------------
- - |abcd|efghi|
- - ------------
- -
- - leaving the following bytes as deciding the order. Hence the nasty left1 and left2 variables.
- -*/
- +/* Bubble sort the RRset into the canonical order. */
-
- static int sort_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, u16 *rr_desc, int rrsetidx,
- unsigned char **rrset, char *buff1, char *buff2)
- {
- - int swap, quit, i, j;
- + int swap, i, j;
-
- do
- {
- for (swap = 0, i = 0; i < rrsetidx-1; i++)
- {
- - int rdlen1, rdlen2, left1, left2, len1, len2, len, rc;
- - u16 *dp1, *dp2;
- - unsigned char *end1, *end2;
- + int rdlen1, rdlen2;
- + struct rdata_state state1, state2;
- +
- /* Note that these have been determined to be OK previously,
- so we don't need to check for NULL return here. */
- - unsigned char *p1 = skip_name(rrset[i], header, plen, 10);
- - unsigned char *p2 = skip_name(rrset[i+1], header, plen, 10);
- -
- - p1 += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
- - GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
- - end1 = p1 + rdlen1;
- -
- - p2 += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
- - GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
- - end2 = p2 + rdlen2;
- -
- - dp1 = dp2 = rr_desc;
- -
- - for (quit = 0, left1 = 0, left2 = 0, len1 = 0, len2 = 0; !quit;)
- + state1.ip = skip_name(rrset[i], header, plen, 10);
- + state2.ip = skip_name(rrset[i+1], header, plen, 10);
- + state1.op = state2.op = NULL;
- + state1.buff = buff1;
- + state2.buff = buff2;
- + state1.desc = state2.desc = rr_desc;
- +
- + state1.ip += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
- + GETSHORT(rdlen1, state1.ip);
- + if (!CHECK_LEN(header, state1.ip, plen, rdlen1))
- + return rrsetidx; /* short packet */
- + state1.end = state1.ip + rdlen1;
- +
- + state2.ip += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
- + GETSHORT(rdlen2, state2.ip);
- + if (!CHECK_LEN(header, state2.ip, plen, rdlen2))
- + return rrsetidx; /* short packet */
- + state2.end = state2.ip + rdlen2;
- +
- + while (1)
- {
- - if (left1 != 0)
- - memmove(buff1, buff1 + len1 - left1, left1);
- -
- - if ((len1 = get_rdata(header, plen, end1, buff1 + left1, (MAXDNAME * 2) - left1, &p1, &dp1)) == 0)
- - {
- - quit = 1;
- - len1 = end1 - p1;
- - memcpy(buff1 + left1, p1, len1);
- - }
- - len1 += left1;
- -
- - if (left2 != 0)
- - memmove(buff2, buff2 + len2 - left2, left2);
- -
- - if ((len2 = get_rdata(header, plen, end2, buff2 + left2, (MAXDNAME *2) - left2, &p2, &dp2)) == 0)
- - {
- - quit = 1;
- - len2 = end2 - p2;
- - memcpy(buff2 + left2, p2, len2);
- - }
- - len2 += left2;
- -
- - if (len1 > len2)
- - left1 = len1 - len2, left2 = 0, len = len2;
- - else
- - left2 = len2 - len1, left1 = 0, len = len1;
- + int ok1, ok2;
-
- - rc = (len == 0) ? 0 : memcmp(buff1, buff2, len);
- -
- - if (rc > 0 || (rc == 0 && quit && len1 > len2))
- - {
- - unsigned char *tmp = rrset[i+1];
- - rrset[i+1] = rrset[i];
- - rrset[i] = tmp;
- - swap = quit = 1;
- - }
- - else if (rc == 0 && quit && len1 == len2)
- + ok1 = get_rdata(header, plen, &state1);
- + ok2 = get_rdata(header, plen, &state2);
- +
- + if (!ok1 && !ok2)
- {
- /* Two RRs are equal, remove one copy. RFC 4034, para 6.3 */
- for (j = i+1; j < rrsetidx-1; j++)
- rrset[j] = rrset[j+1];
- rrsetidx--;
- i--;
- + break;
- + }
- + else if (ok1 && (!ok2 || *state1.op > *state2.op))
- + {
- + unsigned char *tmp = rrset[i+1];
- + rrset[i+1] = rrset[i];
- + rrset[i] = tmp;
- + swap = 1;
- + break;
- }
- - else if (rc < 0)
- - quit = 1;
- + else if (ok2 && (!ok1 || *state2.op > *state1.op))
- + break;
- +
- + /* arrive here when bytes are equal, go round the loop again
- + and compare the next ones. */
- }
- }
- } while (swap);
- @@ -549,15 +558,18 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
- wire_len = to_wire(keyname);
- hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char*)keyname);
- from_wire(keyname);
- +
- +#define RRBUFLEN 300 /* Most RRs are smaller than this. */
-
- for (i = 0; i < rrsetidx; ++i)
- {
- - int seg;
- - unsigned char *end, *cp;
- - u16 len, *dp;
- + int j;
- + struct rdata_state state;
- + u16 len;
- + unsigned char rrbuf[RRBUFLEN];
-
- p = rrset[i];
- -
- +
- if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 10))
- return STAT_BOGUS;
-
- @@ -566,12 +578,11 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
- /* if more labels than in RRsig name, hash *.<no labels in rrsig labels field> 4035 5.3.2 */
- if (labels < name_labels)
- {
- - int k;
- - for (k = name_labels - labels; k != 0; k--)
- + for (j = name_labels - labels; j != 0; j--)
- {
- while (*name_start != '.' && *name_start != 0)
- name_start++;
- - if (k != 1 && *name_start == '.')
- + if (j != 1 && *name_start == '.')
- name_start++;
- }
-
- @@ -592,24 +603,44 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
- if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
- return STAT_BOGUS;
-
- - end = p + rdlen;
- -
- - /* canonicalise rdata and calculate length of same, use name buffer as workspace.
- - Note that name buffer is twice MAXDNAME long in DNSSEC mode. */
- - cp = p;
- - dp = rr_desc;
- - for (len = 0; (seg = get_rdata(header, plen, end, name, MAXDNAME * 2, &cp, &dp)) != 0; len += seg);
- - len += end - cp;
- - len = htons(len);
- + /* canonicalise rdata and calculate length of same, use
- + name buffer as workspace for get_rdata. */
- + state.ip = p;
- + state.op = NULL;
- + state.desc = rr_desc;
- + state.buff = name;
- + state.end = p + rdlen;
- +
- + for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++)
- + if (j < RRBUFLEN)
- + rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
- +
- + len = htons((u16)j);
- hash->update(ctx, 2, (unsigned char *)&len);
- +
- + /* If the RR is shorter than RRBUFLEN (most of them, in practice)
- + then we can just digest it now. If it exceeds RRBUFLEN we have to
- + go back to the start and do it in chunks. */
- + if (j >= RRBUFLEN)
- + {
- + state.ip = p;
- + state.op = NULL;
- + state.desc = rr_desc;
- +
- + for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++)
- + {
- + rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
- +
- + if (j == RRBUFLEN - 1)
- + {
- + hash->update(ctx, RRBUFLEN, rrbuf);
- + j = -1;
- + }
- + }
- + }
-
- - /* Now canonicalise again and digest. */
- - cp = p;
- - dp = rr_desc;
- - while ((seg = get_rdata(header, plen, end, name, MAXDNAME * 2, &cp, &dp)))
- - hash->update(ctx, seg, (unsigned char *)name);
- - if (cp != end)
- - hash->update(ctx, end - cp, cp);
- + if (j != 0)
- + hash->update(ctx, j, rrbuf);
- }
-
- hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
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